

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/5/68

FROM :

SAC, NEW YORK (100-124637) (Sub C)

R. Johnson

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

Re NY letters to Bureau, 4/23/68 and 5/24/68.

[redacted] attempted to contact [redacted] while in Chicago, Illinois, the last week end in May, 1968. Unfortunately, [redacted] was not available but the source left word with their [redacted] that he sought contact.

After returning to New York City, the source received tour information, brochures and offers to do business from Afton Tours - a tour agency which handles Soviet personnel, American Communists and other left-oriented individuals and groups. The source had never done business with or communicated with that agency before and feels certain the name of his firm was recommended to Afton by [redacted] who had boasted to [redacted] of his access to firms like Afton.

[redacted] has taken the preliminary steps necessary to organizing a Middle East - Soviet tour which would be handles by his firm, doing business as [redacted] through Afton as their Soviet representative. As is usual in such tour arrangement the agency is permitted one free guide for each 15 travelers. The source plans to offer such a spot to [redacted] as a means of furthering their business friendship. He further suggested that as a preliminary to offering [redacted] the trip he would find something "wrong" with Afton planning which would cause him to logically call on [redacted] for helpful intervention with Afton.

61-904
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

EX-110

REC-38

100-428091-7045

RJQ:jmm
(3)

4 JUL 10 1968



98 JUL 16 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-124637

The Bureau will be kept advised of progress in this matter.

The first New York letter referred to above concerns the re-development of former [redacted] This former source, like [redacted] is being developed for ultimate utilization in the SOLO Program. The requisite re-investigation has been concluded and the results have been submitted to the Bureau for approval.

b7D

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
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Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: July 8, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 7/8/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:trs *pe*
(7)

EX-110

REC-38

100-428091-7046
4 JUL 10 1968

98 JUL 16 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/1/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
TS-C

ReNYlet, 6/25/68

On 7/1/68, NY 694-S* furnished the following information:

On 6/29/68, pursuant to previously made arrangements with the Soviets, NY 694-S* went to a Westchester rendezvous where he met NIKOLAI TALANOV, his current Soviet contact, who was accompanied by a former contact of the informant's, VLADIMIR A. CHUCHUKIN, who, as the Bureau is aware, recently returned to the US. CHUCHUKIN was the Soviet contact of the informant during 1964 and during the early part of 1965. Upon arrival at the rendezvous, CHUCHUKIN leaped from the Soviet automobile, embraced NY 694-S*, and pinched the latter's cheeks. He stated that he was most happy to see the informant again and said, "From now on - it's you and me". He handed the informant two shopping bags containing \$530,000.00 in 100, 50, 20 and 10 dollar bills.

TALANOV, who was driving the Soviet automobile, extended his hand to NY 694-S*, and said, "This is good-bye". He handed the informant a small piece of paper containing a coded message, the plain text of which was as follows:

- 4-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
- (1-105-40818) (TALANOV)
- (1-105-94406) (CHUCHUKIN)
- 1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
- 1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
- 1-NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
- 1-NY 105-45740 (CHUCHUKIN)
- 1-NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:eac
(10)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 13 1968

REC 13

100-428091-704

EX-105

15 JUL 11 1968

50
MAIL RM.
SPEC

105-40818
105-94406

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NY 100-134637

"Money acknowledgement tonight at 11:45 p.m. - 355-9521 or 355-8557. If unavailable, then tomorrow at 10:45 a.m. - 244-9999 or 695-9423.

"Drops Tara, Vanie, Willa, Zenia, Zoola - O.K. Please, don't use drops Sandy, Urza, Yama.

"Next personal rendezvous, Armstrong. Drop Nicky next.

"July - August: 473-8751 or 473-8707.

"September - October: 563-9523 or 563-9419.

"November - December: 563-8183 or 563-8931.

"\$530,000.00. \$30,000.00 for Jessica Smith."

NY 694-S* stated that, although TALANOV bid him good-bye, his words would not necessarily mean that he was leaving the country. The informant, however, in view of past experience with the Soviets, is of the opinion that TALANOV did intend to convey the impression that he was leaving the USA to return to the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~/NO. FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-17-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC-15/ 00-428091-7048

July 9, 1968

BY LIAISON

ST-100

~~SOVIET REPORT ON VIETNAM~~

The leaders of the Communist Party, USA, have received a report on Soviet efforts to influence North Vietnam and the situation in Vietnam. In essence, this report reads as follows:

The Soviet Union has advised North Vietnam to stop their purposeless rocket attacks on Saigon and expects these attacks to cease. During a secret trip to the Soviet Union in April, 1968, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was reported to have been convinced that a military victory in Vietnam was impossible for either side. The Soviets were reported to have convinced North Vietnam to pull back from Khesanh in order to permit the United States to withdraw without loss of face.

The Soviets believe they have convinced the North Vietnamese to begin to negotiate seriously in their peace talks with the United States in Paris, France. The Soviets state that North Vietnam will seek, but will not insist upon, the role of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam as part of the price for a peace settlement. It was reported that North Vietnam is willing to cooperate in a coalition government including some individuals participating in the current Government of South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese officials have learned that Communist China is not really helping them but that the Chinese communists are "ready to fight to the last Vietnamese," and, therefore, Soviet influence is increasing in North Vietnam.

100-428091

RCP:pab
(13)

~~SECRET~~/NO. FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson _____
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Callahan _____
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Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
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Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 JUL 23 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SOVIET REPORT ON VIETNAM

President Charles De Gaulle of France has promised North Vietnam an immediate loan of \$20,000,000 after the peace settlement is concluded with the United States provided that North Vietnam does not jeopardize French interests in Vietnam.

It should be noted that the information reported above was furnished the Communist Party, USA, as the line it is to follow and project in this country as part of communist efforts to influence United States policies in line with Soviet objectives. Therefore, it may or may not represent actual Soviet policy.

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from New York letter dated 7/3/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C."

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/8/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security-Communist," prepared by RCP:pab.

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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Sullivan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 8, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of a Soviet report on Vietnam furnished the Communist Party, USA, and recommends dissemination to the White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

BACKGROUND:

While abroad on Solo Mission 27, CG 5824-S* received a report on Vietnam from A. S. Belyakov, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Government of the Soviet Union. This report, in essence, was as follows:

The Soviets have told the North Vietnamese to stop their purposeless rocket attacks on Saigon. During a secret trip to the Soviet Union in April, 1968, the Prime Minister of North Vietnam was reported to have been convinced that a military victory in Vietnam was impossible for either side. The Soviets also claim to have convinced the North Vietnamese to pull back from Khesanh to permit the United States to withdraw without loss of face.

Enclosure *sent* 7-9-68
100-428091

REC-15

100-428091-7048

RCP:pab
(6)

8 JUL 11 1968

15 JUL 11 1968

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC.

CONTINUED ON OVER

SPEC. DEL. RM.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: Solo
100-428091

The Soviets believe they have convinced the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously in their peace talks with the United States in Paris, France. While North Vietnam will seek, it will not insist upon, the role of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam as part of the price for a peace settlement. North Vietnam is willing to cooperate in a coalition government including some individuals participating in the current Government of South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese officials have learned that Communist China is not really helping them but that the Chinese communists are "ready to fight to the last Vietnamese," and, therefore, Soviet influence is increasing in North Vietnam.

It was also stated that President Charles De Gaulle of France has promised North Vietnamese an immediate loan of \$20,000,000 after the peace settlement is concluded if North Vietnam does not jeopardize French interests in Vietnam.

Attached is a summary of this information for Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that attached summary be approved and sent.

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow]

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-17-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

BY LIAISON

July 9, 1968

REC-15 100-428091-7049

ST-100

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the latter part of June, 1968, the leadership of the Communist Party, USA, received an inquiry from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was as follows:

The Soviets have noted that Senator Eugene McCarthy had indicated in press releases that he is interested in visiting the Soviet Union. The Soviets expressed the opinion that while Senator McCarthy cannot be elected President of the United States he may become an important man in the political arena in the United States because of the role he has played in the 1968 election campaign. The Soviets fear that if they issue an invitation to Senator McCarthy to visit the Soviet Union, it may antagonize the individual who is elected President of the United States in 1968, regardless of his political affiliation.

The Soviets indicated that they cannot predict how former Vice President Richard M. Nixon will react if he wins the election, but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has taken the position that it "has not given up yet" on Nixon.

Leaders of the Soviet Union do not agree with the theory that President Lyndon B. Johnson removed himself from the 1968 political campaign as a maneuver so that he could be drafted. The official Soviet view, at this time, is that President Johnson is "not such a bad guy after all."

100-428091

✓ ~~SECRET~~ / NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

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RCP:pab
(12)

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 JUL 23 1968

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Soviets requested the Communist Party, USA, to furnish an opinion as to the advisability of the Soviet Government issuing Senator McCarthy an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, has replied to the Soviet inquiry by stating that it would be "stupid" for Senator McCarthy to visit the Soviet Union. However, Hall added that if Senator McCarthy should request such an invitation from the Soviets, it should be given him.

It should be noted that the information reported above was furnished the Communist Party, USA, as the line it is to follow and project in this country as part of communist efforts to influence United States policies in line with Soviet objectives. Therefore, it may or may not represent actual Soviet policy.

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/8/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security-Communist," prepared by RCP:pab.

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from New York letter dated 7/8/68 captioned "Solo, IS-C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: July 8, 1968

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Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum recommends dissemination of information regarding Soviet concern over issuing an invitation to Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn) to visit the Soviet Union to the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 27, CG 5824-S* conferred with A. S. Belyakov, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Government of the Soviet Union. The informant learned the following:

The Soviets have noticed that in press releases Senator McCarthy has expressed an interest to visit the Soviet Union. Up to this time McCarthy has not made a specific request for an invitation. While believing McCarthy will not be elected President of the United States in 1968, the Soviets believe he may become an important political figure. However, they feel that if they issue McCarthy an

Enclosure *Per 7-8-68*

100-428091

RCP:pab
(6)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC-15

100-428091-7049
15 JUL 11 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

5
SPECIAL MAIL RM.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: Solo
100-428091

invitation to visit the Soviet Union, it may antagonize whomever is elected. The Soviets cannot predict what former Vice President Richard M. Nixon will do if elected President of the United States, but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "has not given up yet" on Nixon.

Leaders of the Soviet Union do not subscribe to the theory that President Lyndon B. Johnson withdrew from the campaign in order that he could be drafted. The official view, at this time, is that President Johnson is "not such a bad guy after all."

The Communist Party, USA, was requested to furnish the Soviets with an opinion as to the advisability of the Soviets issuing an invitation to McCarthy to visit the Soviet Union. Gus Hall, leader of the Party, answered the inquiry by stating that it would be "stupid" for McCarthy to visit the Soviet Union, but if he asked for an invitation, the Soviets should give him one.

Attached is a summary of this information for Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that attached summary be approved and sent.

WCS *JP* *✓* *JS*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/5/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

Re Chicago letter dated 6/5/68.

Set forth below is an accounting of Solo and reserve funds transactions during June, 1968:

Balance on Hand June 1, 1968

<u>Solo Funds</u>	\$115,258.97
<u>Reserve Funds</u>	<u>7,845.21</u>
Total	\$123,104.18

Additions

None

Disbursements

Solo Funds

On 6/2/68, for expenses
of GUS HALL while in
Chicago 6/1-2/68 \$ 64.78

On 6/4/68, for partial
expenses of Solo
Mission 27

500.00

Total \$564.78

1-904
2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM)
1 - 100-134637 (SOLO)
1 - 100-128861 (CP, USA - RESERVE FUNDS)

1 - Chicago
WAB:mep
(5)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 23 1968

100-428091-7050
15 JUL 11 1968

ST-100
SPEC. MAIL RM.

CG 134-46 Sub F

Reserve Funds

On 6/4/68, purchase of air
transportation for GUS HALL
from Chicago, Illinois to
New York City \$ 55.60

On 6/6/68, purchase of gifts
to present to Communist Party
leaders on 27th Solo Mission 27.00

On 6/7/68, purchase of books
to present to Communist Party
leaders on 27th Solo Mission 60.00

Total \$142.60

Balance on Hand July 1, 1968

Solo Funds \$114,694.19

Reserve Funds 7,702.61

Total \$122,396.80

Location of Funds - Chicago Office
Territory

Solo Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office
in Safety Deposit Box
Number C1362, La Salle
National Bank, Chicago,
Illinois, with access
limited to SAC and ASAC. \$ 85,166.55

Maintained by CG 5824-S*
in safe in his office at
Arisco Associates,
Incorporated, 25 East
Washington Street, Chicago,
Illinois 19,527.64

CG 134-46 Sub F

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Incorporated checking account at Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access by [redacted] and CG 5824-S* \$ 5,000.00

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Incorporated checking account at First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois, with access by [redacted] and CG 5824-S* 5,000.00

Total \$114,694.19

Reserve Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in Safety Deposit Box Number CI362, La Salle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access by SAC and ASAC \$6,150.00

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe in his office at Arisco Associates, Incorporated, 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois 1,552.61

Total \$7,702.61

Total Funds on Hand \$122,396.80



5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
DATE: July 10, 1968
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

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My memorandum of 6/10/68 set forth, in detail, an accounting of funds received by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), from the Soviet Union and Red China for May, 1968. The following is an accounting of these funds for June, 1968.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 to 5/31/68.

Total received from the Soviet Union.....	\$5,736,538.09
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60).....	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 5/31/68.....	\$5,786,538.09
Total disbursed 9/58 to 5/31/68.....	4,430,334.80
Total as of 5/31/68.....	\$1,356,203.29
Received from Soviets 6/29/68.....	530,000.00
(Second half of 1968 subsidy plus \$30,000 for "New World Review" a pro-Soviet magazine published in New York City and not affiliated with the Party.)	
Total available.....	\$1,886,203.29

DISBURSEMENTS DURING JUNE, 1968

All disbursements made on specific instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA.

6/2/68 - For personal expenses of Hall while visiting Chicago, Illinois.....	64.78
6/4/68 - For partial expenses of Solo Mission 27.....	500.00
Total disbursed June, 1968.....	\$ 564.78

100-428091

RCP:bb
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

98 JUL 23 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Balance of Fund 6/30/68.....	\$1,885,638.51
In Chicago.....	\$ 114,694.19
In New York.....	1,770,944.32
	<u>\$1,885,638.51</u>

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Party funds received from the Soviets will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

Handwritten marks:
Left: A circled 'D' and 'JH'.
Center: 'very good' written vertically.
Middle-right: A large 'D' with a checkmark below it.
Far right: 'H' and 'mm' written vertically.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46)

7/15/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Oberndorf
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReNYlet 7/3/68 which set out highlights of an interview between CG 5824-S* and Mikhail Polonik, the Soviet who handled the Solo apparatus in Moscow. Polonik is expected in Washington, D. C., in the immediate future to assume the position of Counselor in the Soviet Embassy. This would explain the interest he expressed in various individuals in the United States.

There are a number of items in relet which must be further explored with CG 5824-S*. They are:

(1) Polonik's expressed interest in [redacted] allegedly working for the Department of State. CG 5824-S* should be immediately interviewed in depth concerning this matter. Pertinent information should be furnished the Bureau under the caption [redacted] IS-R" promptly. Two copies should be furnished WFO. The information should be phrased in a form which does not indicate the source obtained it while in Moscow in direct conversation with Polonik. WFO should be instructed to hold an investigation in this in abeyance pending further instructions from the Bureau because of the sensitive nature of the source.

(2) CG 5824-S* should also be interviewed in depth regarding the comments made about [redacted] Data developed should be furnished the Bureau and WFO under the caption [redacted] in the same manner as the data on [redacted]

(3) Additional information must be obtained regarding the alleged legislative lobby the Communist Party, USA, is supposed to have set up in Washington, D. C. To date, no positive information has been developed regarding such activity by the Party. Determine whether CG 5824-S* learned anything additional concerning this lobby from conversations with Gus Hall.

2 - New York (100-134637)

EX-110 REC-24

16 JUL 15 1968

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAILED 7

JUL 12 1968

COMM-FBI

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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

RCF:prb

(7)

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

8 JUL 23 1968

Letter to SAC, Chicago
Re: Solo
100-428091

(4) Both New York and Chicago must, through their sources, keep on top of the Party's plans for a laundry or similar establishment to serve as a drop for Soviet funds and instructions. Every effort must be expended to insure we can control such an operation.

(5) New York must insure that any electronic equipment purchased by NY 694-S*, pursuant to Soviet instructions, is fully described for the Bureau prior to the shipment of such equipment. Since CG 5824-S* indicated he would consult [redacted] of Chicago concerning this matter, Chicago must also follow these instructions.

b6
b7c

NOTE:

This matter has been coordinated with the Soviet Section. Items mentioned above were included in a seven-page letter giving highlights of a two-day conference with Polonik by CG 5824-S*. Past experience has shown that when given time to reflect and recover from a Mission, the source can usually recall additional details which may be pertinent to investigations mentioned above.

ROUTE 10 ENVELOPE
VIA TELETYPE

JUL 18 1968

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

WA -08-

6-50 PM URGENT 7-13-68 RDB

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091) AND CHICAGO (134-46 SUB B) (C99B)

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

CHICAGO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM NEW YORK (100-134637) 7P

SOLO. INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST.

ON JULY TWELVE, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, PURSUANT
TO PREVIOUSLY MADE ARRANGEMENT, NEW YORK SIX NINE
FOUR - S ASTERICK MET HIS SOVIET CONTACT VLADIMIR A.
CHUCHUKIN, IN THE AREA OF THE TOWNHOUSE RESTAURANT,
ONE THREE EIGHT - THREE NINE, QUEEN BOULEVARD,
QUEENS, NEW YORK. CHUCHUKIN ADVISED THE INFORMANT
THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CCCPSU
HE WAS FURNISHING THE LATTER WITH INFORMATION TO BE

TRANSMITTED TO GUS HALL (CPUSA GENERAL SECRETARY)

IMMEDIATELY AND SAID INFORMATION IS BEING TRANSMITTED

TO OTHER HEADS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGHOUT THE
END PAGE ONE

TELETYPED TO:

CG
98 JUL 23 1968

Handwritten signatures and initials:
R. P. [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]

100-428091-7053

16 JUL 17 1968

Handwritten: 500

PAGE TWO

WORLD. THIS INFORMATION CONCERNS THE SERIOUS
SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TODAY. CHUCHUKIN'S
INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO
GUS HALL ON JULY THIRTEEN, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT.

ON JULY THIRTEEN, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, NEW YORK
SIX NINE FOR - S ^VASTERICK FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION TO THE NYO.

THE CCCPSU SENDS TO GUS HALL AND OTHER LEADERS
OF VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
A CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING THE PRESENT SERIOUS
SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TODAY. THE CCCPSU CONSIDERS
IT URGENT AND TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE REQUEST
OF OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES THAT THE CCCPSU'S EVALUATION
OF THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA BE BROUGHT UP
TO DATE. THIS CAN BE DONE BY POINTING OUT THE DANGERS
OF THE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY FORCES WHICH ARE TRYING
TO DEFEAT AND ELIMINATE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CCCPZ.
END PAGE TWO

C
A

PAGE THREE

COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY AND REACTIONARY FORCES REPRESENTED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, CATHOLIC PARTY AND FORMER PROPERTY OWNERS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING AND INFLUENCING ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE UNIONS AND THE NEWS MEDIA UNDER THE GUISE OF FALSE SLOGANS OF "LIBERATION". THEY HAVE EVEN PENETRATED INTO PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS WELL AS PROVINCIAL COMMUNIST PARTY BODIES. THERE IS TODAY AN ACTIVE "CENTER" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM WHICH THESE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES AND REACTIONARIES FUNCTION AND ARE GUIDED. THESE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THERE IS A "CENTER" OUTSIDE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH GUIDE THESE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES AND REACTIONARY FORCES UNDER THEIR FALSE SLOGAN OF "LIBERATION". THEIR AIM IS TO TAKE OVER THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN GOVERNMENT AND ELIMINATE THE PRESENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ITS LOYAL LEADERSHIP BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND IF NOT SUCCESSFUL TRY BY OTHER MEANS, ARMS IF NECESSARY.

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

THE CCCPSU CALLS THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IN THAT YOU TAKE THIS EVALUATION VERY SERIOUSLY AND TOGETHER WITH OTHER LEADERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT HELP SOLVE THIS PROBLEM BY A MARXIST - LENINIST SOLUTION. THE CCCPSU WILL WATCH THIS SITUATION VERY CLOSELY AND WILL TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO HELP THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE WORKING PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO DEFEND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CCCPSU HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TODAY IS IN MANY WAYS SIMILAR TO THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY IN ONE NINE FIVE SIX. THE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES AND REACTIONARY FORCES ARE GETTING STRONGER AND THEY ARE TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE WARSAW PACT AND THE ECONOMIC COOPERATIVE OF WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS A MEMBER. THEY ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE COUNTRY BE SAYING OVER AND OVER THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA MUST NOT FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY SAY THAT THE COUNTRY SHOULD FORM A STRONG BOND AND RELATIONSHIP WITH

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

WEST GERMANY, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION. THEY STRESS THAT THE FASCIST ROLE OF GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR TWO AND ITS OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD BE FORGOTTEN.

THESE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY FORCES ARE TRYING TO DESTROY THE ORGANS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE DOCUMENT WHICH THEY SUBMITTED, "TWO THOUSAND WORDS," IS A DOCUMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE AUTHORS APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO COMMIT SUBVERSIVE ACTS IN EACH FACTORY, TOWN AND PROVINCE. THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE PRESS AND THE SECURITY FORCES. THESE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY FORCES HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY DEMANDING THE WORKING CLASS TO DEMONSTRATE AND STRIKE IF NECESSARY TO GAIN FORCE. THEY WILL DO ANYTHING TO GAIN POWER AND WEAPONS.

THEIR AIM IS TO PREPARE THE PEACEFUL LIQUIDATION OF THE STATE. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SEPARATE THE TRADE UNIONS FROM THE PARTY USING THE SLOGAN "TRADE UNIONS WITHOUT COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS." THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS ALSO BECOME VERY ACTIVE IN THE SUPPORT OF THESE REACTIONARIES.

END PAGE FIVE

PAGE SIX

THE QUESTION THAT ARISES IS "WILL CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CONTINUE TO BE A SOCIALIST COUNTRY?" TO DEFEAT THE
COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES WOULD BE A MOST IMPORTANT
VICTORY FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

IT WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR MARXISM AND LENINISM. OUR
AIM IS TO HELP MAINTAIN THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF
SOCIALISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

TODAY THE CCCPSU BELIEVES THAT THE FORCES OF
SOCIALISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE STRONGER THAN THE
RIGHT WING FORCES. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT
THAT AT THE PLENUM OF THE CCCCCZ HELD IN MAY IT WAS
STRESSED THAT THE RIGHT WING DANGER WAS THE MAIN
DANGER TO THE COUNTRY AND SOCIALISM. THE PLENUM
TRIED TO ATTACK THE "RIGHT WING" BUT SUPPORT
WAS POLITICALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY WEAK.
END PAGE SIX

PAGE SEVEN

THE ISSUE NOW IS WHETHER SOCIALISM WILL SURVIVE
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

OTHER INFORMATION FURNISHED BY CHUCHUKIN
TO NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR - S ASTERICK WAS OF A
TECHNICAL NATURE CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF THE
APPARATUS AND WILL BE FURNISHED THE BUREAU BY
SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS.

CORR PAGE 2 LAST LINE LAST WORD SHD BE CCCPCA RPT CCCPCZ
CCCPCZ-

END

WA.. LRC R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
(Att: FBI LABORATORY)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/15/68

On 7/12/68, pursuant to previously made arrangements, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact, VLADIMIR A. CHUCHUKIN, in the area of the Townhouse Restaurant, 138-39 Queens Boulevard, Queens, NY.

CHUCHUKIN, at this time, advised NY 694-S* that in accordance with instructions from the CGCPUSU, he was furnishing the latter with an oral report on the serious situation in Czechoslovakia today. NY 694-S* was to transmit this information immediately to GUS HALL. (NY 694-S* furnished the oral report to GUS HALL on 7/13/68).

This evaluation of the Czechoslovakian situation by the CGCPUSU was to be furnished to HALL and other heads of Communist Parties throughout the world.

(See NY teletype dated 7/13/68).

CHUCHUKIN and NY 694-S* also discussed the following apparatus problems:

1. CHUCHUKIN admitted the television signal had not been entirely successful and therefore they would have another series of tests in mid September. Only this time it would be on Channel 5, from 9:11 p.m. - 9:21 p.m. The code word for this operation is "Wax".

(See NY airtel dated 3/29/68 and 4/5/68, page 2).

1-904
3-Bureau (Encl. 1) (RM)
(1-Att: FBI LABORATORY)
1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (Encl. 1) (RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1-NY 105-45740 (CHUCHUKIN) (344)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:eac
(8)

REC-35 16 JUL 17 1968



9 JUL 25 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

2. CHUCHUKIN admitted that the new microtransceiver had developed some technical difficulties. He stated that he believed they would be corrected and the component would be delivered to NY 694-S* in the fall. Code word "Rye".

(See NY airtel 4/26/67, page 2.)

3. NY 694-S* is to furnish the Soviets a new code word for the money transfer. (The old word was colour prints).

4. It was agreed that if the Soviets failed to acknowledge NY 694-S*' walky talky signal acknowledging the receipt of a radio message, he is to deposit at the Beck Shoe Store (47th St. and 5th Ave.) a Piels bottlecap the same evening prior to 9:00 p.m.

5. CHUCHUKIN advised NY 694-S* the Soviets will give him, in the near future, a new device to be used to pass on the microfilm to them. This device appears to be a screw type device.

6. It was agreed by CHUCHUKIN and NY 694-S* that the latter should spend \$1400 on bugging and anti-bugging devices. (See NY letter dated 7/3/68, page 5).

7. It was decided that the next personal meeting place would be Elliot. (Avenue "J" Subway Station of the BMT).

8. CHUCHUKIN informed NY 694-S* that the Soviets, through someone from "the press" (Tass), had requested three weeks ago that GUS HALL give them an evaluation of what the American people think of the Vietnam situation, including the current peace talks. He stated HALL has not replied and he requested NY 694-S* to ask him to do so.

NY 694-S* gave to CHUCHUKIN a cigarette box - chemically treated - which contained a number of messages on microfilm and in plain code. The messages were as follows:

1. "CCCPSU

"Regret have to use the closed channel for the following delegation since no other way available at this time.

NY 100-134637

"Please have these visas in Washington, D.C. as soon as possible since time is limited.

"GUS HALL
General Secretary
CPUSA N.C."

(GUS HALL is requesting visas for a delegation going to the USSR. He apologized for using the apparatus for this message.)

2. "CCGPSU

"The following comrades will make up the delegation to visit the USSR and would you please have visas waiting for them in Washington as soon as possible:

"1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"3. FRANCES BORDOFISKY - member State Committee and State Executive Board of New York; Bronx County Organizer.

"4. DANIEL RUBEL - member State Committee of New York; Kings (Brooklyn) chairman.

"5. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"6. [REDACTED] - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"7. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"8. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

NY 100-134637

"9. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"Comrade [REDACTED] will be the leader of this delegation assisted by [REDACTED]. There is a possibility that three comrades will come from Sofia, direct from the Youth Festival to Moscow arriving 8/3 or 4. Since this is not yet definite, we would suggest that the visas be left for them both in Washington and in Sofia.

b6
b7c

"These comrades designated below may travel to Moscow from Sofia:

"1. [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED] Community organization activity with youth and education.

"2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Southern California and members of District leadership.

"The above delegation will leave on Aeroflot from NYC on July 30. This delegation was approved by the leadership of the CPUSA, including GUS HALL, HENRY WINSTON, JAMES JACKSON, HELEN WINTER, etc. If there are any questions or problems regarding anyone of the delegations, comrade WINSTON will be in Moscow 8/1 so he would be able to supply you with whatever references or other questions you may raise.

"The leadership suggests that the excursion of this delegation should include a visit in one of the Asian Republics. We believe that the composition of this delegation made up of a number of very active Negro comrades, merits a visit to one of the Asian republics so they can see for themselves the solution of the nationality and racial problem in the USSR. They will benefit from a study in one of these republics made up of people formerly oppressed by old Czarist imperialism. As you know in the past, we rarely made suggestions about the route of our delegations. We do, at this time, because we believe it is very important. We are sure that you will understand our reasons for this comradely suggestion.

"With Warm Fraternal Greetings

"GUS HALL
General Secretary
NC CPUSA"

NY 100-134637

(Chicago will disseminate by separate memorandum the names of the delegates going to USSR).

3. "CCCPSU

"The following is the information which you requested concerning these publications:

- "1. Ramparts
- "2. The Progressive
- "3. The New Republic
- "4. The Nation

"This information has been furnished by comrades who have been in close contact with personnel of these magazines.

"CG 5824-S*"

(Soviets had previously requested from GUS HALL the above information and this was furnished to NY 694-S* by ARNOLD JOHNSON).

Ramparts

Ramparts' is the newest of the political magazines with mass circulation. Some ten years ago, this publication was started by Ed Keating, a Catholic layman of some wealth and usually called a millionaire. Ramparts was to be essentially a voice of the Catholic layman. It started also in the tradition of "muckraking" and exposure of social ills and hypocrisy in society. Keating also utilized extensive advertising in promoting the magazine after it has become somewhat established. He also traveled the country in an effort to get additional support. He was likewise bold in getting writers and administrative people. While Keating was in his late 40's and early 50's, he made a point of getting young people to run the magazine - editorially, promotionally and administratively. Essentially the staff, with one or two exceptions, were under 30 years of age. During this time, he changed the character of the magazine from a "Catholic" character to an all-inclusive, non-sectarian character in personnel and in content. Keating also became active in the peace movement and in politics.

Ramparts reached a circulation of over 200,000 in a short time by dramatically and effectively "exposing the CIA in the colleges, and in particular in Michigan State" and the tie-up with, Diem and Madame Nu in Saigon. On another occasion, it made a major expose of the criminal brutalities inflicted by U.S. armed forces on the children of Vietnam, with a whole series of photographs to prove the case. That was one of the major events which influenced Dr. Benjamin Spock.

The emphasis of the magazine was in the style - and they would take full-page ads in the N.Y. Times and other newspapers across the country so that millions of people were discussing the material which was being exposed by Ramparts. During this time they also did special features on Che Guevera and on Regis Debray, and were likewise influenced accordingly.

During this time the staff on Ramparts and some financial supporters became involved in a major internal struggle for control of the magazine and its promotion methods. The total staff now included a number of independent radicals - some are anarchists, some are nihilists, some ex-Communists and associated with Trotskyists and possibly Progressive Labor. A quick meeting of the Board of Directors was called. Keating was ousted from his post as president and editorial director, and the rest of the staff, including those sympathetic to the Communist Party in the Administrative department, were ousted.

For a period of time, Keating threatened law suits to regain some of his heavy investment. Warren Hinkle III, a young man of wealth who is possibly closer to the anarchism and nihilism of the Hippie movement, became the main benefactor. Other adjustments were made and the magazine continued, even though it was also announced that it had an indebtedness of a million dollars.

Robert Scheer continued as the editor. His policy has gone from one point of view to another. He entered politics in a Democratic Primary and almost made it. Communists helped and possibly carried the main burden. After the election, Scheer expounded on a few occasions some of the worst slander and vilification against the Soviet union. And next he became involved in the Vietnam Summer Project, and other things. The other editors follow a similar unpredictable course. Some regular contact is had with David Kolodney, who is regarded as a more serious editor. And some comparable comment could be made about others. The list of editors includes a number of those who are now graduates of the Students for a Democratic Society (S.D.S.) and persons of every area of the left political spectrum among the younger people, as well as among the Senior and Consulting and contributing editors. Of course, the CPUSA has contact with some of them. Ramparts has carried articles by Carl Eloice, who is a known Communist. This is the one major publication which opens its pages to Communists - although this has occurred only rarely.

Ramparts has had on its desks for more than 18 months its own articles about the Communist Party, USA. Keating's interview with a party official in December of 1966 was to be the start of such an article, although the said official was not told of that at the time. At a later date Ramparts sent Sol Stern - who had been in the Labor Youth League and in the Party - to New York, where a number of comrades gave him long interviews and much material. He also interviewed Communists in other cities. But that has remained on the Ramparts desk. And now, David Kolodney wanted to attend the recent CPUSA special convention. He was given the same attention as other members of the press.

There was a report that a recent issue of Ramparts was delayed in distribution because the magazine didn't have the money to mail it. Two financial supporters - one from Boston and another from Connecticut - canceled their contribution because they didn't approve of some statements presumably in reference to the Middle East and Israel. Thus, there now is a story to the effect that Ramparts can't pay its debts. This may also be the cover for another internal struggle.

See list of editors and editorial staff.

of headgear he
popular with police
ably in anticipation
onstrator carry their
memorandum equivalent;
are the law prohibits
ag their gear unless
al force, the use of
is nonlethal and pro-
police—against po-
into existing legal

ast *prima facie* cause
Some police agencies
e second thoughts
ose in San Francisco,
nnati and washing-
untarily is dictated or
because it causes cen-
depression and con-
of arrest. He would
ined on the basis of
of his civil rights.
at the police should
ailable to help them
so dangerous is fal-
stics show the little-
interesting fact that
rates for fathers are
h as those for police-
n's chance of being
eman are 10 times
oliceman being killed
—DONALD DUNCAN



Art/Pushkin Studios

Ramparts

Published every other Tuesday

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 12 JUNE 29, 1968

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Editor-In-Chief
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Art Director
Dugald Steiner

Managing Editor
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Gene Marine, Sol Stern, William Turner

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O'Brien, Carl Oglesby, Stanley K. Shein-
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Spitzer

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RAMPARTS, San Francisco
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The Progressive

The Progressive was founded in 1909 by Robert LaFollette, Sr., whose record as a U.S. Senator in opposition to World War I and as the "Progressive" presidential candidate is well known. The monthly magazine is published in Madison, Wisconsin and has a circulation of 35,000 copies. Morris H. Rubin, the editor, is a liberal, and that has been the character of previous editors. His anti-Communist tendency of the past has changed somewhat in recent years. While Communists in Wisconsin know the editor and others, there is no meaningful discussion relationship with them, except on occasional conversation. The editors and other writers have at times declared an interest in discussing things with leading Communists, and this has been done.

The Progressive covers a wide field of subjects, and generally has been able to get able and authoritative writers. It does not publish the writings of Communists. It represents on a monthly basis the professional liberal in somewhat the same way as the New Republic and the Nation. It also reaches somewhat the same student and academic audience as the Nation and New Republic, but also a wider area of those in politics in Labor, the Black Liberation struggle, and among mid-west political workers. These three publications are also generally read by liberals in public office, and such liberals are often writing in their publications.

It is generally in a difficult financial situation - and makes several public appeals through the mails for funds each year.

It is pro-peace and has conducted its own campaign against the war. It is good in campaigns for civil rights and liberties, including those to support victims of the Smith Act and McCarran Act, and against such laws and for civil rights. It has been for improved relations with the Soviet Union and Socialist countries.

This magazine as well as the Nation and New Republic are not directly influenced by the New Left. They report such developments, but take a more scholarly approach to such developments.

The Progressive has been active in the McCarthy campaign and in the campaigns of liberal Congressman and Senators within the two-party system. Although it has its origin in the Progressive Party movement in Wisconsin and for a period of time on a national scale, during recent years it has expressed its independence within the two-party system.

The New Republic

The New Republic was founded in 1914 as a weekly "journal of opinion" and is one of the major "liberal" publications in the USA. It is generally considered as somewhat to the right of The Nation. Its articles are more informative and its authors represent a wider area of scholars in numbers, but also more identified with the reformists of capitalism. There is no serious conflict between The Nation and the New Republic and most readers of the Nation also read the New Republic. Both publications are widely used in the schools and colleges, and in the public libraries of the country.

In the earlier years, Mrs. Willard Straight, a liberal with some wealth, was a major financial supporter and her son was the editor for a time. Mrs. Straight was very pro-Soviet in the early years of the Revolution and the magazine was among those advocating recognition of, and diplomatic relations with, the Soviet Union. Mrs. Straight also contributed to other progressive causes.

At the same time, it has always followed an anti-Communist policy in relation to its writers, and while it advocates freedom of speech and press for Communists, it does not open its pages to Communist writers. It will publish articles by ex-Communists, and by certain Trotskyists. Such persons have not gained any control of the editorial policy which has been of a constant liberal course. This also means that Communists do not have any serious influence or relation with the editors.

For many years, the publication was in a critical financial position, and made public appeals for financial aid. It was generally reported that it did receive a substantial contribution a few years ago. At about the same time, it was also reported that President John F. Kennedy made a public statement to the effect that he always read the New Republic. At that time the circulation increased rapidly and it now has a circulation of 120,290 copies weekly.

During the recent period, it has been said that the New Republic was a major influence in urging Senator Eugene McCarthy to enter the Presidential race. It has also urged the formation of a new party, a fourth party, in the present struggle, so as to provide a meaningful alternative to Humphrey and Nixon after the Republican and Democratic conventions. The publication has had many good articles against the war in Vietnam, and is a constant supporter of McCarthy for President. At the same time, one of its feature writers is a rather steady supporter of Pres. Johnson. That represents their liberalism.

The Nation

The Nation is one of the oldest weekly publications in the country. It was founded in 1867 and arose from the abolition and anti-slavery movements. It has continued a "liberal" policy since that time. It was a strong campaigner for recognition of the USSR and has been an opponent of the cold war policy of the U.S. The special editions, such as "The Warfare State" and "On the FBI" and in defense of Jim Hoffa of the teamsters, and earlier in defense of Sacco and Vanzetti, indicate that the Nation is to the left of the New Republic over the years and yet is to be characterized as a liberal magazine. In some areas, such as in the struggle against the war in Vietnam, the Nation has implemented its writings with forums and public meetings.

This publication together with the New Republic is geared to the students in the schools and colleges, and to the professionals. It has a good circulation to the public libraries, and thus its readers are many more than its circulation, which is 29,470.

It is financed mainly by contributions in response to public appeals, and from its subscribers. Within recent years it has had financial difficulties, and it works on a limited budget. The ownership has been changed several times - although its editors and editorial policy continue in the liberal tradition. While editors such as Freda Kirchway, of a few years back, and Carey McWilliams of recent years, have good conversational and personal relations with individual Communists, yet they do not open the pages of the publication to Communist writers. They vigorously support the rights of Communists - except in their own paper. Thus there are no organizational ties with Communists. Miss Freda Kirchway has retired and is not in good health. Yet she responds to many progressive causes, and does not hide from long-time associates who are Communist. The same can be said about Carey McWilliams, and the lack of regular relationships is more often due to failure to develop such a relationship. On a recent occasion he expressed a willingness and a desire to visit the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, a number of editors and writers from publications such as the New Republic and the Nation would welcome such an opportunity in spite of their tendency repeatedly to differ with Communists, and to join in critical or protest declarations.

These publications - Nation and New Republic - also constantly advocate the admittance of Peoples Republic of China to the U.N. and for recognition by the USA. This is not the result of any pro-Marxist influence. It is part of the liberalism.

The Nation wants liberalism within the capitalist system, although an occasional article does challenge the system. The financial and political forces behind these publications are essentially the middle class professional and other liberals. Their relationships are to the Americans for Democratic Action or similar liberals. They are non-partisan independents, who do influence politics.

NY 100-134637

4. "CCCPSU

"JOSEPH BRANDT and his wife will pass through Moscow on their way to Ulan Bator on the invitation of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party. They expect to be in Mongolia on 8/3 or 4.

"Fraternal Greetings
"GUS HALL
"General Secretary
"NC CPUSA"

5. "CCCPSU

"Comrade MICKEY LIMA was recently treated in Moscow at the Main Polyclinic and at Pushkina Sanitarium. When he left Moscow, he was given a formula for medication and treatment. He gave this to his doctor in the US, who either misplaced or will not return it. In the meantime, Comrade LIMA is in danger of becoming totally deaf. Comrade HALL considers this an emergency situation and makes a comradely request that someone from the CPSU get in touch with the Clinic or Pushkina and send the formula to us for the medicine or treatment as soon as possible.

"With Warm Fraternal Greetings

"GUS HALL
"General Secretary
"NC CPUSA"

6.

"6/29/68

"RECEIVED:

"500 COLOUR PRINTS
30 " " CARP

"TOTAL 530 COLOUR PRINTS

"NY 694-S*"

(NY 694-S* is advising the Soviets of the receipt of \$530,000 received on 6/29/68.)

NY 100-134637

7. "Your radio message of July 3 received, stating acknowledgment of receipt of money not received. Signal given June 30, 10:45 AM sharp on 244-9999.

"NY 694-S"

(See NY letter 7/3/68).

NY 694-S* also furnished CHUCHUKIN with an article that appeared in the 7/1/68 issue of the "Daily News", page 36, entitled, "The Naked Society" by JOSEPH MARTIN. This article contained information about BERNARD B. SPINDEL. The article is enclosed.

THE NAKED SOCIETY

By JOSEPH MARTIN

Bernard B. Spindel, snooper and antisnooper extraordinary, has been called the nation's No. 1 ear for hire. Here, in the first of two articles, is the story behind his story.

BERNARD B. SPINDEL, benevolent father, gazed fondly out of an upper window of his electronics research lab at Holmes, N.Y., at two of his sons fishing in a brook a short distance away—innocent as a page out of Huckleberry Finn.

Then Spindel, master craftsman of counter-eavesdropping and eavesdropping devices, told a black, square object, smaller than an aspirin tablet, on the window sill. He flipped a tape recorder switch. The room was flooded with the sounds of children's conversation, a carophony of bird song and the gurgling sound of the stream.

"This isn't right, I thought, The kids don't know. It's like looking into their minds."

Spindel frowned. "The damned kids," he said, "are lousing up the background with their noise."

He slipped a short length of tubing over the object on the window sill. He inserted a blue-stained fleck of metal into the tubing. The bird song became muted, confused.

Spindel added an orange colored chip. Abruptly, the sound of song and stream was erased from the room. The world outside, it seemed, had become silent, dead, containing no sound but the talk of the children. Their voices were nakedly clear. Their father had stripped them of their privacy.

Spindel is ever eager to demonstrate the array of exclusive and incredible products that has earned him the reputation of the nation's No. 1 ear for hire.

The object on the window was a subminiature microphone of super-sensitivity, manufactured by B. R. Fox (a company owned by his wife, and the production arm of Spindel's lucrative business as a general practitioner in the multimillion-dollar snooping and anti-snooping industry).

Spindel, 44, lives in a sprawling, gray frame house hunched against the green foothills of Putnam County. Though the house is filled with all the status comforts of the American dream of life in suburbia, for me it became a place of depression. Anxiety, I quickly discovered, occupied the house, like an unwanted lodger.

The back roads to Holmes twist and climb past lonely houses against a lonely sky and through dark woods that shroud a quiet countryside. Extra cups of breakfast coffee, early morning conversations, pretenses to delay the inevitable encounter, again, with the professional secrets of Spindel's life.

His house has everything that a lot of money can buy: antiques before a stony fireplace, hi-fi speakers half the size of a walk-in closet, air conditioning, books and records spilling from shelves and cabinets, wall-to-wall carpeting, phones and intercoms in every room, a picture window view of a sparkling brook, two Lincoln sedans and a mammoth outdoor swimming pool.

The occupants of the house add up to a filial love-in, with seven handsome children, three dogs

pill vial, containing the tablets he consumes by the dozen, rattles in his shirt pocket.

He dispatches couriers as far as 20 miles to relay messages to associates from phones presumably free of eavesdropping ears. His phone conversations are always brief, often coded. He can hardly claim a right to privacy.

His head turns quickly at the sound of a car entering his driveway. Friend?

Fancy! Fast? Spindel's varied talents must be considered: His credentials reviewed: No. 1 hired ear, ex-private eye, snooper and anti-snooper (he tapped his first phone at the age of 12) for more than 25 years, adviser to legislative committee, and master tactician in endless guerrilla skirmishes with the law.

He is also an expert chef, photographer, picker, author ("The Omniscient Ear," published by Award House), researcher, and multi-engine aircraft pilot.

And, a self-declared pauper. Assets require record keeping and bank accounts, all readily available to hordes of government snoopers eager to learn his secrets. Technically, Spindel owns nothing but the clothes on his back and an engraved wristwatch. A gift from Jimmy Hoffa, an erstwhile client. He rents the tools and equipment of his trade from a company owned by his wife.

A DAY SPENT with Spindel produces endless tales of adventures and misadventures, plots and counter-plots, talk of secrets and intrigues involving house hold names. Dates and details dribble from his lips.

Spindel's services as an electronic detective range from a few dollars to uncover a crude tap or eavesdropping device to thousands of dollars on assignments involving industrial espionage and sophisticated snoopers.

The new federal law prohibiting the manufacture, assembly and possession of intercepting devices, should have caused Spindel to blow a cap-tator. It hasn't. He is a vociferous supporter of the outlawing of all electronic snooping, with no exceptions.

He has disposed of his inventory of devices that are now in violation of law and is retooling. Most of them can be adapted for use in burglar alarm or used in surveillance systems covering freight loading platforms, parking lots and safeguarded plants during nonbusiness hours.

Further, Spindel claims, his search business—phone taps and bugs will increase tenfold. "By experience," he says, "shows that whenever a new law is passed permitting the use of intercepting devices, there is an instant reaction. We are flooded with requests to conduct counter-snooping inspections."

Tomorrow: The incredible devices, from the beams to sonic spectrum, which make the secret of the bedroom and the executive boardroom the body's business.

and two cats. There had been a stable of four horses, but they were mass evicted when one kicked Barbara, Spindel's chic wife, devoted mother and leading volunteer in the local V-H Club.

After a time I began sorting out the kids by name and face. My favorite was the youngest boy, a sparrow under a baseball cap, with a habit of punctuating his talk by slopping an imaginary ball into an imaginary mitt.

Then, there's Spindel:


Chain smoking until his breathing becomes shallow and wispy, almost demanding the use of one of the oxygen tanks that he keeps within reach since he suffered a heart attack last year. His hands betray anxiety; fingernails chewed to the quick. A

In addition to furniture and other obvious hiding places (white dots), more sophisticated locations for tape recorders, transmitters or taps include: 1—eyeglass frame, 2—bell buckle, 3—inside man's cheek, 4—pipe, 5—wrist watch, 6—implanted in dog's flank, 7—dog collar, 8—flower pot (powered by sunlight), 9—hollow table leg, 10—telephone

11—cigarette lighter, 12—base of ashtray.

ENCLOSURE

100-442800-7054



NEWS photo by Paul J. Raftery

Conference in seemingly private living room could be invaded by snooping devices concealed in 27 locations. See key below.

A master eavesdropper tells how you can be stripped of your privacy.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-17-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam
July 16, 1968

BY LIAISON

REC-39 100-428091-7055

EX-105

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~
SOVIET VIEW OF THE
SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Communist Party, USA, has received a report on the situation in Czechoslovakia from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This report was sent to the heads of communist parties throughout the world. In essence, this report was as follows:

The report was prepared in response to requests from the leaders of various communist parties that an evaluation of the situation in Czechoslovakia be brought up-to-date. There are counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia which are trying to eliminate the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. These reactionary forces have succeeded in penetrating the trade unions and news media under the false slogan of "Liberation." There is an action "center" in Czechoslovakia from which these reactionaries are guided, and there is reason to believe there is a "center" outside Czechoslovakia furnishing guidance to these reactionaries.

The reactionaries aim to take over the Government of Czechoslovakia and eliminate the present loyal leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by peaceful means. If peaceful means do not succeed, the reactionaries are prepared to try other ways to gain control.

RCP:pab
(13)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____

98 JUL 23 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SOVIET VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union called upon other communist parties to take this evaluation very seriously, and it is desired that leaders of the international working class movement help solve the problem with a Marxist-Leninist solution. The Soviets will take all possible means to help the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and working class of Czechoslovakia, and to defend the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia. The situation in Czechoslovakia is similar to the situation in Hungary in 1956. The reactionaries are gaining strength and contend that the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia must not follow the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The reactionaries seek to form a strong relationship with West Germany.

In a document entitled "Two Thousand Words" the reactionaries appealed to the people of Czechoslovakia to commit subversive acts in each factory, town and province to destroy the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. These reactionaries will do anything to gain power and weapons.

The reactionaries are attempting to separate the trade unions from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by using the slogan "Trade Unions Without Communist Party Members." The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia is very active in supporting the reactionaries. The defeat of the reactionaries would be a most important victory for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Marxism-Leninism. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held in May, 1968, it was stressed that the danger from the right was the main danger to Czechoslovakia and socialism, and an attempt was made to attack the "right wing" but the attempt was politically and ideologically weak. The issue now is whether socialism will survive in Czechoslovakia.

It should be noted that the information reported above was furnished the Communist Party, USA, as the line it is to follow and project in this country as part of communist efforts to influence United States policies in line with Soviet objectives. Therefore, it may or may not represent actual Soviet policy.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SOVIET VIEW OF THE
SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/15/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security-Communist," prepared by RCP:pab.

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from New York teletype 7/13/68 captioned "Solo, Internal Security-Communist!"

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *wes/kpr*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CB*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: July 15, 1968 *wes/kpr*

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒ _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of a report on the situation in Czechoslovakia furnished the Communist Party, USA, by the Soviets and recommends dissemination to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

BACKGROUND:

Pursuant to a previous agreement, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact, Vladimir Chuchukin, a known Soviet espionage agent employed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, on 7/12/68. Chuchukin gave informant a confidential report prepared by the Soviets regarding the current situation in Czechoslovakia which informant was to immediately furnish Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA. Chuchukin stated this report was being furnished the heads of other communist parties throughout the world.

In essence, this report states that reactionaries in Czechoslovakia are trying to eliminate the loyal leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by peaceful means. If they do not succeed by peaceful means, they are prepared to try other ways to gain control. The Soviets will take all possible steps to help the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and defend the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia. The situation in Czechoslovakia is similar to

Enclosure *see 7-16-68*

100-428091

RCP:pab

(6)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Re: Solo

100-428091

the situation in Hungary in 1956. The defeat of the reactionaries would be a most important victory for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Marxism-Leninism. As the Soviets see it the issue now is whether socialism will survive in Czechoslovakia.

Attached is a summary of this information for Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached summary be approved and sent.

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow: a large 'D' on the left, 'WCS' and 'Paul' in the center, and 'GAS/AMV' with a checkmark and 'GAS-P' on the right.]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *July 15*

DATE: July 15, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 7/15/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:trs
(7)

EX-103

REC-39 100-428091-7056

16 JUL 18 1968

98 JUL 23 1968

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-376537)

7/15/68

SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
ReDulet to NY 7/10/68, and NYlet to Bu 4/23/68,
captioned COLO, (Replacement and Neutralization Program) IS-C.

af The last mentioned reference sets forth that when interviewed (concerning reactivation) on 3/28/68, the source advised that his heart condition no longer causes him any concern so long as he follows his doctor's advice (moderately). He appeared to be in good health. He works every day.

3-Bureau (100-376537) (RM)
(1-100-428691)
1-New York (100-134637) (SUB C) (41)
1-New York [REDACTED]

b7D

RJA:fam
(5)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

73
54 JUL 25 1968

100-428691-
NOT RECORDED

152 JUL 19 1968

RA

EX 106

July 16, 1968

REC 54


100-428091-7057



It was with deepest sorrow that my associates and I learned of the passing of your husband and we want to offer heartfelt sympathy to you and your family. While words are most inadequate, I hope the knowledge that his friends in the FBI share your grief will be of some comfort in your bereavement.

REC'D CIVIL RIGHTS

b7D



Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

- 1 - New York
Reurtel 7-15-68.
1 - Mr. Sullivan - Enclosure
Attention SA R. C. Putnam.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

AWT:jas (5)

61 JUL 25 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

VIA TELETYPE

JUL 15 1968

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

WA ----10----

FBI NEW YORK

8:40 PM URGENT 7-15-68 AWS

TO DIRECTOR (PLAIN)

FROM NEW YORK

o Solo

[REDACTED] CORRESPONDENCE MATTERS.

[REDACTED] A TRUE AND TRUSTED FRIEND OF THE FBI

WHO PROVIDED VALUABLE SERVICES IN THE SOLO OPERATION (BUFILE

ONE ZERO ZERO FOUR TWO EIGHT ZERO NINE ONE) DIED ON

SATURDAY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND A BROTHER OF SA

[REDACTED] NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION

NYO INDICES.

IT IS REQUESTED A PERSONAL LETTER OF SYMPATHY FROM

THE DIRECTOR BE SENT TO [REDACTED]

HE IS SURVIVED BY THREE CHILDREN AND THREE GRAND

CHILDREN. FUNERAL IS WEDNESDAY, SEVEN SEVENTEEN NEXT.

END

WA...MSE

FBI WASH DC

REC 54

22 JUL 18 1968

EX 100

MR. DELOACH FOR THE DIRECTOR

CC: Mr. Bishop

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637 Sub C)
SUBJECT : SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

DATE: 7/16/68

Remylet, 4/24/68.

[redacted] was recontacted on 7/9/68, on [redacted] by SA JOHN A. HAAG.

[redacted] was observed near his place of employment at [redacted] and was engaged in conversation as SA HAAG happened by. SA [redacted] observed nearby.

[redacted] greeted the agent pleasantly and social amenities were exchanged. When SA HAAG asked if anything had happened since they last met, [redacted] stated that no one (Soviets) had been to see him and that he did not think they would. He continued that a few years ago he had gone to Europe with a group of psychiatrists and had visited relatives in the USSR and Poland. He felt that if the Soviets wanted to talk to him, they had ample time to do so on this trip.

b6
b7C
b7D

SA HAAG stated that while he was inclined to agree, he did not rule out contacts entirely and reiterated [redacted] long and loyal Communist Party service.

[redacted] merely nodded and the conversation shifted to everyday things until he reached the door of the laundry, at which he is employed. At this point the interview was terminated with the understanding that SA HAAG would contact [redacted] again.

[redacted] was pleasant and affable throughout the interview more so than on first contact.

He will be contacted again.

1-904
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (41)

EX-110 REC 54

6 JUL 22 1968

JAH:eac
(3)



9 JUL 25 1968

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/12/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO

IS-C

(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

Re New York letter to the Bureau, 5/22/68, reflecting the results of an interview with [REDACTED]

Efforts to contact and locate [REDACTED] under conditions sufficiently discreet for re-interview have been unsuccessful since re letter.

On 7/2/68, a pretext telephone contact with [REDACTED]

disclosed that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]

Consequently efforts to re-interview [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] will be suspended until after Labor Day (September 2, 1968).

1-904
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

RJQ:jmm
(3)



96 JUL 25 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

EX-110

REC 54

100-428091-7059
JUL 22 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/18/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReBulet dated July 15, 1968, referring to "high-lights" of an interview between CG 5824-S* and MIKHAIL POLONIK, the Soviet who handles the Solo apparatus in Moscow. Bulet instructed that CG 5824-S* be immediately interviewed in depth concerning a number of items in relet.

Information set forth in NYlet dated July 3, 1968, concerning discussions with POLONIK represent the entire recollection of CG 5824-S* of these discussions which took place on June 24 and 25, 1968, and concerning which CG 5824-S* was exhaustively interviewed on June 30 and July 1, 1968.

In accordance with Bureau instructions, the information set forth in NYlet dated July 3, 1968, concerning [redacted] has been furnished separately to WFO.

Relative to the "alleged legislative lobby" the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) is supposed to have set up in Washington, D.C.; CG 5824-S* has learned nothing additional concerning this lobby from conversations with GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA. CG 5824-S* voiced the opinion that this is another "pipe dream" of GUS HALL which he dreamed up for the purpose of impressing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the nature and breadth of his contacts.

In regard to the establishment of a laundry or similar establishment to serve as a drop for Soviet funds, CG 5824-S* will, at the earliest opportunity, pursue the possibilities of injecting [redacted] into this operation, concerning which the Bureau has been previously informed.

②-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) Info (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 25 1968

REC 28 100-428091-7060

EX-105

6 JUL 22 1968

STAMP: FBI

CG-134-46 Sub B

Concerning the Soviet request for electronic equipment to be purchased by NY 694-S* CG 5824-S* has not yet had the opportunity to consult [redacted] of Chicago concerning this matter. At such time as CG 5824-S* obtains information from [redacted] the Bureau will be informed and Chicago will follow Bureau instructions in reBulet.

b6
b7c

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/17/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Soviet Views on Disarmament."

The information appearing in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished during the period June 30 to July 2, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* advised that he had obtained the enclosed information during discussions on June 24, 1968, in Moscow, USSR, with A. S. BELYAKOV, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC 25

100-428091-7061
6 JUL 22 1968

EX-100

JUL 13 3 43 PM '68



9 JUL 25 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C.

July 17, 1968

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

During July, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During late June, 1968, a highly placed official of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), made the following comments concerning the Soviet attitude on disarmament. He stated that the USSR is convinced that something has to be done about reaching some agreement with the United States on the matter of disarmament. If it were not for the constant drain on the Soviet economy to keep up in the arms race, the USSR could accomplish wonders with the additional money freed for other uses. He emphasized that the reason the USSR is not making the progress it should in more capital investment, greater productivity, and more consumer goods for the Soviet people, is because of the constant drain for arms.

According to this Soviet official, the economic situation in the USSR is not as bad as it once was, but it has not improved too radically. One of the problems is that the USSR is still exporting some items needed for the home market. Therefore, there is much talk within economic

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-7061

SOVIET VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

~~SECRET~~

circles in the USSR that they would like to divert their money and resources to other areas than arms, but they cannot. Of course, such changes would not affect Soviet aid to groups fighting wars of national liberation, such as the war in Vietnam, to whom arms and aid will continue to be sent.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/17/68

FROM: *MWJ*

SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: *P*

SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Comments Regarding Communist Party of the Soviet Union - Communist Party, USA Relations."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on June 29 to July 1, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

EX-116

REC-37 REC 37

16 JUL 23 1968

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 AUG 7 1968

COMMENTS REGARDING COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION - COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
RELATIONS

On June 24, 1968, a representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) held a discussion with A. S. Belyakov, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). During the course of this discussion, Belyakov commented as follows concerning relations between the CPSU and the CP, USA:

Belyakov remarked upon the actions of the CP, USA delegation at the recent meetings in Budapest, Hungary, from June 12-21, 1968, in preparation for the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties scheduled to be held November 25, 1968, in Moscow, USSR. He noted that the CP, USA had consistently supported the position of the CPSU during the debates in those meetings, especially on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat which was a major point of difference at the meetings. Belyakov stated that the CPSU thanks the CP, USA for its loyalty, but at the same time thinks that the CP, USA should act more independently, because it does not look right for both Parties to always present such a united front. According to Belyakov, the reason these two Parties are so close is because their thoughts seem to coincide; nevertheless, if the CP, USA has some different opinion, it should be said so. In this regard, Belyakov continued, Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, has requested that Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, be informed that Brezhnev would like to hear from Hall from time to time. He asked that Hall write frank letters to him about such problems as come to Hall's mind. Brezhnev said that he has the impression that ordinarily Hall can be a very "ornery guy" and speaks his mind. Brezhnev got the feeling that the last time he and Hall had met in the Fall of 1967, Hall had been holding back somewhat. Brezhnev had remarked specifically that when Hall had last been in the USSR, Hall had gone out and talked to some of the workers in their factories and had compared their efforts unfavorably with factories in the United States. Brezhnev stated that he had liked this honest criticism from Hall but felt that Hall could have said more to him but did not. Therefore, Brezhnev asked that Hall write such frank letters directly to him.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/17/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Soviet Reaction to 'Pueblo Incident.'"

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* during the period June 30 to July 1, 1968, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels regarding the international communist movement thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* advised that he had obtained the enclosed information during discussions on June 24, 1968, in Moscow, USSR, with A. S. BELYAKOV, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

- 1-904 with lead
- ②-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
 - 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
 - 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

LHM
Copy to: State, CIA, DIA
by routing slip for (Lincoln)

☒ Info ☐ action

date: 7-22-68
by: per [signature]



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 31 1968

EX-116

REC-37

100-428091-7063
16 JUL 23 1968

INT. SEC.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

July 17, 1968

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET REACTION TO "PUEBLO INCIDENT"

During July, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During late June, 1968, a leading official of the International Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), made the following remarks concerning the reaction of the Government of the USSR during the incident precipitated by the seizure of the United States Naval vessel "Pueblo" by North Korea. He stated that at that time tremendous pressure was exerted on the USSR by the North Koreans who insisted that the USSR do something. They asked "Why don't you start bombing?" The USSR finally succeeded in calming down the Koreans. However, it was no accident that Soviet planes and submarines were used to keep very close watch on the USS Enterprise when that ship began to move closer. Furthermore, the North Koreans were assured by the USSR that it would act if North Korea was subjected to attack but until that should happen the USSR did not want to aggravate the situation.

On that same occasion, as well as during the Middle East crisis in June, 1967, the Cubans also tried to bring pressure to bear on the USSR. On both occasions, Fidel Castro personally went to the Soviet Embassy in

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~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

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declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428091- 7063

SOVIET REACTION TO "PUEBLO INCIDENT"

~~SECRET~~

Havana in a very argumentative way and personally delivered a message to be sent to Moscow stating that Cuba was ready to go to war and demanding that the USSR give notice that there would be a nuclear war if the United States made a false move.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/17/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Discussions with Boris N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June, 1968."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during the period June 29 through July 1, 1968, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

Information concerning subjects discussed herein was previously furnished to the Bureau by CGlet dated June 13, 1968, captioned, "CP, USA - YOUTH MATTERS" and CGlet dated June 17, 1968, captioned, "SOLO."

1-904 with 1 encl

②-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC 37
100-428091-7064
16 JUL 23 1968



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 31 1968

DISCUSSIONS WITH BORIS N. PONOMAREV,
SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION,
JUNE, 1968

During late June, 1968, a meeting was held in Budapest, Hungary, with Boris N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), who is in charge of the International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, and a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Government of the USSR. Since Ponomarev was Chairman of the meeting of the Working Group making preparations for the world communist conference in Moscow, his time was limited and this discussion was held during a break in the deliberations of the Working Group.

At the outset, Ponomarev inquired concerning the political situation in the United States, especially as a result of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. He was told that the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) was still discussing this situation but the political picture had definitely changed. As of that time, Senator Eugene McCarthy appeared to have no chance at all to win the Democratic Party's nomination for the Presidency. Up to that time there was no third alternative between the Democratic and Republican Parties, but there was some hope for the peace and freedom party if that party could convince Dr. Benjamin Spock and Mrs. Corretta King to accept the nomination for President and Vice President.

Ponomarev was asked whether he had received the message from the CP, USA concerning the need for immediate delivery of the remaining funds promised to the CP, USA by the CPSU. Ponomarev reacted by asking, "What, are you asking for money again?" He was told that the emphasis was being placed on quick delivery of the money already promised to the CP, USA. However, as to his question, the answer was, "Yes, but not at this time." The time would come when the CP, USA must ask for more money. All the reasons for such a request were outlined to Ponomarev: This is an election year in the United States and CP, USA participation in the electoral struggle has required a great deal of money; the

CP, USA is coming out with its new daily paper which has been a serious financial drain; there may be a third ticket in the electoral struggle which will require extensive funding from the CP, USA; the CP, USA itself may run candidates in the election which will require more funds; and, the CP, USA has had to call a Special National Convention which is expensive. So, the foundation for a later request was laid with Ponomarev and later with his Chief Deputy, A. S. Belyakov, as well as with Nikolai V. Mostovets, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, although no concrete request was made at that time.

During a discussion of the progress thus far of the meeting of the Working Group, Ponomarev's attention was called to the fact that there was a lot of discussion concerning the problems of youth, and to the fact that a special section of the draft document being prepared by this meeting was devoted to the subject of youth. Ponomarev was told that Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA, believes that such problems of youth are not confined to capitalist countries and that the socialist countries have the same problems. Therefore, Hall has suggested that there be organized some kind of international conference on the ideological problems of youth and the influence of petty bourgeois ideology on youth. Hall thought this conference might even be made a special part of the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, USSR, during November, 1968. Ponomarev replied that he thought this was not a bad idea at all. However, Ponomarev was of the opinion that such a youth conference should follow the Moscow meeting and should not be part of the main conference. He indicated that he will look into the prospects for such a meeting further.

Ponomarev was then asked if any progress had been made on Hall's proposal for an international communist press bureau. Ponomarev stated that the CPSU had made a number of inquiries on this subject but it was found that very few Parties are in favor of this idea. Although the CPSU supports this proposal, none of the other big CPs do so. The CPSU had also investigated the costs of such a project and had found that it would cost a minimum of two to three million dollars to establish such a press bureau and run it for one year. The CP, USA and the other Parties which support the idea don't have the money to do the job. Ponomarev said he

was not rejecting the idea but he did want Hall to know that it is a big problem. Furthermore, there is another problem connected with this project which may be a bigger problem than the money. This problem is where should the press bureau be located. It seems to be agreed by all, including Hall, that it should not be located in a socialist country. Neither the French nor the British would accept it, and Ponomarev was of the opinion that it could not even be located in Vienna, Austria. Although cooperative to some extent in the past, the Austrian Government has lately been pressuring for the removal from Vienna of the International Institute for Peace. Therefore, the two major problems connected with this project are funds and location.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/17/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Youth in USSR."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on June 29 and 30, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* advised that he had obtained the information in the enclosed letterhead memorandum during discussions on June 24, 1968, in Moscow, USSR, with A. S. BELYAKOV, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

- 1-904 with *handwritten*
- ②-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

Copy to *State, CPH*
by routing slip for *Leinson*

☒ Info ☐ action

date

by

7-22-68
REP/ab

EX-116

REC 37

100-428091-7065

16 JUL 23 1968



98 JUL 31 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

July 17, 1968

~~SECRET~~

YOUTH IN USSR

During June, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During late June, 1968, a leading official of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), made the following remarks concerning the youth in the USSR:

At the outset, a question had been raised concerning the reasons for the demotion of Sergei Pavlovich Pavlov who had until recently been First Secretary of the Leninist Young Communist League. After first dismissing Pavlov's demotion as merely a change of jobs, this official then turned to a discussion of the youth in the USSR.

He stated that the Soviet youth had some serious grievances, and the CPSU fully intends to satisfy them. He emphasized that the changes which would be made were being undertaken upon the initiative of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, CPSU, and of Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, himself. First of all, the USSR is going to establish "participatory democracy" in the universities and schools, as a result of which the students will have a large measure of responsibility and participation in the administration of the schools. Then, the USSR will increase the pay of

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~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

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declassification~~

~~CLOSURE~~

100-428091-7065

YOUTH IN USSR

~~SECRET~~

the students and will improve their living quarters, build new dormitories, etc. No indication was given by this official as to when these changes will be put into effect.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-81)

DATE: JUL 18 1968

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-33729)

SUBJECT: CP, USA - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IS - C
(OO:NY)

THIS INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED UPON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE BUREAU FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY AND YOU ARE CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED WITH RESPECT TO ANY DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED AS THIS INFORMATION, BY ITS VERY NATURE, TENDS TO IDENTIFY THE INFORMANT. UNLESS THIS INFORMATION IS RECEIVED FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN CG 5824-S* AND NY 694-S*, IT SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED, EVEN IN PARAPHRASED FORM, IN ANY COMMUNICATION PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU.

On July 12, 1968, CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) will send a delegation of CP, USA members to the USSR for a period of one month for rest and travel during the month of August, 1968. The group expects to leave New York City, July 30, 1968, via Aeroflot direct flight to Moscow, USSR. The members of this group are identified as follows:

- 1-904
- 3-Bureau (RM)
(1 - 100-428091 (SOLO))
- 3-Cleveland (RM)
(1 - 100- (CP, USA - International Relations))
(1 - 100-1207 (PHIL BART))
(1 - 100- (CONNIE BART))
- 5-Los Angeles (RM)
(1 - 100- (CP, USA - International Relations))
(1 - 100- [REDACTED])
(1 - 100- [REDACTED])
(1 - 100- [REDACTED])
- 2-Minneapolis (RM)
(1 - 100- (CP, USA - International Relations))
(1 - 100- [REDACTED])

WAB:MDW

(see page 2 for additional copies)

NOT RECORDED
202 JUL 30 1968



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CG 100-33729

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(1 - 100- (CP. USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

12-New York (RM)

(1 - 100- (CP, USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- (FRANCES BORDOFSKY)

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

(1 - 100- (DANIEL RUBEL)

(1 - 100-269 (HENRY WINSTON)

(1 - 100-53332 (FERN WINSTON)

(1 - 100-9595 (WILLIAM WEINSTONE)

(1 - 100-15828 (JOSEPH BRANDT)

(1 - 100- (SYLVIA BRANDT)

(1 - 100-134637 (SOLO)

(1 - 134-91)

2-Philadelphia (RM)

(1 - 100- (CP. USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

3-Pittsburgh (RM)

(1 - 100- (CP. USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

2-San Francisco (RM)

(1 - 100- (CP. USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- [REDACTED]

2-Chicago


(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-165)

WAB:MDW

(36)

b6
b7C

CG 100-33729



FRANCES BORDOFSKY

member, State Committee and
State Executive Board, New
York District, CP, USA; Bronx
County Organizer

b6
b7c

DANIEL RUBEL

member, State Committee, New
York District, CP, USA; Chairman,
Kings County (Brooklyn)



[REDACTED]

Additionally, three CP, USA members who have been designated as CP, USA delegates to the Ninth World Youth Festival in Sofia, Bulgaria, may join this group in Moscow on August 3 or 4, 1968. These individuals are identified as follows: b6 b7C

[REDACTED]

There is some possibility that the [REDACTED] may not attend the Youth Festival but will, instead, proceed directly from the United States to Moscow.

[REDACTED] has been designated as leader of this delegation and her assistant is to be [REDACTED]

Since this group is predominantly Negro, the CP, USA desires that the delegation be given a tour to one of the Asian Republics of the USSR which is nominally self-governing, in order to demonstrate the Soviet solution of the nationality minority and racial problems in the USSR.

CG 5824-S* further reported on July 12, 1968, that a small delegation from the CP, USA will visit the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during July and August, 1968. This delegation is to be composed of HENRY and FERN WINSTON, PHIL and CONNIE BART, and will be joined subsequently by WILLIAM WEINSTONE from Budapest, Hungary, where he will be the CP, USA delegate to a meeting beginning July 17, 1968, of Communist and Workers' Parties preparing documents for the International

CG 100-33729

Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties scheduled to be held in Moscow, USSR, beginning November 25, 1968. WEINSTONE was scheduled to depart from New York via Air France flight 010, 10:00 a.m., July 11, 1968, arriving Paris, France, 10:00 p.m. He was scheduled to depart Paris, July 12, 1968, via Hungarian Air Transport flight 354, arriving Budapest, 5:30 p.m. The WINSTONS and the BARTs expect to depart for Berlin, GDR, about July 21 or 22, 1968. While the remainder of the delegation expects to remain in the GDR for approximately one month, HENRY and FERN WINSTON will depart for Moscow, USSR, about August 1, 1968. This group traveling to the GDR will also be accompanied by [redacted] and [redacted] who will remain in the GDR for approximately ten days following which they will travel to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. b6 b7C

CG 5824-S* also reported on July 12, 1968, that JOSEPH and SYLVIA BRANDT will pass through Moscow, en route to Ulan Bator, Mongolian People's Republic, where they are expected to arrive about August 3 or 4, 1968, for a month's stay as an official delegation from the CP, USA.

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTED IN

ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428)

DATE: 7/19/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReCGlet and enclosed letterhead memorandum dated July 17, 1968, entitled, "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."

On July 15, 1968, the Chicago Office received through a mail drop box maintained in the name of N. Hansel, Box 7363, Chicago, Illinois 60680, USA, for CG 5824-S*, a communication from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) which bore the return address Abs. P. M. Schulz, Berlin C 2, Werderscher Mark, postmarked June 11, 1968.

The contents of this communication consisted of two booklets of informative material from the SUPG entitled, "The Concept of Franz Josef Strauss - Basis of the Expansionist and Anti-democratic Policy of the West German Government," and "The Tendencies of Development in West Germany in the Light of the Elections in Baden-Wurtemberg," both dated June, 1968.

It is to be noted that copies of relet with enclosed letterhead memorandum and booklet entitled, "The Tendencies of Development in West Germany in the Light of the Elections in Baden-Wurtemberg" were furnished to the Bureau for submission to the Government of Bonn at the request of Legat, Bonn.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two Xerox copies each and for the New York Office one Xerox copy each of the above booklets. These booklets will be turned over to CG 5824-S* for eventual transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA.

- 1-904
②-Bureau (Enc. 4)(RM)
1-New York (100-134637)(Enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(4)

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by

EX-116

16 JUL 23 1968



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 31 1968

ENCLOSURES (4) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

2 Xerox copies ea of following:

Booklet entitled "The Concept of Franz Josef Strauss - Basis of the Expansionist and Anti-democratic Policy of the West German Government"

Booklet entitled, "The Tendencies of Development in West Germany in the Light of the Elections in Baden-Wurtemberg"

RE: SOLO
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau dtd 7/19/68



100-428091-7066

INFORMATION MATERIAL

**The Tendencies
of Development
in West Germany
in the Light
of the Elections
in
Baden-Württemberg**

8254 - 2

Berlin, June 1968

100-428091-7066

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On 28 April 1968, elections took place in the West German province of Baden-Württemberg which revealed the tendencies of development in the whole of the West German Federal Republic. Their importance reaches far beyond the provincial elections because they were a test for the elections to the Federal government to take place in 1969. All West German parties had geared their election campaigns to this and had instructed their leading politicians accordingly. The Bonn government parties, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which had so far governed together also in the province of Baden-Württemberg wanted, according to their own declaration, to undertake a test as to how the population of the Federal Republic would judge the formation of the "Grand Coalition", their domestic and foreign policy and the positions of the individual government parties. Also after the elections, all serious commentaries and evaluations were based on the test character of this election for the whole of the Federal Republic.

What development tendencies in the West German Federal Republic were revealed by the results of this election?

1. The main party of West German big capital and of the militaristic forces – the CDU/CSU – was able to relatively stabilize its influence with the voters after it had overcome its political crisis through the coalition with the Social Democratic ministers. Thereby, it had created new vantage points for its goal of solitary rule in Bonn.
2. Renazification of the Federal Republic was greatly speeded up during the government tenure of the "Grand Coalition", neo-nazism reveals itself more and more openly and the neo-nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) is gaining votes and mandates in rapidly growing numbers.
3. The entrance of Social Democratic leaders into a government coalition with the CDU/CSU is in a growing measure rejected by the West German voters which is leading to a loss of votes for the Social Democratic Party to an extent not hitherto experienced.
4. In view of the sharpened course to the right in the Federal Republic and of the growing ideological, political and state terror against all democratic and anti-fascist forces, it was not possible in Baden-Württemberg for "the democratic left" to overcome the anti-democratic "5 per cent"

clause and to elect representatives to parliament. The "5 per cent" handicap was only overcome in such cities as Stuttgart and Mannheim.

Altogether, the elections in Baden-Württemberg have confirmed the evaluation that the forming of the "Grand Coalition", the entrance of the Social Democratic ministers into an imperialist government under Kiesinger and Strauss as well as their reactionary domestic and expansive foreign policy, is resulting in a sharpened development to the right, that it speeds up renazification and thereby considerably heightens the dangers which emanate from West Germany for all the European peoples.

Of what help is the government coalition with the Social Democratic ministers to the CDU/CSU?

The West German CDU—as was clearly shown by the elections in Baden-Württemberg—could thanks to the "Grand Coalition" overcome to a great extent the difficult political crisis in which it had found itself under Adenauer and Erhard since the middle of the fifties in view of the growing stability of the GDR and the increasing inner contradictions in West Germany. The "blood-donor" role of the Social Democratic ministers not only helped the CDU to retain the leadership of the Bonn government. With the help of the Social Democratic ministers and with the consent of the SPD parliamentary fraction they could embark on the program of "inner formation" and more sharply pursue the expansive foreign policy in accordance with the strategic conception of West German imperialism formulated by Strauss.

In the spirit of this conception, West German imperialism intends to enlarge its position as European main partner of USA imperialism. The strategic goal consists in extending its power over the GDR, in being the pace-setter of counter-revolution in other European socialist countries and to establish itself as the leading imperialist power in Europe. In this connection the whole significance has to be stressed which is due to the program "Entwurf für Europa" (Design for Europe) formulated by Strauss. It is much more than a statement of opinion by a single politician because

- Strauss has written down what the decisive groups of armament capital standing behind him wanted him to. Published in the post-war period, this concept shifts the points for the beginning period of West Germany's forced expansion policy.
- This "Design for Europe" is not confined to the formula-

tion of goals for a few years ahead but contains an all-inclusive strategic conception of West German imperialism for the correction of the results of the Second World War.

- Strauss had formulated how, in spite of the changed relation of forces in favour of socialism, an attempt is to be made to change the status quo in favour of the West through a long-range policy of economic, ideological and cultural penetration into the socialist countries.
- Unmistakably and in every detail, Strauss has worked out which domestic conditions would have to be created and what kind of government coalitions are necessary in order to be able to pursue the policy of revanchism and of the extension of the power of West German imperialism in coordination with the USA global strategy.

The elections in Baden-Württemberg provide the proof: the Bonn presumption to sole representation, the revanchist foreign policy which for the purpose of deception is termed as "new Eastern policy" and "policy of relaxation of tension" by the Social Democratic ministers, is grist for the mills of the CDU/CSU in the Federal Republic as well as for the neo-nazi NPD. The West German voters see in the government policy pursued by Bonn—including the Social Democratic ministers—the continuation of the policy of the CDU/CSU. As shown by the elections in Baden-Württemberg, the beneficiaries of the foreign-political demagoguery perpetrated by Brandt, are Kiesinger and Strauss. The same applies to the economic policy pursued on a government level by Schiller which he carries out in the interest of monopoly capital against the interest of the trade unions and which therefore, in spite of all blandishments, does not benefit in the last resort the Social Democratic Party but the party of monopoly capital. (The CDU received 44.2% of the votes in Baden-Württemberg which was 46,493 more votes than in 1964, while the SPD received 29%, which amounts to 227,756 less votes.)

The West German CDU draws the conclusion from the election results in Baden-Württemberg to continue the "Grand Coalition" in Bonn with the Social Democrats until the goals are reached for whose purpose Social Democratic ministers were included into the cabinet. This applies to the Emergency Laws as well as to the entire package of reactionary domestic state reforms. The CDU wants to continue to use the Social Democratic ministers and their demagoguery to camouflage the imperialist revanchist policy and to facilitate the political and economic penetration of the socialist countries.

The retention or termination of the "Grand Coalition" is for the CDU/CSU mainly a question of the moment at which

the prerequisites for their solitary rule or for another form of coalition will have arisen. The leadership of the CDU/CSU views the present cabinet as a transition government and Kiesinger as a transitional chancellor who is supposed to exploit Social Democracy during the "Grand Coalition" in order to prepare the solitary rule of the CDU/CSU with the simultaneous weakening of the Social Democratic Party.

Why is renazification on the increase under the "Grand Coalition"?

The election results in Baden-Württemberg unequivocally contradict all claims that the "Grand Coalition" in Bonn would form a brake against the development of the openly neo-nazi NPD. The opposite is the case. Neo-nazism finds its fertile soil in the official Bonn government policy, domestic as well as foreign. The NPD and the Bonn government stand essentially on the same ideological and political-programmatic platform. Thereby, the role of the NPD as a storm troop of the most reactionary section of West German monopoly capital is confirmed. It has in common with the government of the "Grand Coalition" the pursuit of the interests of monopoly capital, anti-communism, the revanchist program for the changing of the status quo in Europe, the pretension to sole representation, enmity toward the GDR, hatred and hostility towards all domestic democratic and anti-fascist forces.

The only difference consists in the fact that the NPD spells out and formulates its political slogans still more openly and unrestrainedly, sets its revanchist goals even further and its domestic policy goals still more sharply. It combines this with social demagoguery, attacks the economic policy of the government, and makes social and economic promises of all kinds for the most diverse strata of the population as was formerly done by the Hitler party. As a neo-nazi party, it combines this with anti-American accents, with extreme chauvinist slogans, with an open glorification of militaristic traditions.

In this way, the NPD creates the impression of being an opposition party to channel dissatisfied popular forces to the right and to make appear as though the official Bonn policy is a "policy of the center". It is in reality the propagandist of fascism. Since in this situation the Social Democratic leadership is making common cause with the CDU/CSU thereby supporting the Bonn policy with its negative results for the population, they enable the neo-nazis to offer themselves as an opposition before the broad, dissatisfied strata of the West German population and thereby gain territory. This was sim-

ilarly the case also during the last years of the Weimar Republic when Hitler fascism was striving for power.

Although the neo-nazi NPD party made its first political appearance only in February 1965, today it commands through provincial elections in 7 out of 10 Federal provinces alone, more than 1,800,000 votes and accordingly 61 seats in provincial legislatures. The NPD was able to gain the highest percentage of votes (9.8 %) in Baden-Württemberg, which significantly is well over a year after the formation of the "Grand Coalition". During this period alone the NPD gained 38 seats in provincial legislatures while the SPD lost 28 mandates in the same period.

The West German Chancellor Kiesinger declared that this development is damaging to the foreign policy of the Bonn government but that he sees no danger to domestic policy arising from it. How is this statement of the chief of the West German government to be evaluated?

Bonn is afraid that in foreign countries the growth of neo-nazism will reveal the actual state of the West German Federal Republic and that especially the picture of the West German reality as drawn by the Social Democratic ministers is becoming discredited. Therefore, Bonn is doing everything to make appear harmless and play down the dangers of neo-nazism and most of all the role of the NPD. At the same time, however, not only is nothing being undertaken against the NPD but its activities are being supported.

Why does the Bonn government not propose the prohibition, why does it not act against the NPD?

1. The Kiesinger government does not act against the NPD because if it wanted to fight the neo-nazi party politically it would have to declare war against its own program.
2. The Kiesinger government does not propose the prohibition of the NPD because at an official legal procedure against the NPD the whole extent of the renazification of the Federal Republic would have to come to light. It would become a legally established fact that the decisive Bonn ministries and offices are permeated with old nazis. This applies mainly to those ministries which are presently headed by Social Democratic ministers such as the Foreign Office, the All German Ministry, the Ministry of Economics.
3. Kiesinger does not apply for prohibition against the NPD because he himself functioned as an active nazi, as a go-between between Ribbentrop and Goebbels and because

around today's Bonn chancellor, more old nazis occupy functions than in the leadership of the neo-nazi NPD.

These facts prove that the growth of neo-nazism in West Germany is directly supported by the occupation of Bonn offices by neo-nazis. The struggle against the renazification of West Germany can therefore not be waged successfully if it is not mainly directed towards cleaning out active nazis from Bonn's offices and functions.

Why the SPD suffered its heaviest electoral defeat

The provincial elections in Baden-Württemberg brought the biggest electoral defeat to West German Social Democracy since the existence of the West German Federal Republic. (The percentage of votes for the SPD sank from 37.3 % in the year 1964 to 29 %, which constitutes a loss of 227,756 voters.) The policy of Brandt and Wehner, the policy of unity with the CDU/CSU and enmity against the GDR, leads as could be expected to a fiasco for the Social Democratic Party.

What situation faced the voters of Baden-Württemberg?

- Those voters who see through the character of the "Grand Coalition" behave according to the motto, "If the SPD makes CDU policy anyway, why not vote directly CDU."
- Those Social Democrats tied to their tradition who are dissatisfied with the "Grand Coalition" and the role of their leaders in the Bonn government but have not yet found the way to a genuine protest in "the democratic left", stayed away from the polls.
- Voters who hitherto voted for the SPD assuming they were giving their vote to an opposition party turned their backs on the SPD. Under the impression of the predominant anti-communism which was actively pursued by the Social Democratic leadership also, only a few turned to the left. At the occasion of these elections in Baden-Württemberg, it became obvious that the SPD had even lost a considerable part of voters to the NPD.

With the election results of Baden-Württemberg, the essential thesis of the Social Democratic leadership were disproven by which Brandt and Wehner had justified their entrance into the "Grand Coalition".

Most of all the thesis has been disproven that the participation in a government under the leadership of the CDU/CSU

constitutes the "lesser evil". In reality, the government participation of the Social Democratic ministers enables the great evil—the imperialist Bonn policy—to become realizable. Instead of an independent Social Democratic policy in the interest of the West German population, the Social Democratic ministers have delivered the SPD into the hands of the CDU/CSU. They provide in the Bonn parliament of the CDU/CSU the necessary majority for reactionary laws and strive also to put the West German trade unions on Bonn's leash.

The thesis is disproven that with the government participation in Bonn, the Social Democratic leadership has gained "half the power" and is on the best road to gaining complete power. The facts show that the CDU/CSU has all the power because its policies are being consistently realized. It is neo-nazism which has gained power and influence while the Social Democratic Party in the Bonn coalition is being tattered and weakened. The SPD is today further removed from power than ever in Bonn.

The thesis is disproven that through the common policy with the CDU/CSU the Social Democratic Party would break away from the "ghetto" into which it was confined by its voters, would establish itself as "people's party" and one day become the leading government party. The elections in Baden-Württemberg prove that the Social Democratic Party not only does not win more votes in this way, but has to suffer serious losses. It has already slipped under the 30 per cent borderline, i.e. back to the state of over 10 years ago. On the disastrous path towards a bourgeois people's party, the SPD loses, as seen in Baden-Württemberg, even a considerable part of their traditional social-democratic support from the working class centers.

Prospects for 1969

Observers of the official West German public organs come to the conclusion that the Social Democratic Party if it persists in the road taken will at least experience no less a fiasco in the Federal elections in 1969. It was stated in this connection that the SPD faces the following dilemma after the next federal elections. Either to accommodate itself as a weakened partner to a further strengthened CDU/CSU, or to sit as a weakened opposition in the Federal parliament next to a ultra-right, ruthlessly operating NPD fraction which then would be already on the way to becoming a coalition partner of the CDU/CSU. The chance which was missed in 1966 to form together with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) a Social

Democratically led Federal government, has ceased to exist for the SPD after the self-ruination of its own influence. The warning issued before the formation of the "Grand Coalition" has come true—that the SPD with its entry into the "Grand Coalition" was able to rescue the CDU/CSU from its crisis but has thereby loaded this crisis onto its own party.

What sort of lessons did the Social Democratic leaders draw from their electoral defeat?

From the official declarations of the party chairman Brandt and the chairman of the SPD parliamentary fraction Schmidt which was issued after a session of the leading body of the party, it can be seen that the leadership of the SPD wants to persist in the course of togetherness and in the government participation in the framework of the "Grand Coalition". Only strong pressure on the part of the SPD membership and functionaries can sway them from their dogmatic course to be blood donor for the CDU.

In contrast to the many critical voices among circles of social democratic members and functionaries who demand a turning away from the CDU policy and which go as far as demands to quit the "Grand Coalition", the Social Democratic ministers restrict themselves to the declaration that it is only necessary to represent the Social Democratic part of the Bonn government policy to the population in a popular way. Even bourgeois commentators state concerning this development that this position of the Social Democratic leadership can only be understood as an attempt to check once more the disquiet in the ranks of their own party originating from the elections in Baden-Württemberg and to avoid essential conclusions. As far as serious measures have been announced, these are directed solely against the left, against party members who demand a basic change of direction and against the trade unions and their struggle against the Emergency Laws. With the resolution to continue the course of the "Grand Coalition" with the CDU/CSU and the course towards a bourgeois people's party, the Social Democratic ministers exactly comply with the wish of West German big capital which needs Social Democracy for the time being in the government coalition in order to realize its goals. For all these reasons the crisis in which German Social Democracy finds itself must become sharper.

As far as the West German FDP is concerned, it has in view of the changeover of the Social Democratic leaders to the government camp succeeded to a certain extent in gaining

the appearance of an opposition party. By having constantly posed as "opposition to the black-red coalition" in the election campaign, the FDP was able to hitherto retain voting stock and to gain additional votes from some bourgeois liberal quarters as well as some former SPD voters (it reached 14.4 % of the votes.) However, this party does not constitute a genuine alternative to the Bonn policy. Its policy is directed towards offering itself again as a coalition partner under the leadership of the CDU/CSU.

About the results of the "democratic left"

At the elections in Baden-Württemberg there appeared for the first time an organization of voters of different progressive groupings in West Germany under the name of the "democratic left". Although it was founded only five months before the election day, it succeeded in gaining nearly 90,000 votes (2.3 %). In several important working class centers as e.g. in Stuttgart and Mannheim, it was able to reach nearly 6 % of the total vote which was not possible in the rural districts, least of all in purely agricultural districts.

Concerning this election result it should be noted that the proportion of the vote of the "democratic left" was twice as high as that of other progressive groupings at previous elections. Nevertheless, this election result does not comply with the prodigious growth of the extra-parliamentary opposition during the last months.

The reason for this lies in the fact that the "democratic left" was opposed by the united front of reaction which reached from the CDU/CSU over the Social Democratic Party leadership to the NPD and to the news media of the Springer monopoly as well as other mass media. The alternative represented by the "democratic left" to the policy of the "Grand Coalition" has been defamed as a source of "revolt and insecurity", to isolate it as far as possible from the public. Under the influence of this campaign of defamation many protest voters who are dissatisfied with Bonn's policy from the most varied motives were frightened off from a commitment to the "democratic left" and moved over to the right. The biggest factor in this were the electoral attacks which were systematically directed mainly against the "democratic left".

Instead of uniting with the forces of the extra-parliamentary opposition and fighting in a common front against the CDU and the neo-nazis, the Social Democratic leaders accused the "democratic left" of splitting tactics, it fought against it and thereby contributed itself to the splitting of oppositional forces and irritated many well-meaning voters.

The development of the extra-parliamentary opposition

After the elections in Baden-Württemberg the forces of the extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany have greatly strengthened their struggle against the immediately threatening parliamentary legislation of the Emergency Laws by the CDU/CSU-SPD majority in the Bonn parliament. An expression of this was the hitherto greatest democratic manifestation of the popular resistance against the policy of the "Grand Coalition", the "Star March" on Bonn and the demonstration of 80,000 representatives of all strata of the population against the Emergency Laws and their proponents as well as short if only scattered warning strikes.

The real unity of action of all democrats, anti-fascists and socialists of West Germany against the policy perpetrated by Bonn is developing in such movements. In this connection the slogan was advanced which is particularly meaningful in view of the parliamentary elections of 1969—not to vote for any member of parliament who voted for the Emergency Laws in the Federal parliament no matter to which party he belongs.

At the moment in West Germany a movement has been created for the first time through the development of the extra-parliamentary opposition, which expresses the interests of the people and organizes its struggle independent from the Social Democratic ministers. This is the beginning of a genuine, independent people's movement. Whoever wants to support it, whoever really wants a change in the relation of power in West Germany in favour of democratic progress, must pitch in in order to push back the adversaries of this democratic movement outside as well as inside of parliament.

Some conclusions for the policy of unity of action

The development in West Germany as reflected by the elections in Baden-Württemberg, as well as experiences of the working class movement lead to some important conclusions for the policy of unity of action:

- The neo-nazi movement in West Germany is just as little an outcome of the radicalized petty-bourgeoisie as the Hitler movement during the thirties in Germany, but it is the product of the might of finance capital, of its most reactionary, most aggressive representatives. The main figure representing this extreme wing of West German monopoly bourgeoisie is Franz Josef Strauss, the leader

of the West German CSU, who extends the decisive influence to the government policy of the "Grand Coalition" and who has formulated in his book "Design for Europe" the strategic conception of West German imperialism which determines Bonn's policy of the day. The neo-nazi NPD constitutes a second iron in the fire for the West German big bourgeoisie which it keeps heated up to retain its power and to be able to extend it. If this disastrous development is to be checked, the struggle has to be mainly directed against the policy of Strauss and Kiesinger and against those who make common cause with them.

- In West German Social Democracy, and this is borne out by the development after the elections in Baden-Württemberg, there are two lines: the line of the working class—represented by the masses of the Social Democratic workers, employees and the Social Democratic trade unionists and the line of the monopoly bourgeoisie—represented by the Social Democratic ministers who went over to the camp of imperialism. Whoever wants to give help and support to the working class forces, the anti-fascist and socialist forces within West German Social Democracy, must reject the policies of the Social Democratic ministers and must fight against them. The renunciation of the principal struggle against the positions subservient to imperialism of the Social Democratic ministers leads to a weakening of democracy and the abandonment of the class interests of the Social Democratic workers and trade unionists and hinders the development of a broad movement against neo-nazism and for progressive democracy in West Germany.
- What is needed more than ever by the real oppositional forces in West Germany, is the ability to recognize behind the political actions of the day and slogans of the adversary, the strategic goals of West German imperialism. Only in this way will they understand its whole danger. It is necessary to help the oppositional forces in West Germany to counterpose this strategy of imperialism with a strategy of peace, democracy and social progress in West Germany from which can be developed the single actions of the day and which can be directed towards a great goal. For this they need the support of the socialist camp. It will be all the more powerful, the more unitedly and cohesively the socialist community of states frustrates the actions of West German imperialism and thereby gives direct aid to the oppositional forces. From this point of view, the GDR makes very effort to develop its socialist

order all-sidedly to provide proof of the superiority of socialism and socialist state power.

In firm solidarity with all socialist countries and all progressive forces in West Germany, the GDR will undertake everything to reveal the secret of the imperialist war preparations in West Germany and not yield the fraction of an inch to any attempts of imperialist penetration. This in accordance with all experiences and with the declarations of the representatives of the democratic opposition in West Germany, is the best support which can be given them in their anti-imperialist struggle in West Germany.

INFORMATIVE MATERIAL

**The Concept
of Franz Josef Strauss -
Basis
of the Expansionist
and Anti-democratic
Policy
of the West German
Government**

Berlin, June 1968

100-428091-7066

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Introduction

Large-scale police attacks with rubber truncheons, water guns and firearms against young West German workers, students and pupils demonstrating for peace, democratic rights and social progress; summary proceedings in court; demands for "preventive" detention in concentration camps; feverish haste in whipping through the emergency laws; threats against the trade unions which demand co-determination; terror against the free expression of opinion; preparation of laws imposing financial dictatorship; the dangerous growth of open neo-nazism; political, moral and financial assistance to the USA in its murderous war against the people of Vietnam; obstruction of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; support of racist and military dictatorships such as in South Africa and Greece; non-recognition of the status quo and of the frontiers in Europe; revanchist sole representation pretension against the GDR—

that is the picture of the West German Federal Republic, clearly indicating the dangerous nature of the rightwing course followed by the ruling circles in West Germany. All these things are no less coincidental than the megalomaniacal "claims on the world" raised by Rainer Barzel, leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the West German Bundestag on 14 March 1968. They are rather an expression of the expansionist and reactionary course taken by the West German government in the new stage of development of West German imperialism. That course is based on a systematic political strategy.

The basic strategic conception of the policy of this new phase of development, marked by intensified expansion externally and further reactionary alignment internally, was developed by the chairman of the CDU and present West German Minister of Finance Franz Josef Strauss. In his book *Entwurf für Europa* (Concept for Europe), first published in London in 1965, Strauss defined the policy of West German imperialism over an extended period. Strauss developed a phased program for the alteration of the status quo in Europe in favour of West German imperialism, in direct connection with Hitler's program for the "New Order in Europe" and in line with the global strategy of US imperialism for the struggle against socialism, progress and national independence in the world. The phases of this program include winning hegemony in Western Europe, the acquisition of control over nuclear weapons, invasion of the GDR and its liquidation, the establishment of a so-called intermediate Europe dominated by imperialism, and finally the imperialist new order of Europe "up to the Bug and the Black Sea" (Franz Josef Strauss, *Entwurf für Europa*, Stuttgart, 1966,

p. 83 — all quotations without other references being given are taken from this book). This program also includes the reactionary alignment of all interior forces in conformity with the imperialist great power aspirations.

I.

Franz Josef Strauss—the "Strong Man" of West German Monopoly Capital

It is not by chance that the new phase of development of West German imperialism should be closely associated with the name of Strauss. Franz Josef Strauss is the most outstanding representative of those forces of the West German monopoly capitalist bourgeoisie which are conducting a particularly sharp struggle for hegemony in Europe, for the revision of the results of the Second World War, for the expansion of their sphere of power and the safeguarding of monopoly profits. The West German journal of big industry, the *Industriekurier*, commented on 10 November 1966:

"It is a fact that the still young economic politician, Strauss, is regarded as the strong man, from Abs to Beitz, in banking and heavy industry, capable of solving our economic problems."

Strauss was systematically made into the key political figure of the most reactionary group of West German monopoly capitalism in various stages. In the spring of 1945 the Americans appointed Strauss, at the time the barely 30-year-old first lieutenant and nazi officer in the Wehrmacht, as deputy district president at Schongau. Strauss won the favour of those in power by his notoriously reactionary attitude. As early as 1953 he was a member of the Bonn government.

1. Strauss Promoted the Construction of the West German Atomic Industry

As minister of atomic affairs in the Adenauer government, Strauss created important prerequisites for nuclear research and the production of fissionable material for the West German monopolies. He provided the relevant legal regulations and from the start oriented the development of that branch of industry on military purposes. Strauss was an eager supporter of the big trusts which made superprofits out of the atomic business and which used the nuclear industry as an instrument of power. At the same time Strauss forged the nuclear plots with the racist clique in South Africa, with Franco in Spain

and with the rulers of Israel, so as to evade the limitations imposed on West German imperialism by international agreements.

2. Strauss Built up the New Wehrmacht of West German Imperialism

In 1956 he was appointed Adenauer's war minister, so as to be able to forge ahead with large-scale military armament, in collaboration with the armament monopolies. During that period he strengthened the basis of his cooperation with the aggressive forces of West German armament capital by providing them with extensive and lucrative orders financed by the armament funds fed by West German taxpayers.

Strauss opened the way to commanding posts in the Bundeswehr, to Hitler generals and officers.

He ruthlessly ignored the resistance of the West German population to militarization and contributed to a decisive extent to the creation of an aggressive armed force in the form of the Bundeswehr commanded by fascist officers and similar in structure to that of the fascist Wehrmacht. The revanchist West German army was and still is being raised in the spirit proclaimed by Strauss on 20 March 1958 in the Bundestag:

"The only purpose of military preparation today could only be the eventuality of a Red War and nothing else."

That spirit is also characterized by the utterances in the autumn of 1966 by a captain in the Bundeswehr and influential leader of the open neo-Nazi NPD:

"Five years of civic training in the Bundeswehr qualified me to be a member of the NPD. That training inscribed the program of the NPD into my heart and soul."

3. Strauss Becomes the Key Figure of West German High Finance

13 August 1961 marked the day when the openly aggressive and reactionary political conception of Bonn failed. The imperialists began to shift to more flexible tactics. Strauss, who had shown an overdose of enthusiasm in fulfilling his orders, was temporarily removed from the limelight. He withdrew from the government. But behind the scenes he was being prepared with the utmost intensity for his part as the "strong man" of West German monopoly capital. Just as Adenauer had been the political representative of the German big bourgeoisie during the period of restoration, so Strauss was and is called upon to attend to the business of West German imperialism during

the next phase of its expansionist policy. And Strauss eagerly prepared himself. He developed the basic strategic conception which was to lead West German imperialism out of the crisis and make possible its hegemony in the whole of Europe under the new conditions and within the scope of the global strategy of US imperialism. That conception, expounded in *Entwurf für Europa*, corresponds to the class interests of West German monopoly capitalism. This book by F. J. Strauss is not unjustly described as the successor of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* in our time.

Strauss became minister of finance in the Kiesinger transition government. In 1966, when the political and economic difficulties of West German imperialism had led to an open crisis, monopoly capitalism was calling for a "strong man". The Springer press urgently demanded the return of Strauss to the government. Strauss for his part threw oil onto the flames of political crisis, called for a sharpened authoritarian course of a new West German government and used every means to make his reentry in the West German cabinet possible, with the declared aim of "establishing order". Strauss became Kiesinger's minister of finance in the new cabinet. Not unintentionally. The time had not yet arrived for him to become federal chancellor. The further way towards that end is to be paved by the compromise and transition Chancellor Kiesinger together with social democratic ministers. Strauss, however, was placed in a decisive key position in that government. As minister of finance he is to provide the economic and financial foundations for the new phase in home and foreign policy, and at the same time ensure the implementation of his conception as a whole. The Government Declaration of Kiesinger of December 1966 and the 16 months of governmental practice of the Grand Coalition in Bonn prove that the political strategy devised by Strauss constitutes the foundation of present-day West German home and foreign policy.

Strauss is regarded as the coming federal chancellor.

Leading circles of West German monopoly capital would like to see Strauss in office as head of the government even today. They would like to accustom the public to the idea that Kiesinger is a man of transition and would one day have to make way for Strauss. On 14 March 1968 the organ of West German big industry, the *Handelsblatt*, commented under the heading: "Strauss is coming to the fore":

"Kiesinger's moderator role has in effect become far more difficult, not least because of the circumstance that now, in contrast to previous times, he must very definitely take Franz Josef Strauss into account."

The big bourgeois weekly Christ und Welt surrounds Strauss with the myth of "divine gifts" which belong to the image of a leader:

"Strauss is one of the very few politicians in whom intellectual qualities are coupled with rustic features; who think in the lofty spheres of the intellect and who are capable of formulating those thoughts in conformity with the acquired self-articulation of the man-in-the-street. In Franz Josef Strauss that gift is coupled with a secularized understood charisma."

That is how Strauss is being praised as the prototype of the new German leader. In a macabre way this continues the imperialist propaganda of past days about a "kaiser by the grace of God", and of the "predestined" leader.

II.

"Concept for Europe—the Strategic Concept of West German Imperialism"

At the CSU Provincial Assembly on 1 July 1967 in Munich Strauss openly declared:

"It is our task... to solve the problems which have arisen with imperative and inevitable urgency in the course of the transition from the first to the second phase of German post-war policy."

In those words Strauss paraphrased the fact that the period of the restoration of the political and economic power of West German imperialism had come to an end and that West German imperialism has introduced a period of forced expansion. This transition took place at a time when the ruling circles in Bonn were confronted with an intensification of contradictions in home and foreign policy. West German monopoly capitalism is seeking a way out according to the old imperialist recipe: overcoming the difficulties at the expense of the German and other European peoples, i.e., by way of intensified reaction inside the country and expansion externally. The Strauss concept gave the basic directives. In his book Entwurf für Europa he wrote down the long-term strategy of West German imperialism to correct the results of the Second World War. Basically this revanchist concept is derived from the Hitlerite program of conquest. That is presumably why Strauss wrote in his book:

"German current policy could not exclusively rely on programs that are only intended to represent a contrast to all the things which Hitler did." (p. 151)

1. Strauss Wants to Change the Status Quo in Europe...

The basic idea of Strauss is the alteration of the relation of forces in the world in favour of imperialism. He proclaimed:

"Only a resolute initiative could help us to cast off the fetters of the status quo" (p. 7)

"We must acknowledge a 'European forward policy'" (p. 135)

"European forward policy means taking up the race against time by adapting our living conditions to the laws and standards of modern technology and on that basis striving for the reestablishment of the historic unity of Germany." (p. 135)

...by the Liquidation of Socialism

Strauss wrote in his book:

"Each move towards the unity of Europe and thus in the direction of the strengthening and autonomy of Europe will result in a change in the status quo—of course in favour of the West." (p. 102)

"Only a West European community of action will provide the starting point for a policy by means of which the demarcation line of the Yalta war conference can be eliminated." (p. 12)

"A united Western Europe should be the preliminary phase of the establishment of the United States of Europe, in which I should also like to include all peoples of Central and Eastern Europe." (p. 26)

Strauss therefore wants to hold up the transition from capitalism to socialism and restore the old capitalist system throughout the whole of Europe. This clearly shows that:

2. Strauss Acts within the Framework of the Aggressive US Global Strategy...

It is aimed at holding up the triumphal march of socialism in the world, brutally beating down all aspirations to freedom and once again extending imperialist rule to the whole world. In this spirit Strauss wrote in his Entwurf für Europa:

"United Europe should take up the position of an independent power between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby assuring the greater weight of free society in the play of world political forces." (p. 26-27)

What Strauss here describes as "free society" is in fact the imperialist rule of force.

Strauss demanded that all European peoples should subordinate themselves to US global strategy, by stating at the CSU Provincial Assembly on 1 July 1967, that

"the burden which the American leading power has to carry

in the worldwide controversy with communism has in no way been relieved by the notions of Europe".

He categorically demanded:

"Europeans...are obligated to strengthen their own continent, in order to relieve America of its multiple tasks. In this way both continents will continue to be linked with each other..."

"Europe should be given a due share in leadership of the Atlantic alliance and in the immediate realization of its essential strategic concerns."

...in order to implement the Revanchist Plans of West German Imperialism in Europe

The support of the global gangster policy of US imperialism is to help West German monopolists to hegemony in Europe.

In Entwurf für Europa Strauss demands:

"The problem is not how to keep Germany economically strong but politically weak—this would be a false premise. The problem in fact is how to obtain a political influence by means of its economic strength...In the long run, there could not be a Germany which is a giant economically and a dwarf politically. That is why German politics needs a European framework. (pp. 149–50—emphasis added)

That is the blunt proclamation of an imperialist Europe under the leadership of West German imperialism. These claims to hegemony are similar to the chauvinist behaviour of the Hitler fascists. Hitler demanded in Mein Kampf:

"The 'German Reich' should once again be endowed with the characteristic features of a state that participates in the all-European game of chess," (A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, 1937, p. 716—emphasis added)

Strauss is obviously inspired by a similar sense of a "mission" as was Hitler. Once again the world is to "recover" thanks to the "beneficial" effect of Germany. Strauss wrote:

"I am certainly not a Utopian. It is, on the contrary, a very realistic demand that we must change the face of the world." (p. 20)

On the basis of Strauss's concept the old nazi slogans are once again being worn out in West Germany. An associate of Strauss, Stücklen, stated at the CSU provincial assembly in Munich on 1 July 1967:

"True self-determination for our people and the European nations is only conceivable through joint co-determination in a new European system."

There is little difference between this and the demand voiced by nazi-propaganda chief Josef Goebbels, who said on 9 No-

vember 1941 that "the Reich (is offered) the unique opportunity of taking a leading part in introducing the new order in Europe."

Today the West German monopoly capitalists are once more seeing a chance "to make the voice of Germany the leading voice of the West...to prove to be the leading power of a true Europe." (Die Welt, Hamburg, 12 February 1967)

3. Strauss Wants a Neo-nazi Internal Policy

A reactionary internal program forms part of the basic concept of Strauss—similar to that of the nazis—in the interest of implementing the ambitious expansionist program of foreign policy of West German monopoly capitalism. In Entwurf für Europa Strauss wrote:

"We need a government in Germany capable of action, a government capable of starting the great concert of Europe." (p. 162)

He wants to avoid

"that the state's ability to act as a whole in its foreign policy should be weakened by harmful developments in the interior". (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 14 March 1968)

On 1 July 1967 Strauss wrote in the Bayern-Kurier that there could be "no systematic foreign policy without internal stability".

In this Strauss is following in Hitler's footsteps. In a speech at the Industrial Club in Düsseldorf on 27 January 1932 Hitler explained the establishment of the nazi dictatorship as a result of the plans for the expansion of the sphere of influence and power of German monopoly capitalism, explaining that:

"Our action in home policy is decisive for our successes in foreign policy and in the achievement of our aims in general." (M. Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945 (Hitler, Speeches and Proclamations, 1932 to 1945), Munich, 1965, Vol. I, half volume, p. 84)

Hitler tried to justify the establishment of a system of brutal terror inside the country by alleging that he was striving to "regulate chaotic internal conditions". Strauss makes use of similar arguments.

At the CSU Provincial Assembly in 1967 Kiesinger expressly referred to the arguments of Strauss, stating that:

"not group interests but the vital interests of the entire nation, the question of the existence or non-existence of the nation is at stake... Franz Josef Strauss said... if we do not succeed in regulating these things, internal chaos is the inevitable consequence for our people."

4. Strauss Planned the "Grand Coalition"

...with a view to imposing the reactionary program of West German monopoly capital with the aid of social democratic ministers. In his book Strauss already outlined the reasons why social democratic ministers were needed in a government led by the CDU/CSU.

The social democratic ministers were to make the revisionist program of West German imperialism "more practicable" by garnishing it with peace slogans and by preparing the ground for its implementation with the aid of flexible methods.

This is the meaning of the thesis of Strauss:

"A Grand Coalition would certainly make an initiative for the great concept for a European policy more practicable—and would be desirable already on this ground." (p. 160)

The social democratic ministers were at the same time to give assistance in the further reactionary alignment internally, suppressing the resistance of the democratic forces, in particular of the working class and the trade unions against the intensified rightwing course. That is the significance of Strauss's thesis:

"A Grand Coalition could enact a few necessary reforms which would not be possible under a different constellation." (p. 158)

The Government Declaration of Kiesinger and the policy conducted by the present cabinet prove that the entire political strategy which Strauss had elaborated and announced as representative of the monopolies even prior to the formation of the Grand Coalition is the basis of official West German government policy.

III.

The Concept of Strauss—the Basis of the Expansionist West German Foreign Policy

The phased program for changing the status quo and for the imperialist new order in Europe under the hegemony of West German imperialism is revisionist and aggressive, despite all peace assertions by the Bonn government.

Strauss proclaimed this quite openly:

"We shall have to acknowledge a 'European forward policy'" (p. 135)

The *Bayern-Kurier* published by Strauss at the party publication of the CSU—in future to be distributed throughout the whole of West Germany as *Deutscher Kurier*—admitted that the so-called "European forward policy" included the alteration of the status quo by force. In connection with the Israeli aggression

in the Middle East that paper demanded on 17 June 1967:

"an energetic forward defence which will also ensure territorial pledges in Central Europe, far into the areas covered by the Warsaw Treaty".

CDU Bundestag Deputy Majonica, a close associate of Strauss, was even more plain:

"We have very ambitious foreign policy aims. Reunification means a radical change in the balance of power as established since the Second World War..."

"The results of a war have only in extremely rare cases been subsequently corrected by peaceful means." (*Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, Bonn, 1 January 1966—emphasis added)

This is the direct propagation of imperialist war of conquest according to the example of Hitler. He was the author of the aggressive principle:

"Oppressed countries are not returned to a common Reich by flaming protests, but by a sharp sword." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 689)

1. Strauss Wants Hegemony in Western Europe, in Particular the Subordination of France

The next aim pursued by Strauss within the framework of his reactionary phased program is the formation of an imperialist bloc under West German hegemony in Western Europe, which is to be the basis for changing the balance of power in Eastern Europe. At the CSU Provincial Assembly on 17 June 1967 in Munich he made this quite clear:

"Only a West European community of action will provide the starting point for a policy by means of which the demarcation-line of Yalta can be eliminated."

Strauss demanded on that occasion that

"a new attempt should be undertaken to accomplish the step-by-step political unification of Europe" and "an end should finally be put to the system of small states in Europe."

According to his plans the predominant position of West German monopoly capital in Western Europe is to be won under the banner of the struggle for "equal rights". In this respect, too, there are striking similarities.

Hitler:

"The world is persecuting us, it is turning against us, it is unwilling to recognize our right to live or our right to protect our country." (*M. Domarus, op. cit.*, p. 263)

Strauss:

"The German people must not become subject to falsifications

of history and one-sided evaluations, degrading it to a nation with criminal instincts and potentially dangerous for its neighbours and for world peace." (p. 154)

Strauss applied the same arguments as Hitler had used, with a view to fostering nationalism and big power chauvinism. The identity of arguments is alarming:

Hitler:

"It is impossible to keep or to lead a nation with a sense of honour and bravery as Helots in the world for ever". (Um den Frieden der Welt—For the Peace of the World, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich, p. 8)

Strauss:

"Are we Helots having to choose between two slave drivers?" (Münchener Merkur, 22 November 1966)

Strauss openly demonstrates that these nationalist tirades are dictated by the hegemony aspirations of West German imperialism. He plainly degrades the states of Western Europe to "federal provinces" ruled by Bonn:

"The further aim is a European federation. Sovereign national rights will gradually be conferred to it. The present nation-states would after a time receive the status approximately equal to that of the individual federal provinces of the German federal state." (p. 19)

Thus Strauss is following up the idea of "European federal provinces" already advanced by Hitler's Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in his "Plan for the New Order of Europe" under German imperialist domination.

Strauss wants to subordinate the political, economic and military potential of France to his adventurist plans. He bluntly stated that he wished to utilize the "better relations of France with the communist countries" with a view to "drawing these countries closer to the West". (p. 124)

Strauss emphasized that the "foundation of all European cooperation... was unity between Germany and France" (p. 117) and at the same time voiced claims to hegemony:

"A prerequisite for good relations between France and Germany is the equality of the two partners... The Germans, too, must obtain an adequate room for their own interests." (p. 122)

In his book he gave an example of how he intended to deal with France:

"We shall further have to convince President de Gaulle that we shall not be able to give him a free hand in regard to the problem of German sovereignty in connection with our political attitude towards the East." (p. 121)

Strauss eagerly propagates the economic and military penetra-

tion of France under cover of keeping pace with modern developments in science and technology. He writes:

"Our two countries should pool their resources in every sphere of modern high frequency technology for economic and military purposes. They should found joint trusts in the key industries, in which the Americans as well are striving to seek a monopoly position in the western hemisphere. This of course requires the pooling by both countries of their investment funds for military purposes, which constitute the lion's share of state expenditure for technical and scientific development." (p. 134)

Strauss wants in this way to utilize the French potential and the "force de frappe" (striking force) for West German armament and for the policy of economic expansion of the federal German monopolies.

Time and again the rulers in Bonn try to entice the French with pleasant sounding speeches similar to those delivered by the nazis after their seizure of power. On 7, March 1936 Hitler said in the Reichstag:

"In these three years... I have repeatedly tried to cast a bridge of understanding to the French people... Why should it... not be possible to break off the senseless age-old strife which has brought no final decision to either of the two peoples and will not lead to one, and to replace it by consideration and greater reason?" (Um den Frieden der Welt, op. cit., p. 19) These fine words did not prevent Hitler from later overrunning France and devastating the country in a war.

Kiesinger stated on 18 January 1967 in the Bundestag that the West German government was convinced that

"certain differences in interests and conceptions weigh less than the imperative need, for the destiny of our two peoples, of Europe, of an economic, technological, cultural, military and political co-operation extending over increasingly broad spheres. It is beyond doubt one of the most fortunate events of post-war times that the German and the French people have overcome the feelings of alienation, aversion, hostility, the worst result of a long development."

These siren sounds cannot delude one about the fact that Bonn is trying to advance to the subjection of the whole of Western Europe via the domination of France.

2. Strauss Advocates the Expansion of Monopoly Rule to the GDR

As regards the GDR, Strauss continues to represent the aggressive plans envisaging the liquidation of the socialist achieve-

ments of the GDR and the expansion of the rule of West German imperialism to the territory of the GDR. In Entwurf für Europa Strauss defined the basic principles of the so-called German policy of Bonn, today being practised by the West German government. Strauss wrote that the task of the federal government consisted in

"acting as trustee of the entire German people and abandoning none of the German rights."

"This includes:

- the sole representation right of the federal government for the whole of Germany;
- the maintenance of firm links between (West) Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany;
- the protection of German legal claims to its territory beyond the Oder and Neisse". (pp. 81-82)

Strauss would like to tie down all West European governments to this position of a potential declaration of war on the GDR and other socialist countries. He therefore established the principle for the "unification of Western Europe" envisaged by him:

"...every future union of Europe must insist on the sole representation right of the German Federal Republic and must actively defend that right". (p. 44)

The so-called Germany policy of Bonn is based on the concept of Strauss. In view of a lack of success and increased difficulties in foreign policy, it has become clear both to the CDU/CSU and among the leading rightwing SPD circles that the tactics of frontal attacks against the GDR applied up to the present have failed. A "flexible" tactical policy is now being practised, but the aims have remained the same. Strauss left no doubt about this:

"We have no reason to change the principles and aims of our policy, but we do have reason to keep a constant control over the correctness of the methods of our policy and to adapt them to the tendencies of fast changes in our time. Not the principles and not the aims, but the methods." (RIAS II, 24 May 1967)

This was also underlined by Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, parliamentary state secretary in the Federal Chancellor's Office:

"There is no other eastern policy of the Federal Republic than that conducted hitherto. The world has changed. The West replied to this with the policy of relaxation—I say the so-called policy of relaxation. This includes the adaptation of (West) German policy to the changed landscape. Methods must be adapted to the given conditions. This does not mean, however, that unrenounceable positions can be even nibbled at." (Address to the revanchist Sudeten German Ackermann-Community in Königstein, 28 July 1967)

Both the statements of the coalition parties in Bonn and official government policy confirm this.

The "Draft Program of Action of the CDU" stated that:

"No other German state can be recognized." (thesis 9)

The main resolution of the Social Democratic Party Congress in Nuremberg in 1968, the so-called Platform of Social Democracy, contains the following statement:

"...recognition of the GDR in international law is out of the question."

In its draft program the CDU unequivocally proclaims the intention of restoring the system of imperialist rule in the GDR: "The state and social system of the Federal Republic should be conceived as an all-German task." (thesis 12)

According to the will of politicians in Bonn who adhere to the conception of Strauss, there is to be no normalization of relations with the GDR, because recognition of the GDR in international law would be contrary to the plans of West German monopoly capital to intervene in the internal affairs of the GDR and expand its sphere of influence to the GDR.

Leading politicians of the government parties in Bonn have made this point quite clear. Kiesinger said on 18 November 1967, at the so-called German Rally of the "Young Union":

"We must encircle and finally eliminate the hearth of disease" (meaning the GDR—editor)

Brandt stated on 13 November 1967 at Bad Godesberg: "We must start with the facts if we want to alter facts." The facts which are to be changed, according to Brandt, include the circumstance that "there is a government in East Berlin with a Council of Ministers, a chairman and a Council of State with its chairman".

Since the aim is the liquidation of the GDR, Brandt, speaking at the SPD Party Congress in Nuremberg in March 1968 spoke of the renunciation of violence against the GDR, but at the same time emphasized that a statement by Bonn to that effect "was not binding in international law". The talk about the renunciation of violence against the GDR merely serves those in power in Bonn as a cover to conceal the expansionist and aggressive nature of their so-called Germany policy.

3. The Liquidation of Socialism in Europe—the Core of the "New" Eastern Policy Conceived by Strauss and Practised by Bonn

In an interview with the journal profil (No. 10/1967) Strauss said:

"I am by all means in favour of the line of the eastern policy followed by the Kiesinger government and by Foreign Minister

Brandt, even though in some details I take a different view." Anyone wishing to know what aims Kiesinger and Brandt are pursuing in regard to the socialist states of Europe is best informed by visualizing the ambitions of Strauss.

Strauss not only wants to conquer the GDR. That militant anti-communist writes:

"Either Europe will become a federation in which the principles of a free society and of the partnership with America will be valid—or it will become a collectivized society dependent on the Soviet Union." (pp. 78-79)

Naturally he would like to see a Europe based on the principles of a "free society"—i.e., an imperialist society.

Strauss therefore openly plans the liquidation of socialism in Europe:

"We should bear in mind that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, etc., are just as much a part of Europe as Switzerland, Holland, or Belgium. The aim is to work, both by exerting an influence on those countries and by means of hard negotiations with Moscow in a long-term process, to make those countries again become a part of Europe, at least to begin with, according to the significance of the term intermediate Europe." (p. 46)

In these words Strauss formulated with unmistakable clarity the attempt which is to be undertaken, in view of the changed relation of forces in favour of socialism, to alter the status quo in the spirit of imperialism, by means of a long-term program of counter-revolutionary policy of penetrating the socialist countries.

This structure called "intermediate Europe" is intended as an intermediate stage on the way to implementing his aggressive aims. Strauss wrote:

"Our task today must consist in establishing a belt between Russia and Western Europe, an 'intermediate Europe'..." (p. 55)

Strauss calls the interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries and the attempts of the rulers in Bonn to liquidate socialism in Europe, a "loosening-up policy". This softening up and undermining policy is to be conducted by various ways and means. Its arsenal includes, according to Strauss, economic, political and ideological means and methods. In view of the economic relations between the West and the socialist states of Europe, Strauss declares that the West

"should seek means and ways to contribute to the transformation of the situation to our political advantage, i.e., it should support only such projects as will serve the loosening

up of Europe rather than the economic strengthening of the East European regimes." (p. 42)

Strauss further explained his "loosening-up policy" by stating that

"a policy of a general loosening-up of Europe could lead to success only in a step-by-step process. One could hardly expect a rapid solution and this should rather be conceived in the dimensions of a historic process. During that period we shall have to tie the peoples of Eastern and South-eastern Europe more closely to Western Europe by means of cultural and economic bonds, by means of youth and student exchanges, tourism, sport events and many other suitable means." (p. 44)

Strauss impudently asserts:

"The only hope for the East Europeans to regain their freedom consists in the construction of a powerful and united Europe..." (p. 84)

This impudent demand that the peoples of the socialist states of Eastern Europe should first separate from the socialist community within an "intermediate Europe" and then subordinate themselves to imperialism in Western Europe under the domination of West Germany, culminates in the statement that:

"Each European should have the right freely to choose his homeland within a free and constitutional Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Bug and up to the Black Sea." (p. 83)

The policy of the Bonn government, garnished with social democratic ministers is clearly following this course conceived by Strauss. On 23 May 1967 Kiesinger stated at the CDU Party Congress in Brunswick:

"We are asked to accept the legal confirmation of the status quo, or in other words unconditional capitulation. No one will force us to do this, either all at once or bit by bit." Brandt (SPD) agreed with the CDU politician:

"The present situation as it exists in Europe will not continue for ever... A European peace system should not be conceived as a mere confirmation of the things left behind by the Second World War." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 4 July 1967)

Entirely in the spirit of Strauss, every possible opportunity is to be used to infiltrate into the socialist countries with a view to implementing the dangerous revanchist designs of Bonn. At the CSU Provincial Assembly in 1967 the demand was raised for "the evaluation of all conceivable opportunities available to us in the Eastern countries".

Stücklen, closest associate of Strauss and chairman of the CSU provincial group in Bonn, spoke even more plainly, when

he said in Munich on 1 July 1967:

"...we must get out of the ghetto forced upon us, and we must utilize every opportunity for an offensive Eastern policy wherever it may present itself."

This unequivocally revanchist position is the basis of the West German government's approach to relations with the socialist states of Europe.

Barzel left no doubt about this fact in his speech delivered on the occasion of the opening of diplomatic relations between the West German Federal Republic and Rumania:

"The opening of diplomatic relations with Rumania is not a turning point in German policy, but a milestone on the way of German policy to our long proclaimed aim... Our legal, moral and historical positions remain unchanged. Our methods can and must change."

In this spirit Brandt stated at the most recent SPD Party Congress that in the opening of diplomatic relations with the socialist states of Eastern and South-eastern Europe the aim was to "guard German interests" and "keep markets open".

The men in Bonn making "eastern policy" seem to consider the spheres of economic and cultural policy as particularly suitable, and to be speculating on the support of other states in Western Europe. Strauss once again indicated the direction at the CSU Provincial Assembly on 1 July 1967 in Munich:

"It is therefore essential that the West should urge a multi-lateral interlacement of eastern countries with the forming European community. It would be an important task for the EEC countries... to give preference to the development of a joint policy in trade with the East." At that same assembly the following statement was made:

"The foreign cultural policy assumes an increased significance in view of the efforts concerning the East of Europe..."

"The CSU provincial group knows that Bavaria, as the German gateway to the south-east, is of particular significance... Apart from Munich, the new university town of Regensburg will become a future centre of scientific and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe." (Report of the CSU provincial group of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag)

The latest trick of the "eastern politicians" in Bonn consists in recommending to the socialist states an imaginary "liberalization" and the acceptance of the principles of "free market economy". That "free market economy", which has long since gone bankrupt in West Germany under the conditions of state monopoly rule is now being praised as an export hit in the spirit of Strauss's eastern policy.

The monopoly rulers in the imperialist states are concen-

trating their economic forces, consolidating into even larger monopoly associations; to the socialist countries, however, they recommend "decentralization" and "liberalization", so that the centralized and concentrated power of West German and western monopoly capital would have it easier in penetrating into the socialist countries.

In their so-called new eastern policy the West German government, in particular the social democratic ministers, are trying to appear in the eyes of the citizens of the GDR and other socialist countries, among other things, also as authorities on matters of freedom and democracy. In West Germany, however, they are conducting a neo-nazi home policy, suppressing all signs of democratic opposition among their own population. In reality the "liberalization policy", as a method of softening the foundations of the socialist countries, and the anti-democratic emergency policy in West Germany are but two aspects of one expansionist policy followed by Bonn.

The notorious anti-communist and "eastern expert" in Bonn, Professor Mehnert, let the cat out of the bag about these imperialist tactics in a television commentary on 30 March 1968. He said that the aim was the "social-democratization" of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe. By that Mehnert above all means

- the separation of the socialist states from their alliance with the Soviet Union,
- the replacement of the socialist system by a so-called liberalization,
- the elimination of socialist relations of production and of socialist planned economy.

4. Strauss Presses for Nuclear Weapons - Opposition to the Non-proliferation Treaty

In the expansionist plans of West German imperialism nuclear weapons have been assigned a central role. Ruling circles in Bonn regard control over nuclear weapons as the basis

- for enforcing their sole representation pretension,
- for hegemony in Europe,
- for changing the status quo in Europe and revising the existing frontiers.

Strauss regarded control over nuclear weapons as one of the main motives for West Germany joining NATO. Under these conditions Strauss, at that time minister of war, had conceived the establishment of the West German Bundeswehr at the beginning of the 1950s. This was confirmed by his personal secre-

tary, Marcel Hepp, in June 1967, during a lecture in Bochum: "Strauss bought the Starfighter because it was the only aircraft which could be used for dropping atomic bombs." Hepp thereby clearly interpreted the brutal formula of Strauss: "The age of power politics has by no means come to an end." (p. 28)

The West German government has made a special effort to obtain control over nuclear weapons directly or indirectly since the decision of the West German Bundestag of 23 March 1958 on the atomic armament of the Bundeswehr. That is why during the past years the federal government submitted its own plans, or supported all proposals advanced in NATO, which might bring control over nuclear weapons within closer reach.

Apart from the arms monopolies, which would gain the highest profits from cooperation in the production of nuclear weapons or from the production of their own nuclear weapons, the Hitler generals whom Strauss helped to obtain key positions in the Bundeswehr are above all coming to the fore in this respect. In August 1960 the Bundeswehr high command demanded:

"The Bundeswehr should have the same effective armament as the allied shield forces. The shield forces of NATO must form an entity." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 20 August 1960)

In a secret memorandum of December 1961 the generals in Bonn stated:

"Without the possession of nuclear weapons it is inconceivable that Germany could be restored within its historic and national frontiers." (Deutsche Woche, Munich, 1 January 1962)

In all their attempts to obtain control over nuclear weapons the ruling circles in Bonn strove to utilize the NATO alliance for the implementation of their revanchist aims. At the CSU Provincial Assembly in 1967 Strauss expressly stated that "purely defensive aims of the alliance" would not lead to an alteration of the status quo. He emphatically demanded "the ability and resolution" to be able to deal "an atomic blow to the vital centres of the enemy". (p. 94) Now as before Strauss demanded that the states of Western Europe should assist Bonn in obtaining control or participation in control over nuclear weapons. His strategic aim in this respect is

"... a European atomic arms potential under the control and authority of a European government". (p. 106)

"Even though I believe that the Federal Republic should participate in all solutions that allow it a wider scope for consultation in the planning and organization of atomic defence, we still need at all times to be clear that this is no real alternative to real nuclear protection, such as could only be guaranteed by a European atomic striking force." (p. 105)

Strauss has lately been trying to conceal his aggressive military aims behind the pretext of the "technological co-operation" of Western Europe:

"The criterion for the success or failure of the technological community in Europe is and remains the decision on a joint security policy... An attempt should therefore be made to lay the foundations for an effective European system of arms production..." (Speech delivered at the CSU Provincial Assembly, 1 July 1967 in Munich)

The CDU politician Hallstein, whose name is closely associated with the West German policy of revanchism and coercion, went into further detail about this concept of Strauss in his "Twelve Year Plan for the Foundation of a European Political Community".

Like Strauss, Hallstein, too, wants to see action within the framework of the US global strategy. He proposes a "bipolar NATO", the poles of which should be the military power of the USA and a "European Defence Community".

Hallstein's plan envisages the acquisition of control by West German monopoly capital over nuclear weapons, via the formation of a "European Federation" and a "European Defence Community". A "European General Staff", mainly manned by West German officers, is to decide the use of conventional and atomic weapons "in each geographical sphere". The plan furthermore envisages the formation of a "European Armament Community", with a view to placing the economic and scientific potentials of the states of Western Europe in the service of the aggressive aims of Bonn.

Opposition to the Non-proliferation Treaty

Because Strauss—as the West German trade union journal Metall wrote on 16 April 1968—represents the "driving force" in the West German striving for nuclear arms, and since nuclear arms are "his favourite toy", Strauss is one of the most fervent opponents of the non-proliferation treaty.

For a long time he has been organizing a propagandist counterattack against the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The strategic planning of this attack will be found in his book. He mentioned the main arguments against the signing of such an agreement:

1. A non-proliferation treaty should be sabotaged and an atomic striking force with West German participation should be set up, "to spare the European peoples a relapse into the status of technical underdevelopment". (p. 101)
2. "... all agreements of that kind have still another aspect — apart from their strategic effects, with an important role being played by the division of the world into nuclear and non-

nuclear powers. This other aspect must be exactly examined by us, namely, the fact that these agreements—like the test-stop treaty—are to be signed by the 'GDR'." (p. 105)

3. "Moreover, we must do nothing which might bar the way to a subsequent atomic control by Europe as a political unit." (p. 106)

When Prime Minister Wilson visited West Germany at the beginning of 1967, Strauss hurled these words into the face of the British visitor:

"I am an enemy of this agreement. And I can tell you that I shall fight against it." (*Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, 20 February 1967)

Strauss stated quite frankly that the opposition of Bonn had political motives. In an interview with the journal *profil* (10/1967) he said:

"The efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic, when, in 1955, it had to start from scratch with me as atomic minister, up to this day, when the country is one of the leading industrial nations in civil, peaceful nuclear technology, are considerable..."

"I have rather more political than scientific and technical reservations against the non-proliferation treaty." (emphasis added)

West German NATO Ambassador Professor Wilhelm Grewe explained clearly what Bonn was aiming at, speaking to the Foreign Policy Society in Godesberg on 24 January 1967:

"Nations without their own nuclear weapons will in future hardly be in a position to play the role of a 'Great Power'." (*Die Zeit*, Hamburg, 10 February 1967)

Strauss has been conducting campaigns against the non-proliferation treaty for months. He was responsible for making the CSU party paper, *Bayern Kurier*, the main press organ in that campaign. The editorial board and staff of that paper are honeycombed with fascist elements. The Yugoslav paper *Vecernje Novosti* recently produced evidence to show that Alex Peter, a staff member of the *Bayern Kurier* and professional anti-communist, was in fact named Slobodan Stankovic and was a war criminal escaped from Yugoslavia.

Strauss's associate Hepp stated on 27 March 1968 in that paper published by Strauss that the CSU would make every effort to prevent the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. The CSU "had at last found its great theme". He described the disruptive manoeuvres of the CSU as a "central problem of German politics".

IV.

The Concept of Strauss—the Basis of a Reactionary, Anti-democratic Home Policy

For the implementation of his far-reaching, expansionist foreign policy program, Strauss has developed a comprehensive home policy program for the "concentration of all national forces", for the suppression of all democratic opposition and for the establishment of the unrestricted dictatorship of the most reactionary sections of monopoly capital—similar to that of the nazis. This program is directed towards increasing the effectiveness and capacity of the state monopoly system for an intensified competition with the other capitalist states and for the big power aims of West German imperialism, with the aid of a bundle of economic, political and ideological measures. At the same time all prerequisites of power politics are to be provided for holding down the population inside the country and harnessing it to the expansionist foreign policy course.

The Strauss concept of home policy may be summed up as follows:

- further reactionary formation of the state monopoly power machinery by way of manipulating the Basic Law (constitution), at the same time providing all the legal authorizations for the introduction of an open neo-nazi dictatorship, accelerated adoption of the emergency legislation as the core of the reactionary "internal state reform";

- stabilization of state finances at the expense of the working class and all other sections of the working population, and budget structures and practices ensuring the required margin for an expansionist foreign policy;

- development of an economic policy and of instruments of economic policy for the further improvement of the growth and competitive efficiency of the most powerful monopoly groups on the capitalist market and for increasing profit prospects;

- application of a long-term imperialist scientific and structural policy at the expense of the working people with the aim of mobilizing all internal resources for the controversy with socialism;

- increased intellectual manipulation of people with the aid of an unrestrained nationalism, chauvinism and anti-communism, intended to make the West German population ripe for the imperialist policy of expansion.

1. Strauss—the Main Whip of the Emergency Laws

Strauss has for years been one of the main whips of the emergency dictatorship laws. Already in 1958 he proclaimed bluntly that the emergency laws were necessary, in order to

"place the whole nation with man and horse and cart, power stations and roads, radar equipment and radio stations, in the service of defence" (i.e. the atomic revanchist policy—editor) (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 September 1958). In his book *Entwurf für Europa* the categorical demand for the accelerated adoption of the emergency laws takes a central position. Strauss left no doubt about the function of the social democratic ministers in the government. He writes:

"We need better provisions for an emergency legislation, a question the balanced solution of which the social democrats are to help to obtain by participating in the responsibility of government." (p. 160)

What Strauss understands by a "balanced solution" was elucidated in greater detail at the CSU Provincial Assembly in June 1967 under his direction. The emphatic demand was raised there, that the emergency constitution should "do justice to the effectiveness and practicability" as given by the far-reaching emergency powers of the allies and the system of more than 60 secret emergency regulations linked with them. In particular all citizens should be expected to make "great sacrifices in rights to freedom" under the "section limiting basic rights". (From the report of the CSU provincial group in the CDU/CSU group of the Bundestag)

Thus Strauss indicated the direction of advance in the accelerated completion of the dictatorship drafts, to be finally passed before the end of 1968. The emergency legislation is to supply the Bonn government with pseudo-legal authorizations for taking the following measures in the service of the aggressive, revanchist concept of Strauss envisaging the hegemony of West German imperialism in Europe:

- militarize working life and chain the trade unions;
- greatly confine or abolish altogether essential basic rights and freedoms of the West German population;
- establish the use of open military force in addition to the police organs to subdue all opposition;
- complete deprivation of rights of the Bundestag and the bodies of parliamentary representation in the provinces and municipalities;
- rigorous centralization of the West German administrative machinery and of the entire financial administration and the exclusion of all effective parliamentary control.

What Strauss conceived is being put into effect by CDU Minister of the Interior Benda with the aid of social democratic ministers. The police massacres staged by the ruling circles in Bonn against the democratic extra-parliamentary opposition in April 1968, which gave a sample of the planned emergency dictatorship, are being taken as a pretext by the politicians in Bonn for justifying the reactionary emergency legislation and calling for further emergency authorizations.

—Minister of the Interior Benda stated on 17 April 1968 in an interview with the American news agency UPI that "the introduction of preventive custody for demonstrators is being considered in Bonn". This is contained in the "Emergency Regulation on Security Measures", which is to empower the Bonn government to set up preventive detention camps according to the model of the notorious Hitler concentration camps.

—Government spokesman Ahlers called for the mobilization of Federal Frontier Guards "as the only centrally commanded police troop" for the brutal beating down of peaceful demonstrations, expressly underlining "that the present laws are inadequate for this purpose". These measures demanded by Ahlers are envisaged in Article 91 of the planned emergency constitution and in the "Emergency Regulation on Federal Frontier Protection".

—The choirmen of the CDU/CSU parliamentary groups in the West German provincial diets raised a whole series of demands for the extension of the reactionary machinery of power at a consultation in Bonn presided over by Barzel. They categorically supported, among other things, the "strengthening of the operational efficiency of the police", its further centralization and coordinated action by police and judicial organs, and the "accelerated conviction" of democratic opponents by "summary proceedings" in court. This system of police and judicial terror, courts martial and the rigorous strangulation of all opposition is already outlined in the planned emergency legislation.

The entire bundle of emergency laws of the Strauss brand already practised in Bonn today correspond in spirit and aims to the notorious Hitler enabling laws and shows alarmingly similar formulations with those contained in the Nazi war decrees.

2. The Strauss Concept of the "Internal State Reform"

The forced emergency legislation forms part of the comprehensive program for the adaptation of the entire state monopoly system of power to the new phase of expansionist policy, developed by Strauss in *Entwurf für Europa* under the slogan of the so-called internal state reform. The aim is to bring about

the complete undermining of the West German Basic Law, the bourgeois-democratic principles of which have been progressively abolished since the foundation of the West German separatist state, and to ensure a rigorous adaptation of the state apparatus to the requirements of an expansionist policy in home and foreign affairs.

In Entwurf für Europa Strauss is clearly steering towards the manipulation of the Basic Law with a view to achieving an "operationally efficient government", for the new phase in the expansionist policy to follow the post-war period. He wrote:

"The Basic Law was drafted in 1948-49. Since then—symbolically expressed—one may almost say that a new age has set in. Compared with previous historical periods there has been an enormous acceleration of development, thanks to scientific discoveries, the technical revolution and its industrial manifestations. We should therefore consider whether our present Constitution still complies with these new requirements." (pp. 158-159)

In the Bundestag session of 21 September 1966 Strauss became even more explicit. After he had spoken at length about the need for monopoly capitalism to take into account the influence of democratic forces in the interior and the critical attitude on the part of large sections of public opinion abroad in regard to remilitarization and the construction of the Bundeswehr, he stated:

"Amendments to the Constitution and the conscription law of those years (were) a precautionary concept. But now, 10 years later... we can calmly begin to examine the elements of our conscription laws and military statutes, which will not incur the slightest political risk after 10 years of experience."

Strauss authorized his personal secretary and intimate Marcel Hepp to call things by their name with brutal frankness:

"The Basic Law is a second Versailles." (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 March 1967)

It will suffice to recall that Hitler had made the demand for revision of the Versailles peace treaty concluded in 1919 the focal point of his propaganda in the preparation for war, in order to recognize the whole scope of the significance of this attack on the Constitution.

Strauss wants to carry out state and social leadership according to a "management that is better adapted to modern industrial leadership". (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22-23 July 1966). The monopoly principles of structure and management of the profit economy are thus to be applied to the state and the entire

political organization of society. In this way Strauss is strikingly following in Hitler's footsteps: speaking at the Industrial Club in Düsseldorf on 27 January 1932, Hitler declared:

"It is absurd... to build up economic life on the authority of individual personality, yet politically to deny that authority of the personality and to replace it by the law of the greater number, by democracy." (M. Domarus, op. cit. p. 73)

Strauss devised a whole system of measures envisaged to do away with the last vestiges of bourgeois democracy, faithful to the evil spirit of nazism. In Entwurf für Europa Strauss demanded, going beyond the emergency legislation, as the core of the "internal state reform":

- the alteration of the electoral system
- a party political reform
- a new budget system
- a reform of the structure of the administration and
- a so-called great financial reform. (cf. pp. 159-160)

All these demands are contained in the government program and are at present being emphatically promoted by CDU/CSU and social democratic ministers.

Strauss proclaimed:

The political parties "should be aware that they are only means to an end". They "only have a right to exist if their scientific, technical, sociological, diplomatic and strategic thought corresponds to the political realities of the present". (pp. 160-161)

This is the significance of the reactionary Parties Law passed on 28 June 1967, which accords the "right to exist" only to those political parties which unconditionally commit themselves to the imperialist phased program of expansion externally and "formation" internally. That law is conceived as a barrier against the formation and development of democratic parties and at the same time as an instrument for guarding the "established" parties against all democratic influences and for tying them even more firmly to the state monopoly system—not least through the state financing of the political parties.

Strauss proclaimed:

"Since my entry into political life, I have on principle been an adherent of the majority voting system." (profil, Nr. 10/1967)

That is the significance of the announcement contained in the Government Declaration of 13 December 1966, that "a new election law is to be established, which will allow clear majorities in future elections of the (West) German Bundestag after 1969". The main motive of that planned "electoral reform" is the fear of the ruling circles that in the course of the further sharpening of internal contradictions a democratic force might arise which could embody a real alternative to the expansionist

policy of Bonn and which might use parliament as a forum for its struggle. The introduction of a "majority voting system" is to bar the way of such forces to the Bundestag. At the same time the CDU/CSU intends to secure an absolute majority by means of this manipulation of the electoral law, so as to become established as the sole government party.

Strauss proclaimed:

"The dynamic forces of state development must not be obstructed to the detriment of the whole cause by adherence to obsolete limitations. The Constitution and constitutional life should therefore be understood and further developed in a spirit of cooperative federalism." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn 34/1968)

That is the significance of the draft of a financial reform law submitted by Strauss and adopted by the Cabinet in Bonn on 13 March 1968, to make possible the introduction of a strictly centralized budget and finance regime. Under the cover of "cooperative federalism" that draft by Strauss is aimed at the destruction of the constitutional principles of federalism and communal self-administration and at coordinating the policy of the West German provinces and communities with the imperialist policy of expansion.

It is intended, among other things, to lay down so-called community tasks in a § 91a to be added to the West German Basic Law, subject to "joint planning and financing" by the federal and provincial governments. In this way the government could arbitrarily declare focal points of its expansionist program as "community tasks" and mobilize the provincial authorities and finances for their implementation; on the other hand it would empower the government to deprive the provinces of their constitutional rights at any moment.

3. Strauss—the Enemy of the Trade Unions and All Democrats

The main blow to be dealt by the program of internal dictatorship conceived by Strauss is directed against the West German working class and the trade unions. Strauss regards the existence of powerful, independent trade unions and their democratic activity in defence of the interests of the workers to be the greatest internal obstacle to his far-reaching expansionist aims. He therefore wishes to chain the trade unions and establish emergency calm in the enterprises.

Strauss Intends to Abolish Tariff Autonomy

In 1966 Strauss had already opposed "declaring the principle of the freedom of tariff partners to be a vital part of a liberal constitutional state"; he categorically demanded that

"the state should have the right to settle disturbances and symptoms of unbalanced conditions through temporary intervention". (Münchener Merkur, 28 July 1966)

Strauss Is a Declared Opponent of Co-determination

Only recently he unleashed a new ferocious campaign in the West German employer's publication *Der Volkswirt* against the legitimate demands of the trade unions for co-determination in economic life. Strauss protects the omnipotence of the monopolies and turns social reality in the Federal Republic upside down by alleging that "the establishment of co-determination would lead to a stagnation of economic life". Strauss considers the co-determination of the working class and the trade unions to be an obstacle in the way of the implementation of his aggressive foreign policy objectives. He wrote:

"We should not be deluded about the fact that a constantly growing economy is the decisive foundation of our effectiveness in foreign policy, in view of our position in the world. That is why the extension and construction of our economic life must not be obstructed in any way." (*Der Volkswirt*, 11 April 1968)

In the eyes of Strauss the co-determination of the trade unions represents a foreign body in the monopoly economy. In his anti-trade union declaration in *Der Volkswirt* he once again stood up as the spokesman of those monopoly capitalist forces which in 1965 had already proclaimed that

"The democratization of the economy is as futile as a democratization of schools, military barracks or prisons." (*Industriekurier*, 7 October 1965)

Strauss turns things upside down. It is not co-determination which called forth regression, stagnation and social insecurity in West German economic life. The causes are rooted in capitalist mismanagement, in the autocratic attitude of the employers, in the misuse of power by the monopolies and above all in the aggressive and expansionist policy of West German imperialism.

The campaign of defamation against the trade unions and against their legitimate demands for co-determination headed by Strauss, was assessed in 1966 by Ludwig Rosenberg, the chairman of the West German trade unions as

"evidence showing how thin the varnish is that makes our democracy still appear respectable externally, and how close are the methods, which in 1933 led to the ruin of democracy." (*Die Quelle*, No. 1/1966)

Strauss instigates open persecution of the trade unions. Revealed as a bitter enemy of the non-proliferation treaty by the West German Metalworkers' Industrial Union, Strauss raged:

"In view of that strange conception of the metalworkers' union about the freedom of opinion, may God protect the Federal Republic against ever being subjected to the rule of functionaries who have the 'democratic substance' of the leadership of that union." (Welt am Sonntag, 24 March 1968)
This campaign of slander does not stop at the trade unions; it is also directed against all democratic activities of the West German population, against the extra-parliamentary democratic opposition in general.

Strauss prepares the way and instigates bloodshed and terror under the pretext of an emergency in the big cities of West Germany and in West Berlin. At the beginning of 1968 he stated: "The wild actions of radical left-wing student groups has polluted the atmosphere at our universities."

At the end of February 1968 Strauss let out renewed furious tirades against young West German workers and students who had courageously stood up against the dirty US war in Vietnam and its support by Bonn, against emergency laws and the gagging of free expression of thought. He slandered them as "unwashed and filthy mobs" who needed to be "seriously taken by the scruff of their necks". (dpa, 28 February 1968)
CSU General Secretary Streibl plainly announced on 1 July 1967:

"A hard fight lies ahead of us... and there will be more hard fights in future in the enforcement of our aims, battles against our political opponents, against the street..." (Speech at the CSU Provincial Assembly 1967)

At the climax of the blood-stained acts of violence by the Bonn government against anti-fascist demonstrations Strauss openly and brutally declared the extra-parliamentary democratic opposition as outlaws exposed to the arbitrary force of a whipped-up police and judicial terror. On behalf of Strauss the Bayern Kurier of 20 April 1968 commented:

"However many wise utterances may have been made about the students' riots, they have ceased to be a problem of democracy, at least since the latest 'direct actions'. They are independent of the forms of state or life of our people and only dependent of the forms of state or life of our people and only a police problem... The desired and unambiguous reply of the Bundestag to the acts of violence in recent days would be a drastic sharpening of the relevant penal regulations. To assist intimidated judges and prosecutors... The Bundestag should without delay impose penalties of hard labour for all calls of violence."

A week later, on 27 April 1968, the same paper observed that "Bavaria still has judges" who would show the opposition that there was no "overweight of the Basic Law over the state organi-

zation". In other words: the emergency terror organized by the state and not the basic rights proclaimed by the Constitution should be decisive. This is not different in spirit and vocabulary from the old notorious nazistyle.

Strauss, his CSU and his paper Bayern Kurier have assumed the leadership of emergency laws in action versus democracy. In its issue of 27 April 1968 that paper wrote:

"Bavaria as a factor of order—that is a program".

It is the program of Strauss, who on 1 July 1967 issued the slogan at the CSU Provincial Assembly:

"Continue in Bavaria, become stronger in Bonn, so that we are able to ensure order."

Before 1933 Bavaria was the starting-point of the Nazi movement. Today, "order" is again to be set up from Bavaria.

4. The Financial Policy of Strauss in the Service of Expansion

The role of Strauss as minister of finance in the present Bonn government rounds off the picture. The economic and financial policy conceived by Strauss and practised with the cooperation of social democratic Minister of Economic Affairs Schiller, is clearly directed towards a long-term program of strengthening the power and expansion of the most aggressive and reactionary groups of West German monopoly capitalism. It is just as clearly at the expense of the working class and of all other sections of the working population. The financial policy of Strauss, expressed in figures, reflects his reactionary basic concept of home and foreign policy. The results and practical consequences of that financial policy speak for themselves:

—The losses of income of the workers due to short-time work, dismissals and the curtailment of social benefits in 1967 total 11 thousand million marks. The real wages of all workers decreased by some 2 per cent.

—The medium-term program of new priorities in financial policy in the interest of the imperialist policy of expansion and for widening the margin of West German financial policy as conceived by Strauss further intensifies the plundering of the population. The amendment of 36 legal provisions is to force a reduction in expenditures of 15.1 thousand million marks. Out of that sum 11.3 thousand million marks are to be cut in the field of social welfare. Other burdens, amounting at the present to three thousand million marks will have to be shouldered by the working people as a result of the planned increase in contributions to the pension insurance; 4.5 thousand million marks more will have to be paid by the workers to Bonn's arma-

ment fund through the introduction of a new taxation system (added value tax).

—Special orders were placed with the monopolies to the value of 7.8 thousand million marks. Tax advantages, investment premiums, special depreciation, easing of credit conditions and interest rates brought them another 3.5 thousand million marks. During the second half of 1967 employers' profits increased by 2.5 thousand million marks.

—The aggressive and revanchist concept of the Bonn government left the largest item of expenditure — armaments — untouched. The extension of armaments is to be gradually stepped up from 18.7 to 22 thousand million marks a year by 1971. Armament expenditure for the years from 1968 to 1971 is envisaged to total 83.6 thousand million marks, reductions in social welfare expenditure will total 40 thousand million marks during the same period.

The concept of Strauss is like that of Hitler right down to the formulations. Hitler declared in his notorious speech at the Sportpalast on 24 October 1933:

"We have the courage to burden our people as far as we feel convinced that the people will have to bear the burdens... We have taken up the struggle for the recovery of our finances."

Strauss stated at the CSU Provincial Assembly in 1967:

"The inventory undertaken shows a serious and admonishing picture of our financial situation. We shall only be able to cope with that situation if all groups and sections of our people are ready to accept certain sacrifices and deprivations." He added threateningly:

"It will now have to be shown, whether the government and the parliamentary groups of the Grand Coalition are capable of resisting those oppositional forces... which are trying to bracket out the sphere of their interests."

Strauss had clearly defined whom he meant by "oppositional forces" at the end of 1966, when he said that economic and financial stabilization would only be possible by "saving in consumer expenditure, in subsidies, or by increased taxation". (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 14 December 1966) He means the workers and trade unions, the peasants and all other sections of the working population. They have to shoulder the burden of the intensified expansionist course. Precisely that was the significance of the slogan issued by Strauss at the above-mentioned CSU Assembly:

"Neither the acquisition of revenue nor the structure of expenditure of the state could be economically neutral."

That was what social democratic Minister of Economic Affairs

Schiller openly admitted when he stated in the Bundestag on 27 February 1967:

"All measures taken by the state are clearly in favour of the employers."

5. Strauss Makes Agreements with Open Neo-nazis

The program of Strauss and the practice of the West German government based on that program form the foundation on which neo-nazism is developing at an alarming rate in West Germany. The revanchism, nationalism and chauvinism of Strauss, his expansionist and aggressive aspirations encourage the openly neo-nazi NPD. That new nazi party—tolerated, shielded and promoted by Strauss and other West German politicians—has already managed to win 60 seats in seven West German provincial parliaments. Strauss and his CSU in particular have long been favourably disposed towards the NPD and closely associated with it:

—At Kulmbach the CSU and NPD openly joined in an alliance in the municipal elections on 13 March 1966 against the SPD.

—In the elections to the Bavarian Diet in the autumn of 1966 the CSU advised its electorate to vote either CSU or NPD. The CSU candidates Brandner and Kiesling in a secret agreement offered the Bavarian Ministry of Justice to the NPD in case the NPD was needed to form a majority in the Diet.

Strauss stated on the election results which allowed the NPD to make its entry into the Bavarian Provincial Diet:

"I regard this as a confirmation of the course of the CSU and a confirmation of my personal attitude." (1st program of the West German Television, 20 November 1966)

—The Bavarian Provincial Diet, in which the CSU has a majority, named Dr. Huber, NPD, as a member of the Bavarian Constitutional Court in 1967. His deputy was Dr. Dettweiler, also of the NPD.

—The leading NPD candidate in Bavaria, Captain Ross of the Bundeswehr was appointed to the Radio Council by the Bavarian Provincial Diet.

—At Roth near Nuremberg the CSU joined in a group headed by the Bundeswehr Captain Horner, NPD.

—CSU and NPD jointly applauded the award of the "Konrad Adenauer Prize" to the nationalist and chauvinist ideologist Armin Mohler. Mohler described the six million Jews murdered by the fascists as "Jewish carrion" and preaches "reconciliation and love" for the fascist past.

Strauss and the CSU have long favoured the chauvinist and neo-nazi ideologists in the West German Federal Republic.

-In 1967 a "Nationalfilm GmbH" was founded in Munich. That company is to produce feature films about the fascist "Waffen-SS" so as to "influence the world of thought of the German people in a soldierly spirit."

-Strauss maintains direct relations with the right wing extremist neo-nazi press. CSU member Emmerich Giel of the provincial party leadership, is the head of the notorious publication *Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung*, which engages in racial hatred, national hatred and warmongering and which spreads the evil spirit of nazism in West Germany in the style of the Nazi paper *Der Stürmer*.

-CSU Bundestag deputy Dr. Becher maintains direct contacts with the NPD chief ideologist Professor Anrich. Both of them belong to the executive of the "Völkischer Wille-Bund"; one of the vilest revanchist organizations. Anrich is today spreading in West Germany the racist ideas of Alfred Rosenberg, chief ideologist of Hitler fascism.

Strauss needs the open Nazi ideology. Covered by the hysterical shrieks from the right, Strauss is himself promoting nationalism with a view to justifying the expansionist and aggressive policy of the monopolists and adapting the mentality of the population to that dangerous right wing course.

Strauss makes use of the NPD for his nationalist propaganda. In "Entwurf für Europa" he drafted the outlines, stating:

"The policy of a great country could not be shaped without political self-confidence." (p. 152)

"... the German people have ... a right to claim recognition as a normal nation." (p. 156)

"For us the post-war period ... could only end when we have once again obtained a just appreciation by the world of the German people." (p. 152)

In the typical arrogant manner of imperialism, Strauss wrote: "It would be a loss to the free world if the proven energy and efficiency of the Germans were to remain ineffective and unused." (p. 152)

The similarity with the nature of the openly Nazi NPD is unmistakable:

"We resent the maintenance of the older generation in the condition of a defendant, whereas youth is being misled into turning away from German history, into adoption to the present powers and renouncing the rights of its people." (NPD program)

"We are called upon to fulfil a historic mission ... We are obliged to make the will to live of the German people credible to the world and to prove to history that Germany did not inactively tumble into its own ruin." (Adolf von Thadden, NPD leader, at the NPD Party Congress in Hanover in 1967)

The CSU and NPD are also cooperating in the violent suppression of democratic opposition. On several occasions NPD rowdies attacked democrats. NPD meetings, however, are protected by the police.

CSU General Secretary Streibl in February 1968 called in the Bavarian Parliament for the formation of a kind of "Home Guard" as baton-troop against democratic opposition. The head of the NPD group in the parliament, Pöhlmann, immediately offered the CSU minister of the interior for Bavaria the support of the neo-Nazi NPD.

It is not surprising that Strauss is highly respected among NPD adherents. According to an enquiry by the Allenbach Institute for Demoscopy, every second person asked considered Strauss to be the "most capable German politician" (*Der Spiegel*, 13 March 1967). The neo-nazis therefore consider Strauss to be their true "Führer".

V.

SPD Ministers—Executors of Strauss

At the end of 1966, when the situation arose in which the constellation of forces of a "Grand Coalition" predicted by Strauss had become necessary with a view to "achieving a government capable of action", social democratic leaders willingly followed the call and joined Strauss in the formation of a government.

They consciously renounced the opportunity to form a government under social democratic leadership and to introduce a turning point in West German policy, offered by the profound political crisis of monopoly capital and the CDU/CSU and based on the power of the trade unions with their 13 million members.

They consciously joined the alliance with West German monopoly capital, as suggested by Strauss and accepted his program for the new government.

That fact in itself reveals the absurdity of the talk of some social democratic leaders who say that any criticism of the SPD ministers would be harmful and would only favour Strauss.

Wehner had, moreover, been planning for a long time to enter into a monopoly capitalist government, and thus proved to be a suitable companion for Strauss.

The SPD ministers have become executors and voluntary helpers, giving the Kiesinger government an active hand in the implementation of the Strauss program; they assist in the incorporation of the Federal Republic in the US global strategy, in

the intensified struggle for hegemony in Western Europe, in the drive for nuclear armament and the obstruction of the non-proliferation treaty, in the continuation of the old revanchist policy against the GDR and the other socialist countries in the garb of a "new eastern policy", in the mobilization of neo-nazism, in the drive to enforce emergency regulations and to introduce a whole series of measures to gag the trade unions as the most important organizations of the working people. At their party congress in Dortmund the SPD leaders had still hypocritically asserted that Strauss was their enemy. Today, the government policy of Bonn, for which they are also fully responsible, is nothing but the concept of Strauss in operation.

At the CDU party congress in May 1967 Strauss stated with great satisfaction:

"The Grand Coalition was possible because our policy in economic and foreign affairs has imposed itself to such an extent that our social democratic partners have abandoned their own ideas and have been obliged to acknowledge the basic lines of our policy."

The present head of the West German government, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, stated at a CDU election meeting in Rendsburg:

"The Grand Coalition was only possible because the SPD has increasingly adapted its program of home and foreign policy to that of the CDU." (Die Welt, 10 April 1967)

CDU General Secretary and Minister of Families, Bruno Heck, rejected all allegations about a foreign policy influenced 'by the SPD as unsubstantiated:

"Our eastern policy has nothing to do with the left or the right. Besides, it was already conceived by the 'little' coalition, under the responsible authority of Foreign Minister Schröder..." (CDU Pressedienst, 3 August 1967)

The conception of Strauss and the policy of the SPD ministers show the similarity in essence of the policy conducted by Strauss and that of Wehner and Brandt:

Strauss:

"Every move in the direction of the unity of Europe and thus towards the strengthening and autonomy of Europe will result in the changing of the status quo—of course to the advantage of the West." (p. 102)

Brandt:

"The present situation which prevails in Europe will not always prevail... A European peace system should not be conceived as a simple confirmation of the things left behind by the Second World War in Europe." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 4 July 1967)

Strauss:

It is the "task of the German federal government to act on

behalf of the whole German people and to abandon none of the German rights. These include:

- the sole representation right of the federal government for the whole of Germany;
- maintenance of the firm ties between (West) Berlin and the German Federal Republic;
- protection of German legal claims to its territories beyond the Oder and Neisse;" (pp. 81/82)

Wehner:

"One can not avoid... making clear what our government is not prepared to accept... Such items include:

- a) the recognition of West Berlin as an 'independent political entity'
- b) the recognition of the other part of Germany as a second sovereign state of German nation, and
- c) the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as an ultimate frontier..." (Parlamentarischer Politischer Pressedienst, Bonn, 20 September 1967)

In the sphere of economic and social policy the SPD ministers also follow the course of Strauss. Kiesinger confirms this to the former nazi, Schiller, at present minister of economic affairs in Bonn, in his speech at the CDU Party Congress in Brunswick, where he stated:

"A number of new expressions were brought into circulation, above all by our minister of economic affairs, Professor Schiller: 'global steering', 'concerted action', and, somewhat in the background, 'social symmetry'. These new technical terms have stirred up considerable anxiety in some minds. They were wondering whether these expressions did not conceal some dangerous meaning. I may comfort those anxious souls; this is nothing other than the tested policy of the social market economy, adapted to the new phase which our economy has entered. It is adapted, not with a view to abandoning its tested principles, but in order to remain faithful to them in a changed situation."

The employers' journal Der Volkswirt of 24 February 1967 put it even more plainly:

"The increase in the profits of employers is the declared intention of the federal government. And the SPD has joined in. The social democrat Schiller is forcing that policy on in his capacity as federal minister of economic affairs..."

Finally, the social democratic leaders are clearly following the course of Strauss in urging the passing of the emergency legislation. At the SPD Party Congress in Nuremberg Brandt said:

"There is no reasonable cause why this irksome subject should be delayed any further."

The social democratic leaders, therefore, have neither taken over "half the power", nor did they bring about any turning point in the policy of the West German government.

The talk by Wehner, Brandt and Schmidt about "half the power" for the social democrats in Bonn only serves to mislead social democratic party members and trade unionists. The CDU/CSU has left no doubt about the fact that "nothing at all of the essential core of the political program which the CDU/CSU has pursued for the past two decades will be abandoned". (Kiesinger at the Congress of the Middle Classes of the CDU/CSU in Koblenz on 17 April 1967)

The essential core of that policy today is the concept of Franz Josef Strauss.

VI.

Who Is Behind Strauss?

The reactionary political concept laid down in the Entwurf für Europa is by no means an expression of the unserious world of thought of an individual extreme right wing politician. Strauss rather appears in that book as a representative of those forces of West German monopoly capitalism which are mainly urging expansion and reactionary policies. Strauss put into words and shaped into a program that which is aspired to by the leading groups of armament and finance capital. These include, among others:

The IG-Farben Trust

Notorious for its guilt in fascist development, for the criminal Hitler war of aggression, and for the production of poison gas used in the Nazi concentration camps.

Strauss was brought onto the political stage by the Wacker-Chemie works belonging to that trust, and by its head at the time, Professor Dr. Siegfried Balke, as their man charged with the task of ensuring within the central government that their plans would be implemented.

Both the CDU, and Strauss personally were given financial subsidies by the Wacker-Chemie works in Munich from a very early moment. In return Strauss, although in those days not yet a member of the CSU, installed his political benefactor Balke as his successor in the Atomic Ministry; Balke then played a decisive role in the development of West German atomic armament in the interest of IG-Farben. Today Balke, although not re-elected at the latest CSU Provincial Assembly, is still a member of the executive of the CSU Provincial Board.

The Federal Association of (West) German Employers' Associations

There is no doubt that it is one of the most powerful initiators of the book Entwurf für Europa. This parent organization of West German Employers' Associations is presided over by Strauss's friend, Professor Balke.

The Deutsche Bank

The head of this bank—which supported Hitler in his day—is Hermann Abs, who advised Strauss in working out the basic strategic concept of West German imperialist policy.

According to a report published by the weekly journal of the West German Trade Union Federation, the Deutsche Bank controls a large number of important enterprises solely through the functions held by its executive members on various boards of directors. The trade union journal published the following table:

Number of Enterprises	Employees	Turnover Proceeds (in million or Yields marks)	Balance sum (in million marks)
15 Chemical firms	215,597	16,627.99	12,904.55
7 Textile firms	22,902	765.81	470.87
24 Engineering firms (iron, steel and metals)	178,746	9,847.44	5,087.68
19 Banks, insurance companies	24,910	5,250.43	25,756.25
5 Breweries, food producers	12,844	1,121.23	542.14
15 Coal and steel enterprises	561,779	31,709.94	24,217.46
4 Power supply firms	35,065	4,326.11	6,379.04
4 Department stores, trade enterprises	106,894	6,394.63	2,073.57
6 Electrical engineering firms	436,337	12,538.49	8,393.89
2 Automobile works	176,064	12,836.59	5,838.19
2 Rubber works (tyres etc.)	35,536	1,471.05	996.71
5 Cement works (building materials)	11,753	1,041.24	911.86

(Welt der Arbeit, 26 April 1968)

This financial trust was interested in having state finances in the charge of a man who would promote the implementation of the expansionist plans of monopoly capitalism. During the government crisis in Bonn Abs had recommended Strauss as the future minister of finance. Welt am Sonntag stated in a report on

16 October 1966 of an exclusive interview with that banking magnate:

"Abs recalled that in 1957 he had proposed to Chancellor Adenauer, that Strauss should be named minister of finance. He had the intelligence for that post. Formerly the Ministry of Finance was the best staffed ministry. I would not say that this is so today... (under Erhard-editor) "Strauss was fit for any ministerial position..."

"In any case he (Abs-editor) would appoint Strauss to a responsible office in Bonn."

Strauss has been in office since 1 December 1966, to the satisfaction of his imperialist backers. He developed the Ministry of Finance into a centre of leadership in economic policy and into a firm support of authoritative state power. As supplier of funds to all other spheres—including the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs—it has an insight and essential influence on the political and objective decisions taken throughout the entire government machinery, by means of its control of the way in which funds are employed. The preamble of the so-called Stabilization Law (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, Printed Matter V/890, Bonn, 2 September 1966, p. 12) states:

"Financial policy should here be understood in the broadest sense of the term. It comprises all measures with financial effects. The regulation thus applies directly to nearly all spheres of political activity."

Strauss, in his capacity as minister of finance, is concerned above all with providing the economic and in particular the financial basis for the expansionist policy of West German imperialism.

He declared:

"Just at this moment, when the wind is blowing in our face in foreign policy, that foundation must not be attacked or weakened, as it constitutes the main factor of our international prestige and is more decisive in regard to our right to be the sole representative of the German nation than eloquent declarations." (Industriekurier, Düsseldorf, 10 November 1966)

The Dresdner Bank and the Commerzbank

The linking threads to Strauss run, among other things, over the armament industries in Bavaria, which experienced a particularly rapid development while Strauss was in office in Bonn as minister of war. The include the Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke AG in Munich, the Messerschmitt AG in Augsburg, and the Krauss-Maffei AG in Munich-Allach. The latter drew large profits out of the armament production launched by Strauss. He had placed the order for the development of the "Leopard" tank with those works during his period in office as minister of war. The Krauss-

Maffei AG increased its turnover thanks to the production of that tank from 194 million marks in 1965 to 325 million marks in 1966. The profits of that trust for 1966 were estimated at at least 45 per cent by the Securities Protection Association, (Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, No. 134, 14 and 15 July 1967)

Strauss, therefore, is associated with the three largest West German banks. These banks hold the destinies of over 3,700,000 employees in their hands: Their turnover proceeds and revenues total more than 200 thousand million marks; annual balance sums also amount to more than 200 thousand million marks (Welt der Arbeit, 26 April 1968). These three banks once financed Hitler. Today they belong to the forces backing Strauss. Those promoting Strauss further include:

The Flick-AG

Dr. Wolfgang Pohle, personally responsible representative of the Flick-AG and central manager of that trust, was sent by the CSU to the West German Bundestag as one of the most fervent supporters of the Strauss policy. Pohle is vice-chairman of the Budget Committee in the Bundestag. He is also treasurer of the CSU and in this way represents the personal link between the industrialists and the CSU party treasury.

The Siemens Trust

The head of the Siemens trust did not by mere chance station the central headquarters of his electrical engineering and electronics industry in Munich, the headquarters of Strauss. In the past the Siemens trust had made profits out of armament orders supplied by Strauss. Siemens is associated with monopoly firms such as the Farbwerke Hoechst belonging to IG-Farben, the Klöckner trust, the Associated Industrial Enterprises, the Federal Association of Private Banks and the Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, in the board of directors of the Bayerische Vereinsbank, with which Strauss and the CSU maintain close connections.

The Bayerische Vereinsbank

Executive board member is Hans Christoph Freiherr von Tucher who is at the same time a member with a seat and vote in the Economic Consultative Council of the CSU.

The Bayerische Vereinsbank (Bavarian Association Bank) granted a credit of two million marks to Franz Josef Strauss in the spring of 1967, for his publication Bayern Kurier and for the CSU. (Westfälische Rundschau, 22 February 1967)

Through the Consultative Council of that bank, interrelations are maintained, beyond those already mentioned, with the Allianz Insurance and the Bölkow GmbH. Bölkow had already

collected experiences in armaments on the fascist "Jägerstab" together with West German President and former concentration camp builder Lübke. The Bölkow firm—subsidized with state funds provided by Strauss—together with the Siemens and the Haniel trusts, forms the core of the West German atomic and missile cartels. At least 90 per cent of the turnover of the Bölkow works is derived from direct armament and space flight orders. The Boeing Company of Seattle holds approximately 25 per cent of the shares of that enterprise; another foreign business partner is the French Nord-aviation.

The Wintershall-AG

Josef Rust, member of the executive board of the Wintershall-AG was state secretary in the ministry of war in Bonn under Strauss. In the past Rust was Nazi war administration councillor on the "Eastern Economic Staff". He is promoting the development of the South German armament industry by means of his activities in the mineral oil and natural gas sector, and he enjoys the wholehearted support of the CSU and of Franz Josef Strauss.

The Diehl Group

This implement construction trust in Nuremberg has become an active partner in the armament business. Closely associated with Strauss and the CSU, this trust finances the neo-Nazi NPD. The former general manager of the Diehl trust, Wendt, is today responsible for armaments in the "Federal Association of West German Industries", and is one of the closest acquaintances of Strauss. Wendt is one of Hitler's most notorious hold-out generals, who drove tens of thousands of soldiers into a senseless death just before the end of the Second World War.

The facts prove that Strauss acts on behalf of the big armament and financial trusts, whose economic and political aims are contrary to the interests of the working population of West Germany. Strauss represents the most aggressive monopoly groups; he is an enemy of the German people and of European security.

VII.

What Does the West German Population Need?

Franz Josef Strauss does not speak and act on behalf of the West German population striving for a peaceful and democratic future. His expansionist program and the fatal policy of the present West German government, based on that program, have been meeting with growing opposition among the population, especially in recent times. The heroic struggle of the

people of Vietnam, which demonstrated to US imperialism the limits of its power, has encouraged the democratic and socialist forces in West Germany and in particular many young people to intensify their own struggle against the aggressive and reactionary political strategy of West German imperialism.

In fact, it is in the vital interest of all citizens of the West German Federal Republic, now that the Vietnamese people have taught an unequivocal political lesson to rapacious US-imperialism, to become aware of the changed situation and to draw the consequences. Vietnam is teaching the West German population

—that freedom and national independence can only be won and asserted in struggle against American imperialism and against West German monopoly capitalism, which tied West Germany to the adventurist US global strategy.

—The population of the Federal Republic will be able to impose its peaceful and democratic interests with success only if the emergency laws are prevented and the dismissal of all active Nazis from the state administration is enforced.

—The cause of the people will triumph if democrats and patriots become aware of their strength, unite for the achievement of common aims and persistently win all sections of the population for joint action in pursuit of these aims.

The population of the West German Federal Republic does not need any program of conquest and oppression such as that devised by Strauss. What it needs is the overcoming of Strauss, the defeat of the big-power politics and chauvinism conceived by him, and the defeat of the circles that back him and his policy. Not expansionist policy, but a European peace system—not emergency laws, but democratic progress correspond to the interests of the people. That should be the aim of struggles in West Germany.

It is essential in the interests of European security to remove the barriers set up by the West German government and its policy of expansion and revanchism. This calls for

—a contractually agreed upon renunciation of violence, also between the two German states; the renunciation of the possession, co-determination and control over atomic weapons and the immediate signing of the non-proliferation agreement by both German states;

—recognition of the GDR, abandonment of the revanchist sole representation pretension by the Bonn government and establishment of contractually agreed upon normal relations on a basis of equality between the two German states;

—recognition of all European frontiers, including the frontiers between the two German states and complete renunciation of the revanchist attacks by Bonn against the status quo.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *John*

DATE: July 22, 1968 *WJH*

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C *C. D. Downing*

On 7/22/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:trs *trs*
(7)
Pring

EX-103

REC-34

100-428091-7067

16 JUL 24 1968

57 JUL 31 1968

50

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/22/68

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Srinewas Ganesh Sardesai, Communist Party of India."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on July 1, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels regarding the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

AGENCY State & CIA
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 7/24/68
HOW FORW. RS
BY RCF:at

REC-34

100-428091-7068
16 JUL 25 1968



98 JUL 31 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

July 22, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SRINEWAS GANESH SARDESAI, COMMUNIST
PARTY OF INDIA.

During July, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During June, 1968, Srinewas Ganesh Sardesai, a member of the Central Secretariat and National Council of the Communist Party (CP) of India, was in Budapest, Hungary, where he attended a meeting making preparations for an International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties scheduled to be held November 25, 1968, in Moscow, USSR. On June 22, 1968, the day following the conclusion of this meeting, Sardesai traveled to Moscow, USSR, on a special plane with the returning delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Upon arrival in Moscow, Sardesai joined his wife and daughter who were staying in Moscow on vacation. Also in Moscow at about this time were the President of the CP of India, Shripad Amrit Dange, and his wife. It is known that both Dange and Sardesai were to meet on June 27, 1968, with Boris N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to discuss the current situation in the CP of India.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Group 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-7068

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/22/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Channels of Communication Between Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Communist Party, USA."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on July 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

REC-34

100-428091-7069

10 JUL 25 1968

- 1-704 100-428091-7069
- ②-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
 - 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
 - 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



98 JUL 31 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

During a discussion in Moscow, USSR, on June 25, 1968, Mikhail Polonik, Soviet official in charge of communications between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), advised that in addition to the clandestine apparatus used, the Soviets also utilize open contacts to transmit some non-confidential messages or requests to the CP, USA. Involved in this channel of communication are the Soviet personnel in the Tass News Agency, New York City, who transmit non-confidential messages to the following three individuals associated with the CP, USA press in the United States:

James Jackson
Chairman of the International Affairs
Department of the CP, USA, and former
Editor and publisher of "The Worker"

Carl Winter
member of the Secretariat of the CP,
USA, and Editor of "The Daily World"

Mike Davidow, member of the New York
District Committee, CP, USA, and a
staff writer for "The Daily World"

1
ENCLOSURE

405-428091-7069

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/22/68

ReCGlet dated June 10, 1968, captioned, "Communist Party, USA - International Relations" and CGlet dated June 17, 1968, captioned, "Solo" containing previous information relative to information contained herein.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement captioned, "James Jackson."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on June 30, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

REC-34

15 JUL 25 1968

- ②-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 31 1968

JAMES JACKSON

James Jackson, Chairman, International Affairs Department, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), returned to the United States in early June, 1968, from an extended trip to Hanoi, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). At the instruction of Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA, inquiry was made in late June, 1968, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concerning any further details which that Party might have concerning Jackson's trip, since Hall found difficult to believe a number of matters Jackson reported, such as the numerous mishaps he encountered in Thailand, Japan, and Cambodia, on his way to and from Hanoi.

Officials of the CPSU reported that they had a great deal of difficulty with Jackson because he refused to take their advice on how to travel to and from Hanoi. In view of the refusal of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to grant a transit visa, it had been arranged for Jackson to travel via New Delhi, India; Phnompenh, Cambodia; and thence to Hanoi, DRV. They had warned Jackson not to travel through Bangkok, Thailand, and Tokyo, Japan; but Jackson had done so anyway and in both places he ran into difficulties, according to his own story. Beyond this, the CPSU officials deny any knowledge of the details of Jackson's trip.

105-428091-7070

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/19/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Travel by [redacted] to Prague, Czechoslovakia, June, 1968."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on July 1, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

b6
b7c

REG-34

100-428091-9071

16 JUL 25 1968

ENCLOSURE

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



98 AUG 26 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

TRAVEL BY [REDACTED] TO PRAGUE,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, JUNE, 1968

An international youth meeting of some kind was being held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on June 12-13, 1968. It had been expected that [REDACTED] of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), would represent the CP, USA at this meeting. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) was so informed and was expecting [REDACTED] who would arrive in Prague for this meeting without a Czech visa. However, on the day before his departure, [REDACTED] discovered that his United States passport had expired and there was not enough time for him to renew it and still make the meeting in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the CP, USA national leadership designated [REDACTED] whose passport was current, to attend this meeting. [REDACTED] was fully briefed by [REDACTED] for this meeting.

According to officials of the CPCZ, [REDACTED] speech at this youth meeting was well received. In addition, [REDACTED] was requested by the staff of the "World Marxist Review," theoretical journal of the international communist movement headquartered in Prague, to prepare an article for that magazine concerning the consequences for American political life of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. [REDACTED] did prepare a brief article on this subject and was paid an undisclosed sum by the "World Marxist Review." When this article appeared, [REDACTED] name did not appear as the author.

ENCLOSURE

- 1 -

100 - 428691 - 7071

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-18-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

EX-103

July 23, 1968

BY LIAISON

REC 45

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
SOVIET VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

The leadership of the Communist Party, USA, has received a report on the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding disarmament. In essence, this report is as follows:

The Soviets are convinced that something has to be done about reaching some agreement with the United States on disarmament. If it were not for the arms race and the resultant drain on its economy, the Soviet Union could accomplish wonders. Since so much money must be spent on arms, the Soviet Union is not making the progress it should in increasing capital investment, productivity and consumer goods for the Soviet people.

The economic situation in the Soviet Union is not as bad as it once was, but there has been no radical improvement. One of the problems is that the Soviet Union must export items needed on the home market. There is much discussion in economic circles in the Soviet Union on the desirability of diverting resources away from armaments. It is realized that such diversion cannot take place under the present circumstances. However, there is no discussion about reducing Soviet aid to groups fighting wars of liberation, such as the people of North Vietnam. No matter what happens, such aid will continue.

It should be noted that the information reported above was furnished the Communist Party, USA, as the line it is to follow and project in this country as part of communist efforts to influence United States policies in line with Soviet objectives. Therefore, it may or may not represent actual Soviet policy.

SENT PER NOTATION
ON MEMORANDUM
RCP
Encl

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

RCP:pab
(14)

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 JUL 31 1968

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

SOVIET VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/22/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C," prepared by RCP:pab.

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter, dated 7/17/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS/SPK*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CB*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: July 22, 1968

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of information given the leadership of the Communist Party, USA, on the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding disarmament and recommends dissemination to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Director of National Indications Center and the Attorney General. *J*

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 27, CG 5824-S* conferred with A. S. Belyakov, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During this conference CG 5824-S* was advised as follows:

The Soviets are convinced something must be done to reach an agreement with the United States on disarmament. The drain imposed on the Soviet economy by the arms race prevents the economy from advancing in a satisfactory manner. While not as bad as it once was, the economy of the Soviet Union has not made a radical improvement. There is

Enclosure *sent* 7-23-68 REC 45 *100-428091-7072*

100-428091

RCP:pab *ypt*
(6)

EX-103

↓ ↓
CONTINUED - OVER

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: Solo
100-428091

talk in Soviet economic circles about diverting resources away from armaments into other areas. However, such action would not reduce Soviet aid to groups fighting wars of liberation, such as the people of North Vietnam.

Attached is a summary of this information for Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Director of National Indications Center, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached summary be approved and sent.

2

[Handwritten signatures: JWS/KPR, W. C. Sullivan, and others]

ENCLOSURES (2) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

2 Xerox copies of Information Bulletin
of CC, CPCZ

RE: SOLO
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau 7/18/68



ENCLOSURE

7073

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

INFORMATION BULLETIN

No 1

Prague

1968

THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMRADE ALEXANDER DUBČEK
AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

on April 1st 1968

April 1968

THE SPEECH BY COMRADE

ALEXANDER DUBCEK

Dear Comrades,

We were asked by the January plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to work out an action programme that would ensure the attainment of objectives set by that session. Our draft programme should also prepare the ground for the elaboration of a longer-term programme of the Party. We wish to submit our draft action programme to you today together with other materials.

Let me give you, by way of introduction, a short explanation of the materials, an appraisal of their importance and ideas, and also submit a brief report as to how the Central Committee presidium of the Communist Party regards the development which our society and our Party have been going through since the January plenary session.

Naturally this evaluation of the development can only be of a preliminary character in view of the dynamism, scope, and depth of the movement after the January plenary session. You, members of the Central Committee gathered here, will surely make your own addition and improvements to it.

However, one thing is obvious and indisputable: the movement since the January session is undoubtedly socialist and democratic, called to life by our Communist Party, and

is also characterized by an unwonted activity of our citizens.

It is clear that, from the point of view of our long-term prospects, the period we have been going through since January is extremely important. It has not only been a very serious test of values, but even a telling proof of the ability of our Party to imbue the social development with a new spirit. The situation deserves and undoubtedly will call for a profound analysis and explanation. Today, however, it requires a great concentration of efforts, sacrifice, will and singleness of purpose, patience and perseverance of the avant-garde party of the socialist society.

The process of new tasks and methods of fulfilling our mission, encountering old attitudes and habits, full of contradictions in itself, surges through the whole Party. That is right. We could not start on new roads otherwise.

On the one hand we can witness new hopes of the really broad masses, an unexpected activity of social organizations and of the Party in the first place, an activity admired even abroad, but was surprising even for us at home, which greatly enhanced the attractiveness of our country and of our policy. However, many are wondering and so surprised as to express fears whether the Party has not been recoiling under the pressure, whether it is not being driven by the development and whether it will be able to oppose wrong actions, harmful demands that always crop up during such a process.

We must seek answers to all these questions, we must go into their causes and judge them correctly. The Central Committee presidium has reviewed the situation, at least for operational purposes, several times lately and published its attitude.

We must, however, try to grasp more profoundly the meaning of the development of the past months. I think we are most likely to come near to this if we understand the most

essential characteristic of the dispute which has been growing in the society and in the Party during the last few years.

The essence of the dispute lay in the appraisal of the social and economic situation as it developed in Czechoslovakia after the political and economic defeat of the bourgeoisie, and after laying the political and economic foundations of socialism. The putting into effect of a new phase of the socialist revolution at the stage of non-antagonistic relations necessitated, at the same time, the development, further shaping, and establishment of a political system to meet this new situation. The problem is one of intensifying the role of the Party and generally its attitude to the present tasks of social development. We have to apply to a fuller extent, the basic principles of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of socialist construction in which we have already achieved outstanding successes, the principles of the leading role of the Party. It was and it is a matter of marching forward, of unfolding these principles. We are beginning a new stage of our proletarian socialist revolution, we have to set up such a political structure, to adopt such political methods of work that will correspond to the new conditions which we have so far been lagging behind. We have to set purposefully to elaborate and realize such a role of the Party in society which will establish - and it has done so already in this short time - the Party as the vanguard of society and its progress, as a political leading force of this society, to restore the confidence of people in it.

We were right in stressing the political aspect of the present problems. Otherwise we could hardly proceed successfully in fulfilling the policy of the 13th Congress, and this is our main concern, that we want to put into

practice, that we shall continue to elaborate. The Party is thus taking an ever more marked and convincing stand in the forefront of the movement and is not only defending the stage achieved. This, I think, is a sufficient retort to those who feared lest the new attitude should weaken the policy of the 13th Congress. We are bound to say publicly and clearly that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia stands and will continue to stand for the concentrated fulfilment of this Party policy. It was just this conviction and resolve that urgently called for an intensification of socialist democracy, for an explanation of the new conditions and tasks of our socialist society. It is with regard to the binding conclusions of the 13th Congress and experience from their being put into effect that we have to formulate even such tasks that have already been overcome and thus add new touches to emphasize the basic line in the period between congresses and prepare a new formulation answering the experience and the new conditions.

It should be said - and you will certainly have a vivid memory of the origin of the events at the last three plenary sessions - that the Central Committee of the Party could not channel the actual course, vigour, and complexity of the events of the past three months into a definite pattern either at the January plenary meeting, or before the district Party conferences. You, members of the Central Committee, know very well what it was like when we were participating in January, that the Party leadership which opened the door to this process and put itself at its head did not and could not have any time schedule for the development of the events.

The peculiarity of this process is actually that it was mostly, especially in the speed of its flow, called forth by a creative and, at the same time, spontaneous activity of the broad masses led by communists, which thus acted in the sense and in accordance with the conclusions of the

plenary meeting of the Central Committee without any instigation and ordering about from above. This, too, bears out the correctness of the January decision. It was therefore necessary, even desirable, to know better the opinion of the Party rank and file and of the broad masses of inhabitants, which made itself heard so conspicuously at the annual meetings and conferences in basic organizations, and especially at district conferences. To do anything before the Party conferences would have meant interfering with the process without having more profound knowledge of Party opinion.

We are more and more confirming that social movement cannot be simply decreed, that reason cannot be imposed upon it from outside, but that under our conditions this reason lies first of all in the knowledge, interests, and movements of the broad masses, and that it is the task of the Party to discover this reason, to give it final shape, to improve it, to emphasize progressive thinking and deeds, to oppose incorrect views, and to return the knowledge thus enriched to the social movement of the broad masses, to point it out to them, and so raise them to a higher social level. This difficult task must be borne by the whole Party.

There is therefore nothing more and nothing less at stake than a full application of the fundamental Marxist concept of the role of the broad masses and the role of the Party and of politics. The Party can play its role only if it fully leans on the interests and experience of the really broadest masses and on a scientific understanding of their application. Also in our latest political movement it was and is practice that helps from below to put finishing touches to the programme of a new political system. This movement seized the existing political and social forms and, where these forms proved to be capable of absorbing the new contents, it made use of them. If, however, the existing forms were insufficient, this democratic movement of the

broad masses started to break them.

Let us not fear this wave, but let us take it as a lesson. Let us adopt and apply, in every more important social issue, the principle of tackling weighty problems in time and with the assistance of people. Only they will help us to get near to the truth and to truthful conclusions, only with them, and if it is their cause, can we achieve something, can we make changes and attain some goals. The Party can only carry out this essence of political activity well if it makes it, that is conceives it and puts it into practice, as a whole, together with communists in the appropriate fields - in production, culture, government - if it makes it jointly with the communists in the particular fields of work or walks of life. It may be more difficult, more complicated, but it is the only correct political procedure.

Such an attitude is welcomed by an overwhelming majority of communists and the population at large. This is borne out by the results of public opinion polls, thousands of resolutions, letters, conclusions of annual meetings and district conferences. What is important is not figures, but the tendency: confidence in the Party is growing, and so is self-confidence inside the Party.

Activity is evident in all social categories, among workers, the intelligentsia, agricultural workers, though still characterized with a certain irregularity and sometimes spontaneity. It is our duty, the duty of the whole Party and of all communists, to imbue this activity with a really creative character. A revival can be witnessed also in the inner life of large social organizations - in the trade unions and among the young people.

Economic results of the first two months of this year show that the hectic period of discussions, polemics, appraisals, and resolutions did not leave any unfavourable signs on the working morale. On the contrary, we are being increas-

singly convinced that the development of democracy is the only way of strengthening a conscious discipline. We also have full confidence in our working people to be able to understand that the newly started tendency of development can be effectively supported by deeds, by purposeful work in factories, in the fields and workshops as well as in scientific thinking and in the arts.

We can, therefore, say quite unambiguously that the decisions and conclusions of the January plenary session proved to be correct, and also absolutely necessary, because the state as it existed - accumulation of many ripe and untackled problems - threatened an acute political crisis. The vehemence of the whole society's response supplies a proof. At the same time, of course, it is a commitment for the whole Party and for us in the Central Committee to apply all our efforts to a resolute realization of socialist democracy, to analyze this decisive positive development and to carry it on. On the other hand not to ignore the extremes which harm the movement, and thus to be at the head of a further development of this socialist democracy. Everybody in this Republic, all the more so a Party member, must be aware that we do not have in mind just any sort of democracy, but socialist democracy. That this cannot mean a weakening of the leading role of the Party, but only a new adaptation in the spirit of Leninism, effective, purposeful, meeting the new conditions. That there is no question of an impairing of the influence on and tasks towards the socialist state, but of the best expression of the principle of democratization and the necessary centralism, so that the democratic element of the development of our society, inherent in the socialist state, might find an ever better expression.

We see the essence of socialist democracy in that it directly affects all social strata, in that it is democracy not only in respect of institutions, but that it governs also all other provinces of the social life of people.

Freedom of speech is a very important precondition for expressing opinions and interests. These, however, will necessarily clash with each other and with the social reality. Institutional safeguards of their objective appraisal and solution is a further necessity which must be thoroughly elaborated and put into legal form. All of this would have no sense, of course, if the submitted and recognized problems were not tackled, if they were not grappled with in the social sphere at all, and in economy in particular, if the social activity were not transformed into economic activity. The wealth of thoughts must be reflected in a growth of cultural and material wealth. It will always be, again and again, the honest, purposeful and good work that pushes us forward. Nothing else can be promised.

We consider socialist democracy to be a system in which the working man has his own standing and value, his security, his right, and his future. It is based upon human participation, coherence, and cooperation. We wish to meet people's longing for a society in which they can feel to be human among humans. This active, humane, integrating part of socialism, a society without antagonism, that is what we want to realize systematically and gradually, serving the people. It is a very gratifying task to serve humanity, one which has been waged by Marxist revolutionaries for more than a hundred years. We are carrying on their work and want to link up imaginatively with everything that is progressive and positive in the history of our nations.

If we want to make socialist democracy a living thing - and let there be no doubt about that - we must and we shall be guided in our work, by the living theory of Marxism-Leninism and shall actively defend its ideology against various attacks. We shall fight for its purgation, for its realization in the full sense of the term, and thus we shall best enhance the attractiveness and convincingness of socialist

ideas in our class-split antagonistic world.

The main bearer of ideas of a further and full realization of the socialist revolution is the working class which was and still remains the pillar of social progress. It is most, socially and politically, interested in an all-round development of our society, it is part and parcel of social progress which can bring it and hence the whole society a further general liberation. The speed of changing the whole society depends on its revolutionary self-surpassing.

It is as true, now as in the past, that the working class will have to find its way - again and again, in every new situation - to understanding its role in society, and it is the duty of the Party to be its friend in this respect to help the working class better understand its tasks at the new stage of development. We have to keep in mind, of course, that just as the whole society, even the working class is differentiated by the varying attitude of its members to the spirit of political progress of social development.

In view of the Party being armed with scientific theory, in view of the whole historical achievement of our Party and in view of the fact that the revitalization process and the opening of a new stage in our country was initiated by our Party, we think we have the right to declare: the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia continues to be, and is now even more rightly, the decisive, organized, and progressive force of our society. The main method in the activities of the Party must be such a political practice in which the Party will continuously seek public control and make full use of the results of science and erudition and of the inspiring existence of the arts. This too will be a permanent well of fresh water upon which the Party may draw for a constant progressive development and against stagnation.

The tasks facing us, the socialist, non-antagonistic

character of our society, and the longing to satisfy, to the highest possible extent, all the needs of our society, preparation of the scientific and technical revolution, all this makes it possible, but also demands, a strengthening and development of the unity of our society. One of the main tasks of the Party at present and in the future, all the more so is that we understand this unity dialectically. We have to respect the increasing differentiation, and achieve unity by meeting specific requirements. In addition, we have to overcome whatever is bad in the heritage of the past as regards relations among individual classes and social categories, between the nations.

When going over to a new chapter of the socialist revolution, I think we have to thank all those who for tens of years took part in its preparation by carrying on a revolutionary fight for a remoulding of society. It was an immense task, hard, full of searching, often accompanied by misunderstanding, self-denial, sacrifice, personal courage. Not only we, but history will surely appreciate that period of the birth, preparation, and putting into practice of socialist ideals in our country as a period literally bursting with historical events, a period of an immense activity of communists-revolutionaries.

I also wish to thank all of those who, in the past twenty years, honestly and boldly carried out their tasks, who make up an overwhelming majority of our society, and whom we have chiefly in mind in our strivings. Without the honest and meticulous work of millions it was not possible in the past, and it will not be possible in the future, to bring the present intentions of the Party to fruition - to meet the longings and realize the ideas of our nations.

In the interest of the future we shall try to get rid of everything that has become obsolete or that has proved to be incorrect. The Central Committee gave impulse to this,

at its January plenary meeting, by the self-criticism then applied, and it accelerated the process. The idea is to further develop and strengthen everything positive that has been accomplished. It is really unfounded if this process is used by individuals for a sweeping rejection and debasement of everything done before. We cannot reject and debase a bold and honest work because of faults and of achievements that have become anachronistic. We shall consider and rectify the wrongs and faults of the past, but that does not mean to disparage and slander the past which is bound up with officials and members of the Party, economic workers, anti-Nazi fighters, workers, peasants, citizens of our Republic. Our thanks are due to them and to their efforts for everything positive in our past.

Now, together with these unambiguous conclusions and standpoints we must at least try to judge how in these past three months the Party as a whole has carried on, the practical part of political management, how we have managed to understand the ideas and moods of the working people in the various social categories, how we project them into our policy, put the finishing touches to them and realize them, where we see the problems of that period.

A really new situation has emerged. Instead of one apparently homogenous social interest in the country which coincided with the ideas of some leading comrades, we are now faced with many differentiated, overlapping and mutually clashing interests and attitudes expressing various short- and long-term partial interests of the most varied social categories.

It is my opinion that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia can at this very stage commence the task of fulfilling the real mission of the Party as the leading force in our society. It can start with an analysis of the people's real interests, with evaluating their common and their differing aspects, their

expressions of progressiveness and conservatism, to make clear what of these real interests are part of the interests and requirements of the whole society, to arrive at conclusions in the strategy and tactics of its advance with regard to individual social categories. In carrying through the logical development of society as a whole the Party may consciously place itself at the service of the real needs and interest of the people, solicit their confidence in materializing them.

Naturally, in the short time we have so far had at our disposal, these ideas can hardly be more than an outline of a programme. People therefore ask for guarantees that this process will not stop. Although we are still only at the beginning of our revitalizing process, some personnel and institutional guarantees of its further development have already been created.

What, in our opinion, is the main problem now, at this moment? I should say the main problem of the moment is to trim our revitalization process, to make it more concrete, to consolidate it. So far all the attention is centred around personal changes, but a more substantial stage is already in the making. A mere change of persons is no way to reach the fundamental goals, but at the same time the fundamental change cannot be forced along hastily, in an improvised way and at the speed characterizing the past few weeks which neither we nor the public can bear indefinitely.

A period is just beginning when a system of safeguards and stimuli of an organized progress is to be set up, when a mechanism must be developed to achieve our aims not in a haphazard and catastrophic way, but calmly, smoothly, and democratically. Our plenary session is sure to play a great role in this respect, insofar that it will be the first step towards fulfilling the action programme. Here, in

preparing the action programme - we have, I think, fulfilled the objectives of the January meeting within a short and busy period. We thought then to be decisive at this stage. A Central Committee plenary meeting without planning further activities, for which an action programme would provide preconditions, would only complicate and hamper the materialization of the conclusions of the last three meetings, all the more so because the level of today's knowledge, based upon district conferences, provides scope for developing the spirit of the conclusions of the past meetings and enables dissociation from some expressions of demagoguery, anarchy, and various extremes which could only interfere with the process of democratization. Nobody and nothing can halt the creative development of our socialist society. It can, however, be slowed down and affected by impatience, subjectivism in reverse and other extremes alien to this socialist development.

Our political work, however, will not be easy either tomorrow or in the future. The criticizing ferment of the past few months indicated the way our political work has to take. Apart from undoubtedly positive features the democratization process brought up many old, and also some new weak spots and shortcomings. Evidently this process of criticism has not yet touched all the old features we have to overcome but, what is more important, it does not always touch the essentials of our social life, but very often only its superficialities. The criticism, it is true, reached and reaches almost all spheres of our social life, but it often concentrates only on the consequences without taking into account the causes. And so various faults and shortcomings are simply stated and more or less put in connection with certain persons. Meanwhile it is clear, that we have to lay stress on an improvement of methods. We are lacking a more profound historical and analytical survey on the origins of these faults and shortcomings. I think, especially in connection

with the preparations for the 14th Congress, that for a further positive course of democratization of our social life, it will be necessary to get down to a really thorough analysis of the entire economic and political development to date in our socialist society.

It is, of course, not only a matter of the past. The analytical method must be concerned especially with the present. Today, tomorrow, and in the future, the development will be controversial, the new will clash with the old. It is essential to recognize in time what is what and where to go in for greater, more general details. Such a deeper sounding is imperative for all those who have a say in social processes.

Hand in hand with this programming role of the Party, the Party activity proper and political work as such, political influencing, must return, at all levels and in all sectors, to a more consistent organizational work among the people, to a more lively contact with the people, to a direct investigation of their real views. This applies to Party officials, but it also applies to every Party member, as this is the essence of his Party membership - to get to know the Party policy, to take a part in its shaping, to participate in its being put into effect, in explaining it.

This activity in the Party has become very weak. In appraising the upswing of Party life these days we have to realize that a return to such a concept of the duties of the Party member will be complicated and strenuous. We are resolutely criticizing the haughty and administrative methods in Party work which paralysed the activity of members. We must at the same time realize that it has left deep marks, consequences in practice, habits and, with some people, even a tendency to seek alibis, to rely on instructions. This is true also of members in all spheres of social activities. Contact and understanding with people whose social-political

interests and problems are being tackled are indispensable. To order people about is not possible and right no matter what form may be used, administrative or theoretical postulates, or means aimed at affecting public opinion. This must be faced not only by members drawing the attention of various Party bodies up to the Central Committee to the wrong opinions but by opposing them ideologically themselves. They are expected to defend the Party policy, to explain it, to win people over for its realization.

I think that from our plenary meeting, we must address with full confidence and also with exacting requirements, the ranks of our membership who must get our full support, the basic organizations committees elected at annual meetings, the district Party committees elected at annual conferences. We must not chicanery and scandalize, without reason, the work of thousands who, consciously, full of loyalty to the Party, courageously and mainly honestly fulfilled the tasks of our socialist construction. We are asking the active Party members, the overwhelming majority of our members to which the Central Committee looks for support - and we are convinced that this request will be met - to show their self-sacrifice again as it was always so typical for them and to develop activity among workers in factories, fields, building sites, and all other working places. This is the direction our socialist policy for the people must take with more vigour than ever before. It is their interests and worries that we must pay attention to in the first place, it is they whom we must understand, in good or bad situations. I think that every communist, every democratically thinking person understands that he can realize his ideals only in unity with the life of our working people. Every type of sectarianism is harmful.

Important in this respect is the role of district committees which, after the district conferences and backed by the realistic content of our policy, will do a good deal

of work among the citizens, especially in securing the fulfilment of economic tasks which should get much more attention in pre-election political activities; no matter whether the elections take place in June or in the autumn. This important task would be jeopardized if the conclusions of some district conferences were to be questioned. If it is found that some replacements of officials are necessary here or there, no new conference is required, especially if the call of some individuals is not in harmony with the opinion of an overwhelming majority of Party members. Democracy does not mean never-ending conferences. The discussion and consultations must be followed by a conclusion binding for all members, and then by the deed. Conferences were and are the highest Party organs in the districts, and in the periods between the conferences it is the district committees elected by the conferences. The principle of democratic centralism, which must be fully respected in the intra-party life, without which the Party would lose its capacity of action, requires the minority to submit to the conclusions, to the decisions of the majority, and to apply its opinion by adhering to intra-party rules.

Just a little note. There are rumours, a sort of doubting, as to whether the people's militia should continue to exist. Of course it should. The people's militia is firmly incorporated in a uniform system of the country's defence, it has its own share of duties which it will certainly carry out. Doubts about its role are quite unfounded.

I think, comrades, that generally speaking, in pushing through democratic relations their scope and depth must be observed to a greater extent. This especially refers to personnel and cadre problems. We must establish an atmosphere that would make it possible for Party officials to be criticized, to make this a natural feature, to prevent criticism breaking out only when things have gone to the extreme, and then using force. At the same time, however, we must reach a state when

the criticized persons can take a stand, when they can explain untruthful or incorrect reproaches. A mass obsession in this respect or even its inciting can only bring tragic consequences, as we were able to see for ourselves in the past. Wrongs cannot be undone by causing new wrongs. In the struggle of the new with the old we must do all possible to rally the Party of the platform and around the goals submitted by the Party Central Committee. Here, in this political scope, let differentiation and unification take their course.

We do not want and cannot proceed so that the rectification of shortcomings would be contrary to our basic principles of ethics, we do not want to have to rectify the rectifications. We declare this idea binding on the communists in all sectors and in all Party bodies. We know our people well, and even if some individuals might succumb to their passions, organizers of an incorrect course which would not comply with the ethics of our Party work would never find understanding with our public.

A further problem, lesson, and requirement to be met - and this will be among the first for us to strive for at a further stage of our socialist democracy, is really to develop an ever richer content - that is the knowledge that the criticism bore the stigma of one-sidedness practically right through. For a long time it was a monologue as it hardly found any opponents either from the ranks of the conservative wing, or even from the progressive wing. It found its expression, among other things, also in the fact that, even though there are both objective and subjective reasons for it, little was heard from the technical and economic intelligentsia. It is necessary to take into fuller account the desirability of a larger share of the public expression of the attitude of workers and peasants for the future course of this democratization process. The reasons are

of course various. A role was played in this respect by information available, its speed of supply and its level, immediate availability of public involvement and so on. It resulted in a certain perturbation and fears with some of the comrades in factories and agriculture because their interests were left unheeded. We have to keep this in mind at all levels of Party activities, in the economic life, in trade unions, in the youth movement, and to redress the situation. Our journalists, radio and television workers must realize this in order to improve their very useful and beneficial work and, by giving more attention to the thoughts and opinions of workers and peasants, to improve to an even greater extent our capacity of rallying for action.

People working in this field and communists did much in accomplishing our aims through the mass media of information. They correctly used the conclusions of our January plenary meeting in preventing people getting informed by a whispering propaganda or from abroad. This is enhanced by supplying information on discussions going on in the Central Committee presidium and the secretariat. They may feel rewarded by an immense interest shown in their work. However, this interest binds them, at the same time, to a very high political or even a statesmanlike responsibility as every wrong or unobjective news or transmission has a mass repercussion, calls for a standpoint, an explanation. If we want to refine, and we shall do so, democratism with a clear socialist tendency, then responsibility for its good functioning and for preventing anybody from meddling with it rests indeed on all component parts, all levels of management.

It is necessary to appreciate the self-evident truth that the speed in submitting problems may be easily increased, but their solution, their realization - unless we indulge in subjectivism in reverse has its own objective limits and requires a good classification of tasks. Unrealistic, irritated demands with an addition of demagoguery may bring im-

mediate popularity, but if they are not met they cannot establish the trust without which we cannot understand each other. And we do need mutual trust if we are to factually assess and bring together the multitude of interests.

We would be short-sighted were we not to see a further feature of the post-January development - a revival of certain non-socialist moods, even of some angry cries demanding revenge. We drew attention to these in the presidium's published statement of February 21. Our standpoint is, that the Party will not be caught unprepared, not even by possible attempts at a legalization of these moods under the disguise of democracy or rehabilitation, and that it will refute any attempts at a weakening and atomization of progressive socialist tendencies. I am reiterating that the democracy we have in mind is and must be, even in future, of a definitely socialist character, and that no anti-socialist tendencies will have a chance to take advantage of this. The decisive feature is that the general character of the revitalizing process in our society is by far not determined by certain extreme tendencies and excesses which try to express these moods. But wherever they may crop up, we must oppose them on basic ideological grounds so as not to be retarded on our way. The main and decisive factor of our development is the unfolding of socialist democracy, the road to which was opened by the October, December, and January plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

This must remain the basis of our policy even in the future. On this basis, and that has been confirmed by the past three months, an immense energy of our Party and of our nations was put into motion. This is the basis on which the efforts of workers, agricultural workers, and intelligentsia are consolidating. We have, therefore, to go on looking ahead, to develop all that is new and all the positive features of our socialist construction.

Comrades,

allow me to say a few words about our work as members of the Central Committee and the Presidium. I think that we must regularly and self-critically ponder over it, especially in such a fermenting political period as this, in order to improve our work in practice too, in the way we resolved at the January Plenary Session, in order to strengthen leading Party work and rid it of outdated, unsuccessful and incorrect methods.

A state has originated in the Party following the January Plenary Session of the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in which discussion about the problem dealt with by the Central Committee has continued for quite a long time. As you all know well, this was an extremely serious discussion on the position of the Party in the society. The complexity of the discussion, the contradiction of the process of unification marked the conclusions of the Central Committee's January Plenary Session with incomplete and diverse, and particularly non-analytical information - including that provided by members of the Central Committee about the reasons, which led to the decisions at the January Plenary session. This contributed considerably to the fact that many Party organisations did not grasp well enough or sufficiently appraise the resolutions and especially the importance of the content of the Plenary Session's debate. A different situation arose where correct understanding and verbal report of the conclusions and content of the Plenary Session's debate, helped it to

be grasped fully. This led to an unbalanced state, which really made the situation difficult for functionaries. We take this for a fact resulting from the state of our Party before the January Plenary Session and it is impossible to arrive at any conclusion but that in future we should pay greater respect to the importance of a more unified approach to the basic questions by members of the Central Committee before the Party public. This is not a matter of uniformity. That would harm the cause. The point at issue is that the Party - if it is to be a Party of action of revolutionary practice - must adhere to the principles of democratic centralism so that in its activity, in action it can proceed as united as possible.

We assumed that we should first manage to present to the Party the draft Action Programme, which might function as an outstanding unifying factor, a factor of unity on the basic problems of progress and development of our socialist society. However, the succession of events was more rapid. This was promoted by increasingly comprehensive information about the essence of the conclusions to the active Party group and the course of the latest Plenary Sessions imparted from a different angle, I should say, "the Sejna case" disturbing the public, as well as other circumstances.

We were aware that the decision of the January Plenary Session would influence the growth of the political activity of citizens, that it would bring about a new political atmosphere, speed up the raising of demands - including social demands - which are frequently justified and which will have to be solved gradually and systematically, though not all at once. The government will have to seek ways of solving them setting a course and give reasons for it so that the solution is realistic. Under the pressure of time we were faced with other new problems, for the solution of which the Central Committee had not been sufficiently pre-

pared in advance. This relates to certain problems of the work of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth, the tasks and position of the National front and the political parties, the activities of cultural and art unions and many other problems.

Many questions and problems have accumulated for solution over the past period. The January Plenary Session brought them to the surface. It is possible to say today, even more than in January, that the Central Committee has assumed its task, but that it was already high time.

At the beginning, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak C.P. was meeting once a fortnight. We believed that, contrary to the past, it should not deal with details, but with really fundamental political problems of the society. But they are many today. Therefore we had to meet much more frequently lately. However, it is difficult in this respect to make up what was neglected in the period after the 13th Congress. In this period of just over two months it was beyond our strength to adopt an attitude without proper analysis towards the large quantity of problems posed by this development.

It proved to be correct that the Presidium of the Central Committee took a stand on many important principal problems, for instance, at the Congress of agricultural co-operatives, at the February session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak C.P. at the enterprise conference at Kladno, where the present position and tasks of the working class were discussed, and at the district conference in Brno.

But we must also ponder over how to achieve that the attitudes being published from the session of the CC Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia should reflect the situation more profoundly, more emphatically point out the reasons of the given phenomena to the entire Party, serve more as instruction for activity and thus stimulate

even greater activity of communists, and their zest and will to solve serious social problems.

In this respect, we shall have to rely more effectively on, while channelling the work of the Party apparatus, which we cannot do without. The apparatus itself, its workers, particularly through the active Party group, must help more efficiently towards better, really analytical work of Party bodies. The work of the apparatus must be increasingly orientated, improved and made more efficient in this direction. It must have the position which is really its due - no more, no less. It is impossible not to see its important position in the system of our Party work. Therefore it is also out of place to negate indiscriminately the work of the Party apparatus. Its overwhelming majority is made up of brave and honest communists whose aim is to serve devotedly the Party and our people.

There were proposals during the first conferences that we should call a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia. The Presidium of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adhered to the set course in preparations for the first Plenary Session after January. This was mainly because it was too much to work out a course for the future work of the Central Committee, which would proceed from the principles of the Action Programme in this short time. The Presidium thought it decisive for the future course of work to concentrate on the content of Party work in the next period and carry out personnel changes only on this basis, and not vice versa. Without knowing the conclusions of the response to the January Plenary Session and the intensity of Party activity, which became evident at the district conferences, the CC Plenary Session would be unable to advance. The district Party conferences attested to the Party's maturity and to the ability of communists to make a correct estimation of the situation.

Although we do not want to, and must not, fall into giving directives for particular processes, we could give positive replies to certain questions only in the spirit of the prepared Action Programme. I have in mind for example the problem of youth organisation. In the coming period the youth organisation should respect the differentiation of the interests of young people, while preserving the unity of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth in what unites all the different groups of young people, so that the strength and importance of youth are not split in this fundamental issue. I believe that young people will not only state their demands, but also what they want to do. What is common to, and what unites young people will become evident on the basis of these interests. I think that the unity of a differentiated youth organisation should be as natural as the unity of other important social organisations. In this we must not ignore the fact that the struggle for the unity of youth organisations has been fought for decades so that youth as a whole could apply their political influence more efficiently. This is also why the youth movement should not give up its unity.

I spoke here about certain problems in achieving a more coherent functioning of the Party in society. I should also like to say that by no means can we, nor do we want to, return to some sort of authoritative relationship towards society, towards individual social groups. We should demonstrate this also by subjecting the decisions and conclusions of the Central Committee from the past period to a really profound analysis that would be as objective as possible. We should annul and practically outpace those which proved to be erroneous. I want to inform the Central Committee in this connection that we have also thought of including a political assessment of the Party attitudes towards the 4th Congress of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers of last September on the agenda of this session. As a result of the pressure of time and the insufficient ideological analysis of various

aspects of this Congress we have arrived at the conclusion that it is correct to concentrate first on solving the basic political problems of this time and tackling others without haste afterwards.

At the same time we think it inevitable in the interests of normalizing relations between the Party Central Committee and the writers' organisation to cancel immediately the validity of those conclusions of the Central Committee which administratively interfered from a position of power in the ideological conflict which needed to be settled by ideological means. Therefore we recommend that the September 1967 decision of the Central Committee on the transfer of *Literární noviny* into the sphere of the Ministry of Culture and Information be rescinded and that the proposal of the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia revoke the resolution on the expulsion of comrades Klíma, Liehm and Vaculík from the Party, on the punishment by reprimand with caution of comrade Kohout and on the introduction of Party disciplinary measures against comrade Milan Kundera.

Dear comrades,

Allow me now to pass to a brief explanation of the materials submitted to you. In them we stress the political aspect of work, above all the deepening of the content and methods of Party work.

We must purposefully create preconditions already today to be ahead of schedule in our future work. This means to work out with the help of solidly based scientific analyses the key problems of the new policy which is now being formed and which will continue being formed with the advance of preparations for the 14th Party Congress, and to accumulate prerequisites for the formation of a prospective programme. In this respect, we must activate and coordinate the

work in all spheres of scientific research, not give way to rashness, and reject the insincerity of cheap slogans and promises. On the other hand though, we must not be afraid to set ourselves the boldest aims the feasibility of which can be scientifically anticipated.

The importance of the choice and leadership of communists, who work in State and non-State institutions and organisations, and especially the importance of Party branches in which they are grouped must be stressed in connection with the new concept of the relationship of the Party to these organisations. Communists in non-Party organisations must be able to work out their policy independently and create scope for its implementation by winning the confidence and support of non-communists through the correct statement of their interests. The growing importance of the mission of communists should become and will be more clearly evident also in the fact that new members will be joining the Party mostly from the ranks of those who have best proved their worth and have grown into respected public officials.

It will be necessary to build up an objective Party system based on the system of democratic relations between all the components of the Party structure on an entirely new foundation. Consistent struggle against undesirable and undemocratic tendencies, lively and permanent confrontation of practical measures with the Party's Action Programme and with the democratic process of policy-making, of protection of rights and interests of communists, will be the main purpose of this system.

It will be necessary now to concentrate the best forces of the Party for practical action and at the same time for working out the general line of the next Party Congress, which would fully correspond to the new stage of the development of our society. In view of the situation and demands of

many district conferences we believe that it is necessary not to take a decision on the convocation of the 14th Congress, but to analyse the possibility of speeding up and intensifying its preparation while starting to work out a long-term programme of the CP of Czechoslovakia.

The reasons stimulating the speeding up of preparation for the Congress will certainly be intelligible to our comrades. For if we really want to take the lead in the current, and especially future, social changes we cannot do so predominantly through propaganda nor by personnel changes only. We can lead and inspire mainly by a realistic and clear policy. Its basis for the next period is the Action Programme. However, we should not forget that development is very dynamic. What is good today will be no longer sufficient tomorrow. Our nations rightly expect that, at the future Party Congress, we shall be able to state a clear, programmatic standpoint, in its entirety. This means inclusive of the problems of the growth of the standard of living, basic objectives of the fifth five-year plan, prognoses of long-term economic development, etc. Otherwise, the proceedings of the Congress will bring nothing and would only result in wasting the initiative and activity to which we have stimulated the Party and masses.

The Party Congress presupposes the completion of the Action Programme, its extension into the guideline of the 14th Congress, though in unity with the economic programme. Otherwise, the workers will not understand us. The Congress will certainly take up everything that was viable and really progressive in our past policy and in the history of the Party, that stood the test of historical proof of values. And this guide-line will also clearly disengage from everything that was unrealistic and wrong.

There will certainly be an opportunity in the process of the implementation of the Action Programme and preparation

for the next Congress - i.e. on the basis of an active and matter-of-fact attitude, in everyday work - for the Party, public to decide responsibly, who should be given the mandate of member of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia at the Congress.

In order to succeed fully in what we shall energetically strive for we must create the necessary preconditions in Central Committee bodies and in the central apparatus of the Party already at this Plenary Session. To reorganise the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee is the first task. We must logically proceed in this from the results of the past Plenary Sessions. The new Presidium and the new Secretariat must then prepare proposals for a complete adaptation of the structure of the central apparatus. Suggestions - although they cannot be regarded as complete - have been submitted to you. We are submitting them to you for study and for comment as working material, which has not yet been approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia. We shall take a decision on them after they are completed and debated by the presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC, probably at our next Plenary Session.



All-round rationalization of the state administration in accordance with the spirit of the proceedings and conclusions of the December and January plenary sessions of the Central Committee is part of the policy of strengthening our socialist system. We have taken the first step in this direction by the election of the new president. We are fully confident that the election of comrade Ludvík Svoboda will contribute to the unification of progressive forces, to the

consolidation of political conditions in the state, and that all our efforts will benefit from it.

A very important task is to intensify the work of the government. The government must work, from the beginning, at a level in keeping with its constitutional function and the requirements of the new era. It must be not only a team of ministers, but also a collective body actually governing the republic and ensuring the needs of the society, expressed in the policy of the Communist Party and the National Front. In its work it must fully respect the will of the supreme body of state power, the National Assembly, cooperate with it in an active way, and systematically account to it for its work. Gradually, the government must get rid of excessive, for the government disproportionate, operative management of the economy and culture by directives; and be, above all, a body of conceptual and perspective management and effective state administration; sufficiently firm and exact to ensure that desirable order and democratic discipline prevail in our country.

In forming a new government, it will be right to count with the most urgent changes in the structure of the ministries, as proposed by the presidium of the Communist Party, Central Committee and the government. In the foreseeable future the new government should propose other necessary structural changes and adopt fundamental measures aimed at improving its work.

Mainly, however, we must proceed from the necessity of substantially changing the composition of the government, in keeping with the new conditions of its work and function. The public expects that those people will be appointed to government posts who will represent guarantees that the spheres assigned to them will be administered well. We must respect and apply the democratic principle that fundamental changes and turning points in politics are connected with the changes of political personalities asked to carry out the changes.

One of the first tasks of our Central Committee, the government and the National Assembly will be to accelerate the consolidation of the situation in the security forces and in the army.

Many critical words have been directed lately against the Ministry of Interior, and security bodies. The public was disquietened by a large number of facts which had come out in connection with the work of some security agencies in the 1950s, and by certain recent events. The measures, including the cadre measures, which are being taken at present will support everything that is sound at the Interior Ministry. Party conferences and meetings of the ministry personnel confirm that the sound forces within the security services represent the overwhelming majority. These forces guarantee that the confidence of the public in security services will be restored.

I am sure you will agree with me that the social need for security services is beyond any doubt. Only recently, Prague was perturbed by the report that another young member of the Public Security had lost his life in a struggle with a criminal. We must show full, sincere understanding for the difficult, responsible work of the security service, and we must extend a helping hand to the comrades in the service.

The Party regards reliable protection of the secure life of the country's peoples as an important political task. The defence of the republic is the concern of all the people, all Party, state, social and economic bodies and organizations. The resolutions and letters addressed to the Central Committee confirm that the communists in the armed forces, and other servicemen, fully and unequivocally support the results of the October, December and January plenary sessions of the Central Committee. They support the progressive trends in the Party and in the society, especially the process of democratization and rectification of errors in the methods

and work of the Party and state bodies. The communists in the army, security forces and units of the People's Militia have our full confidence, and will be given full support of the Central Committee for their highly responsible, demanding service and work.

The communists in the army realize that the revitalization process in our society and Party applies, to the full extent, to the army. Also we see in that, and in the necessary cadre changes in the army command, the guarantee that not even a shadow of doubt will ever fall on the absolute loyalty of the army to the people and to the progressive development of our society.

We must continue building our army, and improving it on socialist principles, on the basis of full centralism and indivisible authority of command, as a defence bulwark against the external enemy, against the imperialist aggressors. The army must be built as a firm link in the alliance of the Warsaw Treaty armies.

The building and operations of the Czechoslovak armed forces, army and security, must proceed under the democratic control of responsible state bodies. It will be right to create appropriate guarantees in this respect. At the same time, to a much greater degree, the problems concerning the army and security must become the subject of interest and democratic supervision of the whole public.

As regards the National Assembly, we must fully ensure the application of the constitutional rights of this supreme state institution, already in its present form and under the conditions of the valid constitution and other laws, with possible necessary partial amendments. It is necessary to recommend inevitable cadre changes in the presidium of the National Assembly. Finally, it will be necessary to draw up new principles for the activities of the communists in the National Assembly. In this connection, the necessity to

set up without delay an armed forces and security committee of the National Assembly is urgent.

The communists in the National Assembly should come forward with the initiative for the inception, without delay, of qualified work on the preparations of a new constitution which will give legal expression to the social transitions in our society, and which will become a firm legal base of the democratic structure of our life, as a permanent principle of advancing, modern socialist society. The principles of the draft constitution should become the subject of broad, democratic discussion of the public and of experts.

Fundamental changes must also be carried out in the constitutional expression and protection of the principle of equal rights of the Czechs and Slovaks. Experience from development hitherto, and especially following the constitution of 1960, prove convincingly how various aberrations have affected this sphere of state law, supremely important for the unity of the two nations, practically annulling the elementary rights of Slovakia, of the Slovak national bodies. The existing organization of the Slovak national organs is the target of justified criticism. It is our task to develop the relations between the Czech and Slovak nations on sound foundations, to strengthen the common Czechoslovak statehood.

It is, therefore, necessary, to prepare a new constitutional law in the foreseeable future, even before the elections to the National Assembly and to the Slovak National Council. This constitutional reform, which should be a continuation of the positive concepts and proposals which have been born in the periods of the anti-fascist resistance and of the beginnings of the national and democratic revolutions, will fundamentally change the status and authority of Slovak national bodies. The amendment should be based on the wishes and needs of our nations and nationalities, should fully ensure their national development, and thus contribute to the

strengthening of Czechoslovak statehood. The development of our statehood should be directed towards enhancing the equality of our fraternal nations. In this connection, and respecting the will and experience of both nations, it is necessary to analyze constitutional development so far, and its future direction. On the basis of this analysis, and of a thorough study of political, cultural and especially economic relations, a federative system should be drafted as one of the Leninist forms of solving nationality questions in the constitutional sphere. The "action programme" of the Party sets this task. The task will require, however, further, very careful work.

The constitutional law should state quite clearly that the Slovak National Council is to be constituted as a legislative body, and that the division of legislative authority between the National Assembly and the Slovak National Council should be consistent with the principles of the Kosić Government Programme. The legislative and executive powers, vested today in the Slovak National Council and its presidium, should be separated. In consequence of these changes, the status and structure of the boards of commissioners and other executive bodies of the Slovak National Council will change. The constitutional law should also explicitly state that in constitutional matters in the relations of the Czechs and Slovaks, the representation of the Slovak nation cannot be majorized.

With regard to the national committees, we recommend postponement of the elections to these representative bodies, in accord with the numerous proposals of the public and of experts. The presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and the presidium of the National Assembly have adopted conclusions in this matter, on which comrade Šedovský will report. The plenum will have to adopt its position on the date of the elections during the current session.

The existing and the new national committees should,

in our opinion, centre without delay their main attention on care for the daily needs of the population.

In the past few months, we have already practically started on the road towards solving a number of questions of socialist democracy. Freedom of speech and criticism, freedom of press - these are no longer demands, but realities. We have begun solving definitely all problems of the rehabilitation of all unjustly persecuted people - communists and non-communists. There is also full-blooded development of initiative in our social organizations, especially in trade unions. The National Assembly and the Slovak National Council are beginning to understand their new role. Changes in certain important state, party and social functions also belong to the realities of the past weeks.

However, these are all only first steps. What will be necessary now? Above all, we must give a legal form to all positive features of the current revitalization process, we must pass laws which will guarantee that the freedoms of speech and criticism, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly will be, in connection with socialism and the inviolability of our statehood and socialist achievements, permanently protected by laws, by the fundamental parts of our political system, by the fundamental rules of our public life.

No democracy - and thus not even our socialist democracy - can live for long only on the fact that opinions can be freely expressed, that criticism is permitted. That in itself is only decisive, if free and sound criticism removes old obstacles from the road of social progress. In order to live and to rule democratically in our society even then, when the obstacles have been eliminated everywhere and for good, we must have a well-thought out and well functioning system of institutions, bodies and organizations, which will work in a new and effective way, where new policy will be pursued, and these bodies will be permanently under democra-

tic supervision of citizens. Therefore, we are faced with the very urgent task of consolidating political conditions, developing the whole existing system of political management in our society so as to make it into a system fully combining socialism and democracy, a system capable of factually and in a qualified way solving all problems arising from the needs of the life of our society, a system in which the relationships of responsibility and control will be determined, in which it will be clearly stated who is responsible for what and to whom, in which independent authority and independent responsibility of everyone for his tasks will be exactly fixed.

This will require systematic work on the part of government bodies and elected state bodies, social organizations and of the Party in the next few months.

All these problems will be dealt with in an atmosphere of genuine socialist democracy. This means the beginning of a situation - which will now be of a permanent character - when we, the communists, will have to defend and argue in public, our views and standpoints in discussion with all the others. The communists will stand in the vanguard of the development, and will have the status of leadership to the extent to which they will be able to win and keep it by ideological and political means, under democratic conditions. Authority is not given once and for all - neither to the individual, nor to a party organization, nor to a party. Authority must be unceasingly renewed, on the basis of the results of work. The Party and its members must be at the head of the progressive development, must lead and sweep the other masses of the working people into the vortex of the tasks.

The relationship of the communists and non-communists, the relationship of the Party and the rest of the society is thus becoming the key question of today. Quite naturally, this is being discussed both within and outside the Party. In doing so, we must proceed from the reality of contemporary processes. The process of revitalization has put into

motion the whole mechanism of social life. The purpose and aim of the democratization process is clear: to create an improved type of socialist democracy, in keeping with Czechoslovak conditions. It is in the interest of the Party and to the benefit of the whole society that the process should be completed in a relatively quiet way, without any major oscillations. Any other transition might seriously endanger the aims we are following, might thwart the historical opportunity which is offered to us today for our socialist development.

The present process, taking place on a socialist basis, must give a truly democratic scope to the interest of all social groups, must guarantee the permanence of our international ties. These vital demands cannot be met without the leading role of the Communist Party. No other organized force exists in our society which could guarantee the socialist character of the current social process and its even democratic development.

In solving the problems of relations of the Party to state and social institutions, we proceed from this realistic position. The past situation in this sphere, especially as regards the National Front, was not entirely satisfactory. It has been negatively affecting the authority and activity of these bodies, as well as the authority of the Party. We welcome and appreciate that the social organizations are beginning to assert themselves as independent, autonomous parts of the political system. We especially welcome and wish to develop the revitalization process in the trade unions, because it enhances their status in the National Front.

The whole National Front, the political parties which form it; and the social organizations, participate in the formulation of state policy. The political parties of the National Front are partners, their political activities proceed from the common political programme of the National

Front, proceed fully from the socialist character of social relations in our republic. The Communist Party regards the National Front as a political platform which does not divide the political parties into government and opposition parties in the sense that opposition would be formed against the line of state policy as the policy of the whole National Front, and that a political fight for power in the state would be waged.

The formation of political forces striving to deny this concept of the National Front, to exclude the National Front from political power, was on the whole overcome already in 1945 after the tragic experience of both our nations with the prewar political development of CSR.

In the National Front and in the whole political system, we shall apply the Marxist-Leninist concept as a concept of leading policy so that we shall use all means of political work - in all parts of our system and directly among the masses of the workers and all working people - to win for it such support which will ensure its leading position by democratic political means.

All this contributes, and will contribute even more, to the realization that the responsibility for the development of our society and our state will be a common one, fully and really shared by all, communists and non-communists alike.

For many communists, who have become used to the old methods, it will not be easy. The Party as a whole is, however, bound to succeed. We are firmly convinced of it, because there are many creative forces within the Party, and to fear the new process would be to underestimate deeply these creative forces.

Our political system will certainly not revert to the state in which its foundation would be only the relations of the political parties. In the system of socialist

democracy, we are concerned with more than a copy of the parliamentarism typical for formal democracies. The aim is to increase the real independence of social and group-interest organizations, to make the representative bodies of the state - up to the National Assembly - into bodies where political decisions of the state are actually made. During the process of further development of our political system, it will be desirable to give consideration especially to the question of how even the whole scale of interests of the people in certain spheres of the social division of labour - in the economy, in the industries and agriculture, in social services, education, science and culture - will directly assert itself in the system of socialist democracy to a more marked degree. Socialist democracy must differ from formal democracy, inter alia, also insofar that it will be the working people who will have the decisive word in the management of the society.

Naturally today, we cannot yet define the future model of a functioning socialist democracy. The democratic forces and phenomena are at the beginning, and not at the end. We must follow their movement, and strengthen and elaborate it further. The first steps we are taking today are sufficient only for what is most urgent in the given situation, and would be insufficient, even one-sided, for further perspectives. In connection with the preparations of the 14th Party Congress, we should consider how to develop the whole political system so that we could use all knowledge and international experience to make of it a much more intensive union of democracy with socialism under specific Czechoslovak conditions.

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Another important task of the future period is the consolidation and development of our national economy. In the current discussions, it is increasingly demanded that the present stage of our national economy be quite frankly and critically evaluated, that it be stated clearly and with full responsibility what our situation really is and that it be said quite clearly and responsibly how and by which methods we want to consolidate our economy. I think that an analysis of the present state of our national economy should be given by the new Government when it submits its program. This analysis should precede the report on the ways and methods by which we want to and must ensure a balanced, smooth and effective development of our economy.

We want to consistently introduce the new system of economic management. We must stop talking only about improving the system of management and say clearly that it is to be a profound economic reform designed to create a new system for the functioning of the socialist economy. We know that it will be a system based on a synthesis of the plan and the market, a synthesis which must be first of all elaborated. In this synthesis, the criterion of economic activities will be not only formal indicators of a directionally-conceived plan, but economic instruments ensuring the aims of the whole society, objective criteria of the market and of social-political priorities, resulting from objective economic interrelations and which are fully binding on every state which wants to make its economy permanently prosperous. It should be a system which will fully appreciate high-quality and effective work and which will ensure that people are remunerated not only according to the physical and mental energy they expended but, above all, according to the real results by which they contributed to the satisfaction of all the needs of the society. A system which will set free the creative initiative of the working people, will enable the growth of capable people and will create a wide scope for natural

selection in making appointments to leading positions.

The main condition for the consistent and rapid implementation of the new system of management is today the institutional adjustment of relationships in the economic sphere and the creation of a new organisational structure in the whole sphere of production. In this connection, I want to emphasize - and this also answers many questions and comments from district conferences - that we are putting through, and shall continue to put through, further measures designed to democratize economic management. As regards enterprises, we expect them to gain such a measure of independence as will enable them to fully develop business activity. Within enterprises, democratic managing bodies will operate to which directors and other leading economic executives will be accountable. In addition to this, the trade organisation will also assert itself in putting through the interests of employees and in exercising control over management.

Profound changes in the system of management will be supplemented by extensive changes in the structure of production which, at present, is not in keeping with Czechoslovak conditions and, moreover, has departed from the objective tendencies of the progressive development of the productive forces which are becoming increasingly predominant in all industrially advanced countries. It will be a difficult transformation which will affect many partial interests. But we have no other choice. At the same time, we must take care that those who are not responsible for the present unsatisfactory production structure should not be the worse for the changes.

The government will have to submit to the National Assembly a set of immediate measures by which these important tasks will be consistently ensured. It will be necessary to carry out changes in the structure of investments, i.e. to allocate means especially to agriculture and to the consumer

and food industry, as well as to the non-productive sphere, particularly to housing construction and the whole field of services. Since our resources are limited, each measure which will make their use more effective can help to reduce the economic imbalance and achieve a faster growth of the national income. The most important reserves of greater effectiveness are, in our view, the living activity of the people and the application of that which has always been typical of Czechoslovak workers and technicians and which has been rendered inactive by the old system of management, i.e. an independent approach to tasks, the application of knowledge, abilities and skill, as well as of initiative, resulting from the restored feeling that the people's work is their own creative personal contribution to the successful effort of the whole society. This will be stimulated not only by the application of the principles of the new system of management but also by the current process of revitalization in our public and political life.

These measures are closely interrelated with the program concerning the standard of living. Prosperity can be achieved only on the basis of a modern and highly efficient economy which is able to assert its qualities in tough competition on the world market. All other roads towards prosperity are provisional, temporary and full of risk.

At present, we can solve only the most urgent social problems, those we formulated in the document adopted at the plenary meeting in December. In this connection, I want to emphasize that we must seek possibilities of making cuts also in the field of central management and public expenditure; these cuts will be used for improving the social conditions of the population. However, the achievement of a more substantial improvement will depend to a decisive extent on how we shall be able to run our economy in future. The changed system of management should contribute not only towards rationalizing the state and economic apparatus but

also towards making it cheaper and at the same time towards eliminating many abnormalities and bureaucratic anomalies.

In addition to these measures which we shall implement in the next few months, we must intensify the elaboration of the long-range conception of the development of the Czechoslovak national economy which will not only comprise changes in the structure of production and in its more consistent integration in the world division of labour, but also in which we shall proceed from the new structure of the needs of our population.

Today, attention concentrates mainly on the material and social needs of the people. However, we want to, and must, achieve even more. Socialism, and especially socialism based on broad democratic principles, must create a new humanism of the modern era, one which other systems are unable to give to mankind in spite of all their technical progress, it must create better conditions for the development of man than have been so far created by any other society. This means that when we strive for normalizing the economy, we do not regard this task as an end in itself but as an instrument designed to promote the full development of man, of human personality. It must therefore aim at creating, for every individual person, conditions in which everyone will be able to assert himself in all spheres of work and life. An immense role will, in this sense, be played by science and art. We therefore strive not only for a fast development of the individual branches of science, which are interrelated with the growth of the productive forces, and with the scientific and technical revolution, but also for the development of the humanistic scientific branches and all spheres of art which will help people to find a new way of life corresponding with the era of the scientific and technical revolution and with the socialist principles of our society.

In solving present-day economic difficulties, i.e.

the economic imbalance, we must take into account the factor on which we could not count before the January plenum of the Central Committee, the factor which could not be counted upon by economists but which must be today seen by politicians, i.e. the activity which is setting in motion the creative mind and energy. Economic effectiveness and economic difficulties can, in no case, be solved at the expense of the living standard of the people. Resources and reserves for solving this vitally important task must be found in production. In solving the present tasks, it is therefore necessary to take fully into account the moral factor emerging with new revitalizing and renescent power after the January plenum. People must be infused with faith in themselves, with faith in knowledge, skill and intellect. This faith in the working people is today a moral force but will tomorrow certainly be a material force on which we shall be able to count fully in our drive for the further development of our national economy, for further growth in the living standard.

The period since the January meeting of the Central Committee of the CP CZ has been characterized up to this day by lively foreign political activities of our Party in spite of the fact that the stormy internal political developments have apparently relegated international policy to second place. However, it has again been confirmed that we are implementing and shall implement all the complicated and exacting internal tasks in a certain concrete international situation.

In this relatively short period of time, several multilateral meetings have taken place which are important for strengthening the cooperation of the socialist countries and for further efforts to achieve unity of the internal Communist movement. In terms of time, first place among them is held by the Budapest consultative meeting of Communist and workers' parties. I do not intend to give a more detailed evaluation of its results but, in this connection, we want to emphasize two aspects of this meeting. It is important

that the delegations which participated in the Budapest meeting, under complicated conditions reached unity on a number of points which are of decisive importance for convening and preparing a world conference of the Communist parties. This is an encouraging success. Secondly: the Budapest meeting was a step forward in seeking new forms of unity while preserving the independence of the fraternal parties and their mutual international collaboration.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia undoubtedly made a positive contribution to the talks. It tried to assert a sober and realistic view of the contradictory problems of the present world as well as of complicated questions of the cooperation of the Communist parties. Our delegation strongly supported demands for a substantial extension of ties with all the anti-imperialist forces. It adopted a clear attitude to past incorrect evaluations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and it raised its voice in support of sensible efforts to develop relations with those fraternal parties which hold different views on a number of questions.

The recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty in Sofia and the meeting of the highest representatives of certain socialist states in Dresden were also important. The first meant much for political cooperation, the second, I believe, will become an impulse for a more thorough and open discussion on the problems of economic cooperation, both within the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and on a bilateral basis.

It is natural that we have taken advantage of all these meetings to supply information on developments in our country and to explain correctly the positive sense of the process of democratization. As you know, I myself met earlier Comrade Brezhnev, Comrade Kádár and Comrade Gomulka. Such meetings will take place in future with representati-

ves of other fraternal parties also. Comrades Koucký and Kriegel held talks in this sense with delegations of many fraternal parties in Budapest as well as on other occasions. A broad exchange of views took also place during the visit of the delegations of fraternal parties and states at the time of the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the February events.

Our last discussion to date took place at the recent meeting in Dresden. It must be stated that the representatives of the socialist countries and the central committees of their parties at this meeting showed understanding for the present views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on developments in our Republic and on questions of mutual cooperation. The discussion and the exchange of opinions must be understood in the sense that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties will continue to be valid.

I am sure that I express the identical view of the entire Central Committee if I once more emphasize that in the same way as the socialist character of our future road is inviolable, so are equally inviolable the basic values of the Czechoslovak foreign political orientation: firm alliance and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist states, based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, non-interference and international solidarity. This basic orientation of our policy is in harmony with the most vital needs of the security of our nations and with the development of our national economy. No one will ever succeed in casting any doubt on the unerving Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship. This friendship is not only a matter of historical experience of the people of our country but, above all, the outcome of a realistic appraisal of the present situation of the Republic in the surrounding world. If our country is now, at the present time, not exposed to any acute threat from outside, which sometimes

gives rise to not exactly profound conclusions as regards the existence or non-existence of danger; it must be seen that this is precisely the consequence of our alliance with the Soviet Union, the consequence of the safeguard we have in the Soviet Union.

The idea that in today's antagonistically divided world we could stand somewhere in the background appearing and behaving neutralistically and speculating that if things should go badly for our nations we should invite others to bleed for us, is impossible not only from the political but also from the ethical point of view.

Proletarian internationalism, its practical application in relations to other socialist countries as well as towards the whole international Communist movement, respect for our essential common interests, our assistance to everything representing social progress in the world, constitutes today, and also for the future, the basis of the foreign policy of our socialist country.

This is also the aspect in which we view our intention to activate generally the foreign political activity of our state. We must require this activity to have an elaborated conception and to assert with greater initiative our standpoints on important international problems, our active contribution to the common, scientifically substantiated, international political activity of the socialist states. This will, in particular, mean pursuance of a more effective European, and primarily Central European, policy contributing to the consolidation of peaceful relations in Europe and to the expansion of cooperation among countries with different social systems.

Our interest concentrates especially on a peaceful solution of the German problem which is of cardinal importance for European security and in which an important role is played by the existence and the policy of the German De-

mocratic Republic. Positive efforts for the creation of a peaceful atmosphere and good relations among the nations of Europe and in the world in general represent the chief line of our international policy.

At the same time, however, the activities of world imperialism and particularly the activation of revenge-seeking forces in the German Federal Republic forces us to continue strengthening and maintaining our armed forces, our Czechoslovak People's Army on a high level. The American aggression against the Vietnamese people is too strong a warning for us to be able to underestimate it. This is also why - and certainly in harmony with the evaluation by members of the Party Central Committee - we are for taking the necessary measures for extending the mechanism of the Warsaw Treaty so that it corresponds to present-day conditions. Concretely, this means to improve the activities of the joint command, which was recently discussed at the Sofia and Dresden meetings. As was shown at the Dresden conference, especially in Comrade Kosygin's speech on the economic sphere, we have still many untapped reserves in this respect. The State Planning Commission has been therefore charged with preparing an initiative proposal for intensifying cooperation with the Soviet Union where we are bound by the raw material basis, but also with other socialist states, especially with our neighbours - with Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic.

The action program could outline only very briefly certain foreign political tasks. It will depend on initiative efforts especially of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and naturally also of the whole Government the National Assembly, the Central Committee and its Presidium smaller to no extent that these principles are concretized as soon and as well as possible in order that Czechoslovak foreign policy may ensure all the indispensable external conditions for the successful internal socialist development of our country.

Comrades,

The action program which has been submitted has a double purpose: first of all, to create unity in action for the implementation of the main tasks of our development, to give sufficient impetus for the development of the socialist initiative of the people, to show the road by which it is possible to eliminate the obstacles which have until now been standing in the way of further development corresponding to present-day conditions, obstacles consisting first of all in excessive centralism, in administrative-directive methods rooted in the field of political management.

The second and deeper sense of the program lies in the fact that it opens up scope for basic structural changes in our society and for the creation of a new dynamic of socialism which would be in harmony with the changed social, economic and cultural conditions as well as with specific national conditions. The implementation of this program can, and must, open up the road towards the solution of other more complicated and more important questions concerning the organization and the dynamic development of our socialist society in directions which could now be only indicated. Greater activity of socialist development can be created only by setting into motion new powerful forces of social life, and - relying on creative Marxist thinking - carrying out bold, but at the same time well-considered, experiments. In the course of this process, it is necessary to deepen and perfect the new general line of the Party.

This is why the program has been drafted as a fundamental political view of the present stage and its needs. It cannot be understood as a directive enumeration of concrete tasks but as a political platform which must be creatively developed. It is an open document which will be further perfected in the course of its implementation. The program does not want to, and cannot in advance, determine the

detailed course to be adopted by individual organizations and institutions but it opens up sufficiently wide scope to enable them to determine and concretize these tasks themselves in the spirit of the basic lines. Any other approach would be at variance with the spirit of the program. If people are to identify themselves with the aims of the program, they must participate in their formulation.

I should like to say a few words about work with the action program, especially about its role in the current general process of democratization. We must be aware of the character of this process, its rate and its rapid acceleration. Things which, a fortnight ago, appeared as something basically different from the general view are today becoming generally accepted and may already tomorrow be out-of-date. In connection with the action program we may also hear that people already know its content. It is an actual fact that certain ideas of this program have already been published, some of them have even been discussed. However, knowledge, acceptance or non-acceptance of its ideas are one thing. This can be achieved in a short time. But the main thing - implementation, elaboration and concretization - is something different. This activity is more difficult, frequently also little effective, ordinary and routine work, it requires perseverance but is indispensable if the program is to serve any purpose.

The current of democratization, the social mechanism which began to operate, will indubitably develop even further. Only if the Party submits in its program demands which, from the present point of view, are sufficiently bold, if it regards the program as the basis and a starting-point, shall we be able to be constantly at the head of the creative process and enforce its socialist character. We must endeavour to master the social interests operating in society. It is therefore desirable to orientate ourselves to progressive

demands - even if perhaps they appear to us at this moment to be too radical - in order that we may be able to keep up with this process, in order that the Party may stand at its head, so that there might not be a great difference between the potential interests of the people and the program of the Party.

As regards organisational procedure, we recommend that immediately after its adoption by the Central Committee the program be submitted to the National Front and that, after it has been discussed and amended, it be submitted - this time already as the program of the National Front - to Parliament. This will be in harmony with democratic principles and with the demands requiring the assertion of the leading role of the Party.

Simultaneously with this, it will be correct to submit the program to gatherings of working people at various places, particularly in enterprises, so that they may familiarize themselves with it. Immediately after the plenum of the Central Committee, it will be useful to organize also meetings and gatherings in the decisive cities and at larger places of work too. This method should be one of the main sources of information immediately after the meeting of the Central Committee. We now have an excellent and extraordinary opportunity to approach our people and to show them how purposefully and energetically our Party intends to pave the way to progress and socialism.

In conclusion, I want only to emphasize that the action program is to become an important political platform on which to unify the revitalizing efforts of the Party, and all the people in the interests of the successful development of our socialist society.

On the basis of the action program, attention must be already focussed ahead. It is necessary to pass on to practical deeds at every place of work, to pass over from words to deeds, to act and organize work so as to make everyone feel that he is needed, that he is counted with.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/18/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On July 3, 1968, [redacted] furnished to SA ROBERT A. VILLEMURE a communication postmarked Praha, Czechoslovakia, with an illegible date, which was forwarded to a mail drop in the name of JOHN SHOULDERS, in care of Modern Book Store, Chicago, Illinois 60626, USA. This mail drop is maintained for CG 5824-S*.

This communication contained an Information Bulletin of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) which contained the speech delivered by Comrade ALEXANDER DUBCEK at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPCZ on April 1, 1968.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two Xerox copies and for the New York Office one Xerox copy of this Information Bulletin. This Information Bulletin will be turned over to CG 5824-S* for eventual transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA.

EX-103

REC 45

- ②-Bureau (Enc. 2)(RM)
1-New York (100-134637)(Enc. 1)(Info)(RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(4)

Copy to CFA
by routing slip for

☒ Info ☐ action

date 7-23-68
by REP/LL

16 JUL 25 1968



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 JUL 31 1968

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *Down*

DATE: July 24, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing *Down*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 7/24/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:trs trs
(7)
Pring

EX 109

REC 82 100-428091-7074

16 JUL 26 1968

56 JUL 30 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/24/68

R. P. [Signature]

As the Bureau is aware, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) requested the opinion of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) on the subject of whether or not the CPSU should extend an invitation to visit the USSR to Senator EUGENE MC CARTHY who had publicly indicated a desire to visit the Soviet Union. The opinion of GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA, at that time was that if MC CARTHY should ask for an invitation, then the CPSU should extend the invitation. However, HALL indicated that in his opinion MC CARTHY would be stupid to make such a request.

On July 19, 1968, CG 5824-S* advised that on July 18, 1968, GUS HALL had requested CG 5824-S* to send a message to the CPSU to the following effect. HALL desires that the Russians extend an invitation to the United States to engage in an exchange of delegations from the Foreign Relations Committees of the respective Governments. The USSR would invite members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to visit the USSR and speak before various official audiences in the USSR. The Russians would, in turn, expect that members of the Foreign Relations Committee of their Government would be invited to come to the United States to speak before various official and unofficial bodies in the United States. HALL indicated that in this manner it might be possible to induce people like Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT and Senator WAYNE MORSE to visit the USSR. Furthermore, since Senator EUGENE MC CARTHY is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he might also undertake such a trip without incurring any stigma which might be the case were he to be the only Senator making such a trip. HALL was under no illusions that the Russians

- 1-904 940
②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

REC 46/100-428091-7025

16 JUL 26 1968

WAB:MDW
(4)



INT. SEC. 7

CG 134-46 Sub B

would accede to this request just because he asked them to.

Furthermore, on the same date, CG 5824-S* advised that on the preceding day HALL had been engaged in discussions with PAUL ALBERT, the individual whom HALL uses for contacts with the presidential campaign group of Senator EUGENE MC CARTHY. HALL instructed CG 5824-S* to send a message to the CPSU to the following effect. HALL would like PAUL ALBERT and his family to take a trip to the USSR immediately following the Democratic Party Convention for a period of a few weeks. The CPSU should be informed that ALBERT is a Party person who is not known as such, who is not known to anyone but HALL and one or two other leaders of the Party, who works inside the Democratic Party and who has the widest contacts among Democrats. While in the USSR, ALBERT can be talked to by leading officials of the CPSU because ALBERT has more knowledge than anyone else concerning the electoral situation in the United States. ALBERT would profit by learning something about the USSR, and, before leaving the USSR, ALBERT could be afforded a physical examination.

In the discussion on this subject, HALL and ALBERT agreed that it would not be wise for ALBERT to go directly from the United States to the USSR. Therefore, on his application for a passport, ALBERT will list three or four other countries as his expected destination. In addition, it was not deemed advisable for the CP, USA to furnish ALBERT's name to the Washington Embassy of the USSR in the usual manner for a visa. Therefore, the CPSU should be requested by CG 5824-S* to have visas available for ALBERT and his family at the USSR Embassy in London, England, as well as in Washington, and the CP, USA would later make the decision as to where these visas would be picked up.

In addition, since ALBERT is not known as a Party person and the CP, USA wishes to keep it that way, the CPSU should be informed that the CP, USA considers it inadvisable that ALBERT be lodged in the Party hotel in Moscow. In view of the circumstances, it would be better that ALBERT be lodged in an apartment or dacha.

CG 5824-S* was instructed to furnish the names of this party to the CPSU as follows:

CG 134-46 Sub B

PAUL ALBERT (age 45); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

In view of the signal received in New York City for a personal contact between NY 694-S* and his Soviet contact in New York City on the evening of July 23, 1968, the above information was furnished to the New York Office on July 23, 1968, to be orally furnished to the Soviet contact that evening.

In addition to the above, CG 5824-S* stated that in his discussions with HALL in Chicago, HALL had given indication that he had heard a reaction from the Russians concerning the list of delegates to the USSR from the CP, USA which was recently furnished to the CPSU through the Solo apparatus. HALL stated that the Russians were objecting to the use of the Solo channels for this purpose. CG 5824-S* stated that HALL had been so informed by the CPSU last Fall when HALL was in the USSR. Nevertheless, he had recently instructed that these names be furnished by this channel. Therefore, HALL's raising of this subject in this manner again signified to CG 5824-S* that HALL has received some more recent complaint from the CPSU concerning this latest listing of delegates. Although it would seem inappropriate for the CPSU to make mention of this clandestine channel to any other member of the CP, USA in contact with the Soviets, it is possible that a veiled reference was relayed to GUS HALL through some other Party emissary such as JAMES JACKSON, CARL WINTER, or MIKE DAVIDOW. Therefore, CG 5824-S* requested that during his personal meeting with his Soviet contact, NY 694-S* raise the question of whether or not the CPSU had made such a complaint through some other channel. This information was also relayed to the New York Office on July 23, 1968.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
(ATT: FBI LABORATORY)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/25/68 (lost)

R. J. [Signature]
Quinn 20

On 7/23/68, pursuant to previously made arrangements, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact VLADIMIR A. CHUCHUKIN in the area of the Avenue J Subway station, Brooklyn BMT subway line. CHUCHUKIN stated that in accordance with instructions from the CCCPSU, he was to furnish an oral report to NY 694-S* on the Czechoslovakian situation. NY 694-S* was to furnish this information to GUS HALL (CPUSA General Secretary) as quickly as possible.

(See NY teletype dated 7/24/68).

In accordance with the above instructions, NY 694-S* met with GUS HALL on 7/24/68, and gave him the information that CHUCHUKIN had furnished. HALL, upon learning of the Soviets' request that he endorse the letter the CCCPSU sent to the CCCPCZ (printed in the July 18th issue of Pravda), became extremely angry and expressed himself in the following way:

- (1) "Who wants their reports - are we a bunch of puppets?"
- (2) "Neither they (the Soviets) nor the Czechs bother to give us any details about what is going on."
- (3) "They want us to endorse the letter; it is a poor letter; it is a difficult letter for us to endorse."

1-904
3-Bureau (RM)

(1-Att: FBI LABORATORY)

1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1-NY 105-45740 (CHUCHUKIN) (344)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

FILE

REC 46

100-428091-7076

16 JUL 26 1968

JFL:eac
(8)



98 JUL 31 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

NY 694-S* expressed the opinion that, although HALL's initial reaction to the Soviets' request was an angry one, after a cooling off period, he would find some way to endorse the Soviets' letter.

(1) At this meeting NY 694-S* orally advised CHUCHUKIN that GUS HALL thought it would be a good idea that now, or in the near future, the CGCPSU propose an exchange delegation of three members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and three persons of equal rank from the Soviet Union. These individuals would be invited to one another's country to discuss international problems. HALL suggested that the individuals to be invited to the Soviet Union should be Senators EUGENE MC CARTHY, MORSE and FULLBRIGHT.

(2) NY 694-S* further advised that GUS HALL stated he wished that PAUL ALBERT, [redacted] visit the Soviet Union for a few weeks. HALL stated that this trip was planned for the end of August or early September and that visas should be available in both Washington and London for the ALBERTS. HALL said that ALBERT could brief the Soviets on the political situation in the U.S. ALBERT would not go directly to the Soviet Union; however, when he arrived there he was not to stay at the Party hotel, the reason being that only HALL and one or two CP persons know ALBERT to be a CP member, and that HALL wants to keep it that way.

(The Chicago Office is furnishing information concerning message one and two by separate memorandum).

(3) NY 694-S* advised CHUCHUKIN of the following words to be added to the open code:

- (1) Stem - PAUL ALBERT
- (2) Pairs of shoes - one thousand dollars
(This is the new code word for money, taking the place of "colour prints").

CHUCHUKIN and NY 694-S* also discussed the following apparatus problems:

NY 100-134637

(1) The television signal experiment (wax) will not continue until after September 15, and it will be on Channel 43 instead of Channel 24. The time will remain the same - 9:11 P.M. - 9:21 P.M., at two minute intervals.

(NY letter dated 7/15/68, page 1).

(2) The new magnets to be used to transmit the microfilm have not arrived as yet.

(NY letter dated 7/15/68, page 2).

(3) The Soviets requested that the CPUSA furnish them the same type of information on the magazine "Liberation" as was furnished to them on "Ramparts" etc.

(NY letter dated 7/15/68, page 6).

(4) The Soviets requested that the CPUSA furnish information on all pro-Peking organizations in the US, including the names of their leaders, financial operations, and the extent of their activities.

(5) The next personal meet is Armstrong and the next drop is Nicky.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

BY LIAISON

Date: July 25, 1968
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: ~~COMMUNIST PARTY, USA~~
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

5010

delivered
7/26/68
RCP

The Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) furnished the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) its observations on the problems of youth. The CPUSA noted that the problems with youth are not confined to the capitalist countries, and that socialist countries were also experiencing difficulties controlling youth. It was suggested that an international conference on youth be organized to study the ideological problems of youth and the influence of petty bourgeois ideology. It was proposed that this conference be made a part of the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties to be held in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in November, 1968.

J

REC-75

100-428091-7077

While the CPSU agreed this was a good idea which should receive further study, the CPSU did not believe that the youth conference should be made a part of the meeting in Moscow in November, 1968. It was proposed that a special international meeting on the problems of youth be held subsequent to the November, 1968, meeting in Moscow.

Good
am

The CPUSA requested the CPSU to advise it of the progress being made toward the establishment of an international communist press bureau, noting that this idea had been previously submitted by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CPUSA. The CPSU advised that numerous inquiries had been

16 JUL 26 1968

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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

RCP:pab
(6)

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

well known

98 JUL 31 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

conducted on this proposal. Very few communist parties favor the idea. While the CPSU supports the proposal for an international communist press bureau, none of the major communist parties approve of it. The CPSU noted that the proposed press bureau would cost a minimum of two to three million dollars to establish and operate for one year, and this money is not now available. Another problem which would be most difficult would be the matter of locating the headquarters for the press bureau. All parties agree that the headquarters should not be located in a communist country. The Communist Parties of France and Great Britain would not approve having the headquarters for the press bureau in their countries. While the CPSU did approve of having the headquarters located in Austria, it is doubtful that the Austrian Government would permit it. While the idea of an international communist press bureau has not been rejected, there are problems associated with it that make its implementation impractical at this time.

1 - Director BY LIAISON
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter, dated 7/17/68,
captioned "Solo, IS-C."

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

~~TOP SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-18-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC-68 100-428091-7078

July 23, 1968

BY LIAISON

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

The leadership of the Communist Party, USA, has received the following from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

The Communist Party, USA, has consistently supported the position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at international meetings and in its publications. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union especially appreciates the support given by the Communist Party, USA, at the meeting held in Budapest, Hungary, in June, 1968, to prepared for an International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties to be held in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in November, 1968. The support given the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the major point of difference at the Budapest meeting, was most welcome. However, it is the opinion of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Communist Party, USA, should begin to act more independently in these matters because it does not look right for both Parties to present a united front on all questions.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has requested Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to write frank letters to him about conditions as Hall sees them. In this regard Brezhnev has the impression that Hall can be a very "ornery guy" who speaks his mind, but that when he and Hall conferred in Moscow in the Fall of 1967, he got the idea Hall was holding back. It was noted that when Hall spoke to workers at various plants in the Soviet Union, he compared Soviet efforts in industry unfavorably with efforts of the workers in the United States. Brezhnev appreciates honest criticism of this type and seeks such in the letters to be directed to him by Hall.

~~TOP SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

RCP:pab

(12)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

98 AUG 17 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan,
dated 7/22/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C," prepared by RCP:pab.

Classified "~~Top Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination"
since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal
the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing
value and such revelation could result in especially grave damage
to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter dated 7/17/68,
captioned "Solo, IS-C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE
WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS/ysa*

DATE: July 22, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD/B*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
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Bishop _____
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Sullivan _____
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Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of information furnished the Communist Party, USA, by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the effect that the Party should adopt a more independent attitude. The memorandum recommends dissemination of a summary of this information to the White House, the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 27, CG 5824-S* conferred with A. S. Belyakov, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During this conference, CG 5824-S* was advised as follows:

The Soviets appreciate the support the Communist Party has given them at international meetings and in its publications. However, the Soviets believe the Communist Party, USA, should adopt a more independent attitude because it does not look right for both Parties to present such a united front on all questions.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has requested Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to write him frank letters about conditions as he sees them. Brezhnev noted that when he and Hall conferred in Moscow in the Fall of 1967, he got

Enclosure *sent* 7-23-68

100-428091

RCP:pab *yph*
(6)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC-68

100-428091-7078

6 JUL 29 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Re: Solo

100-428091

the impression Hall was holding back, and that when Hall spoke to workers at Soviet industrial plants, he compared their efforts unfavorably with workers in the United States.

Attached is a summary of this information for Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached summary be approved and sent.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: "P", "JWS", "WCS", and "L"]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

7/29/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Farr
1 - Mr. Mastrovich
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO
IS - C

Reurlet 7/25/68 and CGlet 7/24/68. Relets contain information relating to possible travel by Paul Albert and family to the Soviet Union.

Since it appears Albert will now reside in New York City and New York will assume origin in his case, New York must insure this matter is closely followed. If Albert does travel abroad, such travel must be handled in accordance with current instructions relating to foreign travel by security subjects. The letterhead memorandum reporting his travel should set forth his communist affiliations as completely as possible without jeopardizing the security of the Solo Operation. If information developed through the Solo Operation is utilized in carefully paraphrased form, the letterhead memorandum should be classified at least "Secret/NO Foreign Dissemination."

1 - Chicago (134-46)

RCP:pab
(7)

NOTE:

Albert is allegedly the clandestine contact for the CPUSA with members of Congress. Intensive investigation has failed to substantiate this claim which has been made by Albert and Gus Hall, although Albert does have contacts among liberals on the Hill. At the present time, there is no information indicating that Albert will travel, but Hall has suggested to the Soviets that Albert be invited to brief them on the political situation in the U.S. Since Albert's CP membership is known only to about three Party members, it must be handled with utmost discretion.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

REC-68

100-428091-70792
6 JUL 29 1968

98 AUG 1 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

7/25/68

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC 27 100-428091-7080

TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ATTENTION: MRS. MILDRED STEGALL

SECRETARY OF STATE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~(SECRET)~~ COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

ON JULY TWENTY-FOUR LAST THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION ADVISED THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AS FOLLOWS:

THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS DETERIORATING. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION SENT A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SETTING FORTH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS LETTER WAS UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FIVE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHO ATTENDED THE WARSAW PACT MEETING IN POLAND LAST WEEK. WALDECK ROCHET, GENERAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE, REQUESTED THE SOVIETS TO CALL A

MEETING OF ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN EUROPE TO DISCUSS THE

RCP:pab

(6)

INITIALED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

VIA TELETYPE

JUL 25 1968

ENCIPHERED

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

SENT BY TELETYPE

7-75-68

TELETYPE TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS PROPOSAL WAS DISCUSSED AT A PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION WHERE IT WAS DECIDED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE USELESS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION REGARDING THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HELD BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES.

THE COUNTRIES WHICH APPROVED THE LETTER SENT TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DID SO WITH THE REALIZATION OF THE HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVED IN PREVENTING THE LOSS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENTS ATTAINED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TAKE THIS MEANS TO CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IF SUCH REVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENTS SHOULD BE LOST.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION REQUESTED THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AS A FRATERNAL MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST WORLD TO ENDORSE THE LETTER SENT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHICH LETTER WAS PRINTED IN "PRAVDA" ON JULY EIGHTEEN LAST. THIS ENDORSEMENT CAN BE SET FORTH IN ANY MANNER WHICH IS SUITABLE FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

GP-1

TELETYPE TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S* who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from New York teletype, dated 7/24/68, captioned "Solo, IS - Communist."

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/25/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pab, which advised that a summary of this information was being furnished the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. The Attorney General will be furnished a copy of this teletype by separate cover.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

VIA TELETYPE

JUL 24 1968

ENCIPHERED

WA 12

322 PM URGENT 7-24-68 JLW

TO DIRECTOR 100-428091 AND CHICAGO 134-46 SUB B (CODE)

ATT. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

CHICAGO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM NEW YORK 100-134637 3P

SOLO: IS - COMMUNIST

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

ON JULY TWENTYTHREE, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, PURSUANT

TO PREVIOUSLY MADE ARRANGEMENTS, NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR -
S ASTERISK MET HIS SOVIET CONTACT, VLADIMIR A. CHUCHUKIN
IN THE AREA OF THE AVENUE J SUBWAY STATION, BROOKLYN
BMT SUBWAY LINE. CHUCHUKIN ADVISED THE INFORMANT THAT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CC CPSU, HE
WAS FURNISHING THE LATTER WITH INFORMATION TO BE IMMEDIATELY
TRANSMITTED TO GUS HALL (CP, USA GENERAL SECRETARY).

THIS INFORMATION CONCERNS THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION
WHICH IS DETERIORATING.

HALL WAS TO BE INFORMED THAT AT A PLENARY SESSION
OF THE CC CPSU A LETTER WAS WRITTEN TO THE CC CPCZ
SETTING FORTH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN 6 JUL 31 1968
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS LETTER WAS UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY THE
END PAGE ONE

TELETYPED TO:

CG

Memo C.G. Sullivan to W.C. Sullivan 7/25/68
FBI to W.C. Sullivan 7/25/68
FBI to W.C. Sullivan 7/25/68
FBI to W.C. Sullivan 7/25/68

REC-108

REC-27

100-428091-7080

5-20

PAGE TWO

CC CPSU. IT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHO ATTENDED THE WARSAW PACT MEETING IN POLAND, LAST WEEK, AND, ENDORSED UNANIMOUSLY BY THEM. THIS LETTER WAS THEN SENT TO THE CC CPCZ. (THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE LETTER WAS PRINTED IN FULL IN THE "PRAVDA" ISSUE OF JULY EIGHTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT).

AT THE SAME TIME, COMRADE WALDECK ROCHET, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CP OF FRANCE, REQUESTED THAT A MEETING BE HELD BY ALL EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO DISCUSS THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION. THIS REQUEST WAS TAKEN UP AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE CC CPSU AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA TO HOLD A MEETING OF THIS KIND AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE CC CPSU DISCUSSED THEIR DECISION WITH COMRADE ROCHET AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING NOW WOULD BE USELESS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BY THE VARIOUS EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.

THE FIVE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT WHICH APPROVED THE LETTER SENT TO THE CC CPCZ DID SO WITH THE REALIZATION OF THE HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY OF PREVENTING THE LOSS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN CALLING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IF SUCH REVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENTS SHOULD BE LOST.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

THE CC CPSU RESPECTFULLY SUGGESTS THAT THE CP, USA AS A FRATERNAL MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST WORLD, ENDORSE THE LETTER WHICH WAS PRINTED IN "PRAVDA" ON JULY EIGHTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT. THIS ENDORSEMENT CAN BE SET FORTH IN ANY MANNER WHICH IS SUITABLE FOR THE CP, USA AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

ON JULY TWENTYFOUR, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR - S ASTERIS WAS TO FURNISH THE ABOVE INFORMATION TO GUS HALL. THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION WAS WHAT PROMPTED THIS MEETING.

OTHER INFORMATION EXCHANGED BY CHUCHUKIN AND NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR - S ASTERISK WILL BE FURNISHED THE BUREAU BY A SEPARATE COMMUNISTION.^{CA}

END

LRC R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS/pjz*

DATE: July 25, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CB*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

C. D. Brennan

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of information furnished the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) regarding the situation in Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and recommends dissemination to the White House, the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency by teletype.

BACKGROUND:

Late in the evening of July 23, 1968, pursuant to previous arrangements, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact Vladimir A. Chuchukin, a Soviet intelligence agent assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

Chuchukin, under direct orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, furnished NY 694-S* with information on the situation in Czechoslovakia which was to be immediately furnished Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA.

The Soviets described the situation as deteriorating and referred to a letter sent to Czechoslovakia which was subsequently printed in the July 18, 1968, issue of "Pravda," official Soviet newspaper. The Soviets requested the CPUSA.

Enclosure

100-428091

RCP:pab

(5)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SENT DIRECTOR

7-25-68

61 AUG 2 1968

REC 27

JUL 31 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: Solo
100-428091

as a fraternal member of the socialist world, to endorse this letter in any manner suitable to the CPUSA and its leaders. NY 694-S* furnished this information to Gus Hall on the afternoon of July 24, 1968.

Attached is a teletype containing a summary of the information furnished the CPUSA for transmittal to the White House, the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency. A copy will be sent to the Attorney General. Teletype used in view of the rapidly changing situation in Czechoslovakia.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached teletype be approved and sent.

d *Jan/SPY* *WOL* *d*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 7/26/68

ReBulet dated June 20, 1968, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commenting upon the FBI summary regarding the April 24-28, 1968, Budapest Preparatory Meeting.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Preparatory Committee of the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Budapest, Hungary, April 24-28, 1968."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on July 22, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SAs ROBERT A. VILLEMURE and WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared in Washington, D.C.

1-904 7-100-428091-1
②-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC 27

100-428091-7082
6 JUL 31 1968



6 AUG 2 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

July 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES,
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24-28, 1968

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dated June 17, 1968, captioned as above.

Referenced letter pointed out that while the prepared speeches at the April meeting in Budapest, Hungary, give clues to the positions of several Party delegates, it would be helpful if further information could be obtained regarding the actual behind-the-scenes maneuverings and whether there were any attempted Soviet applications of pressure at the Budapest meeting. Consequences of the clash between the Italian and Polish delegates are of particular interest.

During July, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that it has been learned that the activities and conduct of the delegation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in attendance at the April Budapest meeting were most circumspect. The principal figures in the Soviet delegation were almost bending over backward to avoid any impression of exerting influence or pressure upon any of the other communist delegations present. This attitude by the Soviet

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
Group 1 DISSEMINATION
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-7082

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES,
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24-28, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

principal delegates was carried to the extreme of almost non-fraternization with other communist delegations and those delegates who expressed an interest and made an effort to hold private discussions with these leading delegates found it a most difficult task. Nonetheless, leading Hungarian delegates confidentially advised that the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) had received substantial assistance from the CPSU in all phases of the preparations of the April Budapest meeting.

In the interim since the April Budapest meeting, another gathering of Communist and Workers' Parties has taken place in Budapest for the purpose of preparing a draft main document for the coming Moscow conference in November, 1968. This gathering from June 12 to 21, 1968, encompassed the meeting of the so-called "Committee of Eight" and the meeting of the Working Group. During the course of the deliberations of these two bodies, the influence and pressures of the delegation from the CPSU came more to the fore. A leading delegate from the HSWP advised that although the principal document considered as a working outline at the above meetings was known as the Hungarian draft, it was, in fact, prepared jointly by the HSWP and the CPSU. As a matter of fact, a special delegation from the HSWP had gone to Moscow, USSR, for a period of weeks prior to the June meeting to work out this draft and other preparations for the meeting in collaboration with the CPSU.

As to the consequences of the clash between the Italian and Polish delegates, their respective positions must be understood. The Italian Party opposed the convening of an International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties or at least wished it to be postponed. On the other hand, the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) wanted such an International Conference to be convened as soon as possible. Underlying the Polish position, to some extent at least, was the Polish idea that if the International Conference should result in the establishment of some international communist coordinating body, Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, could be inserted as the head

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES,
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24-28, 1968

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

of such a body and thus solve some of the factional problems of the Polish Party which were in evidence at that time. This desire on the part of leading members of the PUWP may or may not continue up to this time, in view of the subsequent events in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Additionally, other disputes and disagreements in policy lay beneath the surface of the clash between the Italian and Polish delegates at the April Budapest meeting. The Italian Party disagreed strongly with the Polish drive against intellectuals and students, the drive against Polish Jews, and their expulsion of some Party members. The Polish disagreement with the Italian CP showed itself concretely in the censure and later expulsion of correspondents of the Italian CP newspaper "L'Unita" because of their quotation of certain parts of a Gomulka speech in which he characterized Polish Jews as a fifth column in Poland. A second embarrassing dispatch by the "L'Unita" correspondents was made in the midst of the Polish drive against the more liberal elements in their Party with overtones of anti-Semitism, in which the Italians remarked that they could not conceive that the small minority of Jews could constitute the chief danger to Polish socialist society. These quotations from Gomulka did not appear in the official version of Gomulka's speech but the "L'Unita" correspondents were present and printed what they heard. Now, the above is how the argument appears on the surface but in reality the dispute concerns the entire process of democratization of socialist society and the decentralization of the world communist movement. The dogmatic line of the PUWP in the international as well as national arena is strongly opposed by the Italian CP. This fundamental ideological disagreement between these two Parties is not resolved and will continue to manifest itself in subsequent meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties right up until the day of the International Conference in Moscow, USSR, in November, 1968.

The CPSU has some very definite feelings on the subject of the eventuality of some kind of organizational structure being established for the further guidance and coordination of the international communist movement. Over

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES,
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24-28, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

a considerable period of time Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), has enunciated the thesis that the unity of the world communist movement requires not only periodic conferences but also some coordinating committees. The CPSU accepts Hall's thesis wholeheartedly but in order not to aggravate relations with more liberal CPs both in the East European socialist bloc and in the Western world and in order not to jeopardize chances for the International Conference in Moscow, has not deemed it advisable to take such a position either publicly or in such international forums as the current round of conferences in Budapest. The CPSU is also in the forefront of those supporting another project espoused by Gus Hall which is the proposal for an international communist press agency. As a matter of fact, the CPSU, after receiving this suggestion from Hall, has been actively sponsoring its establishment with other CPs throughout the world. The chief obstacles to its establishment, however, are support by other CPs and a location in a non-communist country willing to accept it. It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of the establishment of such an international communist press agency because, as presently envisioned, this agency would be quite similar to the old International Press Correspondence which wielded considerable influence in the international communist movement during its existence.

The Russian leaning toward international coordination or control of the international communist movement is evidenced in the debates which took place at the June Budapest meetings. These debates over the content of the draft outline of the main document for the Moscow conference centered upon the inclusion in such a document of general theses or laws that would apply generally to all CPs and to the development of socialism anywhere in the world. The CPSU delegation vigorously supported the inclusion of such general theses in the draft document, while the Italians, the French, the Czechs, and others argued just as vigorously against it because this was interpreted as outside interference in the internal affairs of another CP or state. As a consequence of these debates, the Soviet Party has begun to back off from their initial insistence upon demands for such general theses. Therefore, at the June Budapest meeting the

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES,
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24-28, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

prospects for an International Conference in Moscow in November, 1968, looked reasonably good even if on a compromised basis. However, in view of recent events in Czechoslovakia and the sympathetic response to Czechoslovakia from a number of other socialist countries and CPs, there may be a dimming of the prospects for a broad and successful conference as visualized by the CPSU.

Concerning multilateral and bilateral meetings of the CPSU with other CPs, such as the May 30-31, 1968, conference in Moscow commemorating the 150th Anniversary of Karl Marx, it is quite evident that the aim or primary emphasis of such meetings is on internationalism. Such meetings, including a Karl Marx Sesquicentennial sponsored by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG), concentrate upon the discussion of some theoretical subjects invoking the "sacred writ" of Karl Marx. But these subjects are not approached as concretely as they are at the Budapest Preparatory Meetings. All of these meetings are being used by the CPSU and its allies as a vehicle to strengthen the coming Moscow conference; to win friends; and to increase their influence.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: July 29, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 7/29/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 64 GR 87, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS: dry

(7)

REC 27, 100-428091-7083

6 JUL 31 1968

61 AUG 2 1968

NR 0064 GR 087

07/29/68

1. TOPALM REGARDING INFORMATION ABOUT STEM'S STRIP WITH FAM
ILY WE UNDERSTOOD HE IS GOING TO VISIT NEST AS TOURIST HAVING
TOUR AND BOTH WAYS TICKETS IF DATE OF ARRIVAL IS KNOWN IN ADVANCE
NEST PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS WILL ASSIST IN MAKING A CASUAL
INTERVIEW WITH DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF NEST LIFE AND ORGANIZED MEDICAL
EXAMINATION. PLEASE CONFIRM THIS BY POLL

NR 0064 GR 087

07/29/68

96869 45608 35818 25269 78008 60450 44119 69531 84859 29292
57995 49179 61273 55492 91180 85935 75138 89410 98817 52042
46641 72989 71309 57058 36059 84659 75522 98318 38698 78707
78729 02338 75491 64250 72209 31187 47111 99980 59225 87187
20131 05392 91515 38248 92127 68536 30935 82456 90468 83848
84537 00301 05955 67956 48633 08496 64564 63502 92867 75189
48319 39007 53703 70102 88828 63490 72671 77758 69935 95483
23877 45851 40858 25821 02665 87332 54541 62022 72845 37082
57315 12207 92078 91523 41718 54225 66892

NEST

USSR

PALM

GUS HALL

POLL

WALKIE TALKIE

STEM

PAUL ALBERT

ENCLOSURE

100-428091- 7083

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/29/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

*R. P. [unclear]
Morduch
[unclear]*

On 7/29/68, there was received from the Soviets, by way of radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To GUS HALL

"Regarding information about PAUL ALBERT's trip with family: We understand he is going to visit the USSR as a tourist and that he has round trip tickets. If date of arrival is known in advance, USSR public organizations will assist in making him acquainted with the different aspects of life in the USSR. Also, they will set up a medical examination for him.

"Please confirm this by walky-talky."

(See NY letter dated 7/25/68, page 2.)

(NY 694-S* will notify GUS HALL concerning this message.)

J

1-904
②-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:eac
(6)

REC 54

100-428091-7084

6 AUG 1 1968

EX-105

500



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637-Sub C)

8/2/68

REC 13
Director, FBI (100-428091) 7085

1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. H. A. Grubert

SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS - C

Reurlet 7/29/68.

Authority is granted to interview [redacted]
[redacted] for the purpose of developing him for possible
utilization in the Solo apparatus.

Your contact with [redacted] should be made in
accordance with Section 87D, Manual of Instructions.
Care should be taken to preclude the possibility of
embarrassment to the Bureau.

Advise the Bureau of the results and submit
recommendations for further action in this matter.

b6
b7C
b7D

HAG:pab *pab*
(5)

NOTE:

Between 1953 and 1966, [redacted] was interviewed nine
times under the Toplev program. Each time he spoke to inter-
viewing Agents he was polite and affable, was not antagonistic,
gave opinions on such matters as Smith Act prosecutions, but
refused to furnish pertinent information regarding himself or
any associates. [redacted]

[redacted] when he reportedly became disillusioned with Russian
intervention in Poland and Hungary. There is no known CP
activity regarding [redacted] was honorably discharged
from the U.S. Coast Guard in [redacted].
He continued working in the [redacted] and is currently

[redacted] which manufactures
etc. Judging from his

[redacted] present employment and residence address in [redacted]
[redacted] it can be assumed [redacted] has gained considerable affluence since
1956. The beginnings of this affluence are contemporaneous with
his apparent break from the CP. New York requests to contact
[redacted] on the premise that he, as a [redacted]
equipment, may have been contacted by CP or Soviet representatives
seeking [redacted]. This interview constitutes part of a
program designed to locate individuals to be developed as informants
and utilized in the Solo apparatus.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
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Casper _____
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Conrad _____
Felt _____
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Sullivan _____
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Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 13 1968

8 *ncp* *A*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *AM/OP* SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-Sub G)

SUBJECT: SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

DATE: 7/29/68

R. J. Brown
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] has been selected for interview under the SOLO Replacement and Neutralization Program.

[redacted]

He was educated in NYC completing two years of

[redacted]

[redacted]

Subversive Activities

[redacted] from [redacted] a CP training class and in [redacted] leaders. The same year he became [redacted] P. [redacted]

In 1950 he was given the assignment to obtain a [redacted]

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (41)

AH:eac
(3)

REC 13

100-428091-7085
6 AUG 2 1968



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5-*J*

b6
b7C
b7D

NY 100-134637-Sub C

[redacted] at the section level. [redacted] when his position was that of a member of the [redacted]

In [redacted] CP and later the same year it was determined that he left the Party because [redacted] in [redacted]

There has been no known CP activity on the part of the subject since [redacted]

Miscellaneous

Of interest is the fact that when [redacted] applied for employment and was subsequently hired by [redacted] in March 1953 [redacted]

In the course of a Toplev interview on 10/30/56, the interviewing agent touched on his use of the [redacted]

[redacted] explained he got the [redacted] and used it because he was unable to hold a job [redacted] He said he did not know this [redacted] and used [redacted]

This is incorrect since investigation revealed that he had been employed from January to June, 1952, at [redacted]

Previous Interviews

Between 1953 and 1966, [redacted] was interviewed under the Toplev Program nine times. At no time was he antagonistic. Each time he spoke to the agents, gave opinions on such matters

NY 100-134637-Sub C

as the Smith Act prosecutions and the Socialist Labor Party, but each time he refused to furnish pertinent information on himself or his associates. In his last interview on 4/8/66, while friendly, he refused to be drawn into discussing his CP past.

b6
b7C
b7D

Recommendation

From the subject's residence address and employment, one can assume that he has gained considerable affluence since 1956. It appears too that the beginnings of this affluence are contemporaneous with his break with the CP. [REDACTED]

In the past he has been polite and affable in his contacts with Bureau agents, albeit adamant in his refusal to discuss his past.

In view of the above, Bureau authority is requested to openly contact [REDACTED] on the premise that he, as a [REDACTED] may have been contacted by the CP or Soviet representatives seeking [REDACTED]

At the outset of the interview, [REDACTED] will be assured that the Bureau has no current interest in his past. However, a subtle, oblique reference regarding his filing for a [REDACTED] could be interjected when the time is ripe, to keep him, for want of another phrase, on the defensive.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-Sub C)

SUBJECT: SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

DATE: 7/30/68

3/25/68, authorizing the interview of

In view of the recent penetration of the Professional and Cultural Section of the CPUSA by [redacted] the matter of interviewing members of this section was discussed with him. Informant stated that interviews at this time may reflect unfavorably on him, since as far as he knows, he is the only recent new member of this section.

[redacted] and has been present at two recent section meetings with [redacted]

In view of the above, no interview of [redacted] be conducted UACB. If information is developed that an interview of [redacted] conducted without jeopardizing the informant, Bureau authority will again be requested.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (41)

JAH:eac
(3)

REC 13

100-428091-7086

6 AUG 2 1968



98 AUG 13 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-19-2012 J

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

BY LIAISON

Date: July 31, 1968
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3010

delivered
8/1/68
RCP

[redacted] Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) was to travel to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in early June, 1968, to participate in a seminar on current youth movements to be held June 12-13, 1968. On the day before his departure it was discovered that he had allowed his United States Passport to expire, and there was not enough time for him to have it renewed and still attend the meeting.

The leadership of the CPUSA designated [redacted] a youthful member of the CPUSA National Committee, to attend the meeting in place of [redacted]

Officials of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have advised the CPUSA that the speech made by [redacted] at this meeting was well received. The CPUSA was also advised that the staff of the "World Marxist Review," the theoretical journal of the international communist movement with headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, had asked [redacted] to prepare an article for that publication. This article is to set forth what effect the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy had on political life in the United States. It was reported that [redacted] will prepare a brief article on this subject for which he is to be paid, but his name will not appear as the author of the article.

1 - Director BY LIAISON
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

100-428091

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

RCP:pab
(6)

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

6 AUG 2 1968

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 13 1968

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter dated 7/19/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C," and National Security Agency Intercept received from CIA 7/25/68.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *Jul*

DATE: July 31, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 7/31/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

JLM:trs
(7)
31

REC 13

100-428091-7088

6 AUG 2 1968

98 AUG 13 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *AK*

DATE: August 1, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
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Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 8/1/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

R.A. Putnam

J

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J.A. Sizoo, Mr. R.C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

REC 13

100-428091-7089

6 AUG 2 1968

HS:cpbepb
(7)

98 AUG 13 1968

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

8/2/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO
IS - C

Reurlet 6/28/68 which set forth possible cover names for CG 5824-S* and CG 6653-S.


Bufiles contain no identifiable references to the names set forth in relet.

Records of the Passport Office, U. S. Department of State, were searched and no record could be located for the names set forth in relet.

RCP:pab *pab*
(4)

NOTE:

In order to provide additional security we are preparing a new legend for CG 5824-S* and CG 6653-S.



REC 13

100-428091-7090

6 AUG 2 1968

Tolson _____
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TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 13 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: August 1, 1968

WCS
DeLoach ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Casper ☒
Callahan ☒
Conrad ☒
Felt ☒
Gale ☒
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel ☒
Trotter ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of information furnished the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) regarding the situation in Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and recommends dissemination to the White House, the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency by teletype.

BACKGROUND:

On 7/30/68, pursuant to previous arrangements, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact Vladimir A. Chuchukin, a Soviet intelligence agent assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

Chuchukin stated Moscow had furnished him, in documentary form, information which Chuchukin was to give orally to NY 694-S* for immediate transmittal to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA.

The message reflects Soviet concern of the serious political situation in Czechoslovakia; that the Czechoslovakian Government is doing nothing to prevent the tendency of "going to the right." They are critical of the laxity of security along Czechoslovakian borders which they feel is responsible for couriers from capitalist countries linking right-wing counterrevolutionary forces with similar organizations abroad.

Enclosure *sent 8-1-68*

HAG:pab (5)

EX 110 REC-58 100-428091-7091
CONTINUED - OVER

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. H. A. Grubert

AUG 5 1968

98 AUG 13 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: Solo

The Soviets are concerned that the working class in Czechoslovakia is being attacked with the aim of disorganizing them and blames outside influences, including the United States and West Germany for that situation.

The Soviets declare that they are ready to help Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in every way possible to repulse reaction.

The main item in the Soviet message was to stress the unity of all communist parties in the world and their determination to struggle for socialism in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets feel that by acting united they can score success in the solution of the complicated tasks facing Czechoslovakia.

NY 694-S* gave this information to Gus Hall on 7/31/68. Hall stated he would like to support the Soviet position but other CPUSA functionaries are against the endorsement until further information is made available. Hall hoped, that with the new information, he might convince the other CPUSA functionaries to support the Soviet position.

Attached is a teletype containing a summary of the information furnished the CPUSA for transmittal to the White House, the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency. A copy will be sent to the Attorney General. Teletype used in view of the rapidly changing situation in Czechoslovakia.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached teletype be approved and sent.

AB
W.C. Sullivan
Gus Hall
As

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-19-2012

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

July 29, 1968

BY LIAISON

REC 12 100-428091-7092

~~TOP SECRET~~
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, has advised the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as follows:

It would be a good idea if now, or in the near future, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union proposes an exchange of delegations with the United States. The United States Delegation should be made up of members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The Soviet Delegation should consist of individuals of equal rank.

Hall suggested that the individuals from the United States to be invited to the Soviet Union should be United States Senators Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, Wayne Morse of Oregon and J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. Because of the sensitive nature of the source which furnished this information, this communication is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~/No Foreign Dissemination."

RCP:pab
(12)

11 AUG 6 1968

NOTE:

Classified "~~TOP SECRET~~/No Foreign Dissemination" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
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Callahan _____
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MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 73 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTE CONTINUED:

Data extracted from New York letter dated 7/25/68 and Chicago letter dated 7/24/68, captioned "Solo, IS-C," both of which contain additional information to be handled under other captions. They are not attached.

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/26/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:pab.

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson ☒
DeLoach ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Casper ☒
Callahan ☒
Conrad ☒
Felt ☒
Gale ☒
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel ☒
Trotter ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS/AM*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CB/B*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

DATE: July 26, 1968 *WCS/AM*

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
 - 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 - 1 - Liaison
 - 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
 - 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam
- C.D. Brennan*

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of a proposal made by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to the Soviets that the Soviets exchange delegations with the United States involving high-ranking officials. It recommends dissemination of this information to the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

BACKGROUND:

On July 23, 1968, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact Vladimir Chuchukin. During this contact NY 694-S*, pursuant to instructions of Gus Hall, furnished Chuchukin, for transmittal to the Soviets, a proposal that the Soviets should invite three members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate to the Soviet Union and send three Soviets of equal rank as a delegation to the United States. Hall suggested that the Soviets invite Senators Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn), Wayne Morse (D-Oreg) and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark).

Attached is a summary of this information for dissemination to the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached summary be approved and sent. 7-29-68
Enclosure *sent*
RCP:pab *gph*
(6)

WCS/AM
WCS/AM
WCS/AM

SENT DIRECTOR

7-29-68

REC 11

100-428091-7092

5-9

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 7/31/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

Re NY teletype, 7/31/68, regarding the Soviet message transmitted to GUS HALL through NY 694-S regarding the Soviet-Czechoslovakian controversy.

On 7/30/68, pursuant to previously made arrangements, NY 694-S met his Soviet contact, VLADIMIR CHUCHUKIN, and told him that he had received from Moscow, on Saturday, 7/27/68, a document concerning the Soviet position with regard to Czechoslovakia. He stated that his orders were to furnish NY 694-S orally the content of this message. He further stated that he was supposed to have delivered the message to the informant as soon as possible after receipt, but, owing to his being new in the current apparatus, he was unfamiliar with the signal operations and had not furnished the proper signal indicating that he had wanted an immediate contact with NY 694-S. CHUCHUKIN mentioned the fact that it was the Soviet intention that the contents of the aforesaid document be in the hands of GUS HALL before the Soviet-Czech meeting scheduled to begin on 7/29/68.

The following is the report of NY 694-S reflecting the information furnished to him by CHUCHUKIN, for transmittal to GUS HALL.

- 100-904-2
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(CI)
1 - NY 105-45740 (CHUCHUKIN) (#344)
1 - New York

ACB:gam
(7)

ENCLOSURE



98 AUG 13 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

NY 694-S advised that he transmitted this information to GUS HALL on 7/31/68, and that, upon reading the informant's report, GUS HALL stated that, much as he would like to publicly endorse the Soviet position in the current controversy, he presently is in no position to do so because of opposition from Party functionaries who are arguing against such endorsement until further information regarding the Soviet position is available to them. HALL stated that with the newly furnished information from the Soviets, he hoped perhaps to convince the other CP,USA functionaries that the CP,USA should endorse the Soviet position.

Pencil lines appearing on the attached Xerox report were placed there inadvertently by the NYO and have no significance.

7/28/68

About this situation in CZ, it now is even more serious than before. The CC CPSU is, and has been, watching developments in Czechoslovakia there, especially since the January plenary session of the CC CPCZ held last January. During all this, the CC CPSU received much information from friends in CZ on this serious situation. Based upon this information, it is the opinion of the CC CPSU that the main tendency of the political life in CZ has taken shape, which is most dangerous and serious (going to the Right). Since January, the present leadership of the CZ CP has intended to overcome and correct the mistakes of the past, particularly in the field of economy, and national questions; but, during the past seven months, no positive steps in that direction were taken in the aforementioned fields. Until now, there has been no specific program on the national economy in CZ, and while they speak of disorganization of production in some fields, at the same time, losses in wages are taking place in the working class. They criticized the past under the slogan of "ABSOLUTE FREEDOM", and began to criticize the officials who made past mistakes, criticizing everything, essentially the Socialist achievements of 20 years. Under this pretense of criticism, the working class of CZ was actually being attacked with the aim of disorganizing them. It was reported from most reliable source that the CC CPSU that this criticism was made by recommendation of groups in West Germany and the USA. These critics (Right wing and the counter revolutionists) were not effectively resisted by the CC CPCZ, therefore, weakening, as an act of force in society, the working class and the CP. According to the information received by the CC CPSU, only 20%, or less, of CP CZ members attend party meetings, worsening the situation. It is clear that the counter revolutionaries forces are finalizing the process of regrouping. At this moment, "Clubs" are very active, according to reliable sources. At the head of such clubs are former Nazis, Trotskites, and former Bourgeois generals of the military. One such case involves PALECEK and convicted CIA Agents from Ramborisek and Chekh. The Social Democratic Party recreated and organized such clubs in many cities, and villages in the country. The CC CPSU see such social democratic clubs being organized and being headed by former Right wing and social democrats, contrary to the statements made by the social democrats today in CZ that these people do not head such clubs. However, these clubs play an important undermining role in many factories and in the rural areas and among the working class. The Social Democrats today are openly supporting the document "2,000 words". These Social Democrats are headed by former members of Benes Party. In an interview with "Spiegel Magazine" the West German reactionary publication, KUCHERA present Minister of Justice in CZ, made the statement stressing that the practical aim is for them to come to power, but as of now, it is too early to speak of concrete details. The Right wing counter revolutionary

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-7093

leadership in CZ is in contact with different foreign organizations, and also directly in touch with DE GAULLE through new Premiere DE MURVILLE. The People's Catholic Party is maintaining contact with corresponding parties, such as theirs, in Austria, and with such people as GRUBER and WEICHALM, officials of the Catholic Party in Austria, and even with the leadership of the Socialist International. One of the members of the Social Democratic Party, MICHKA visited Austria, and enlisted support of the Austrian Socialists, especially in finance and the printing of pamphlets and leaflets. At the meeting of the Club 231, in the town of Semil in CZ, it was declared, openly, that they are in contact with Radio Free Europe. On July 18, 1968, a group of Right wing organizations appealed to certain people in the USA and asked for assistance in case the situation should become complicated. More serious than that is that the frontiers of CZ are wide open and that the border guards are not alert and vigilant. So much so, that during the first six months of this year, three hundred seventy thousand citizens from capitalist countries, such as West Germany and Austria visited CZ. Amongst the visitors were many diplomats without official status, newspaper men, and military men. In many cases, these people were playing the role of couriers or messengers between the Right wing counter-revolutionary forces and similar organizations abroad. In fact, the Soviet Government sent a special note to Prague, pointing out the danger of this. Also, amongst the visitors who come in large numbers to CZ are military officers from the USA.

Nowadays, the Right wing forces are trying to slander the CP of CZ, and the loyal comrades in the country. Persecution of the loyal members assumes an open and unruly character. This campaign by these people is also to discredit Slovakia. There is a campaign to discredit the present membership of the National Assembly of Slovakia and the Slovakian leadership; also to demoralize the army, and the state security forces, and unduly influence the members of the militia. In Slovakia today, slogans are printed on walls, etc. that "A Good Communist Is A Dead Communist". There is a slogan, also, that there are enough trees to hang all Communists in Slovakia. "We have enough Poplar trees to hang all Communists". Another slogan in Slovakia, which is shouted, printed and written is "Democracy without the Russians and the Communist Party".

CZ writer VAZULIK, one of the authors of "2,000 words", published an article in Literarni Listi. In this article he wrote an appeal to a certain Tomichek, a leader of a club Mladdech, that the Communist Party is a criminal organization and it must be thrown out of public life; but this impudence by VAZULIK was not resisted and refuted by the CP of CZ. The reactionaries and counter-reactionaries, when using the slogan of Liberation, do so under the pretext of removing the CP of CZ as an active force, from political life. These Right wing forces say

that is is necessary to conduct a new election campaign for a new national assembly, hoping that, in this election, the CP of CZ will be defeated. In other words, they are attempting a coup d'etat. For this purpose all counter-revolutionary and Right wing forces are united and also are trying to disorganize the working class of CZ, and are ready, if need be, for a confrontation with these in support of Socialism. In this there is an alliance with the former officers of Benes Army. At a meeting of the Club of Active Non-Party People, IVAN SWETAKA stated "There is a possibility of a civil war" - in this connection there is an anxiety in the CC CPCZ and especially among those members of the central committee who are friendly to the Soviet Union. We say to the Communist Party of the US openly, and frankly, that the leadership of the CP CZ at the last CZ CP plenum under estimated the danger of Socialism of Right wing counter-revolutionary forces. The letter of 5 nations concluded with an evaluation that the situation in CZ was sent to the CZ leadership with honest intent and pointed out that the main danger is the danger from the Right. To have evaluated this situation incorrectly is a step backwards, and to ignore the advice given by fraternal Communist Parties to the CP of CZ that they concentrate their fire against the anti socialist forces, is also serious. The letter of the five nations was motivated by the desire to strengthen the position of Socialism, but, unfortunately, the Presidium of the CC CPCZ looked upon this letter as interference in the internal affairs of CZ, and permitted the press of CZ to represent this as pressure on CZ from the USSR. Someone among the leadership of the CZ party is "sliding down the road of heating up the Nationalist tendencies". An official statement made publicly in CZ repeated statements of friendship toward the Soviet Union, but in practice anti-Soviet leaflets are being distributed, and the flag of the USSR is defiled in many cases, and an attack has been made against the Warsaw Treaty and the Council of Economic Cooperation. General PROCHPIK is making public, classified information related to military secrets of the Warsaw Pact, and, in our judgment, this situation is VERY SERIOUS. The Presidium of the CC CPSU is going to the meeting of the CZ with USSR to discuss this situation. We declare that we are ready to help CZ and the CP of CZ in every way and make everything possible to repulse reaction.

THE MAIN THING TO STRESS NOW IS THE UNITY OF ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES.

Further developments will depend, to a certain degree, on unity of Communist Parties' determination to struggle for socialism in CZ. Acting united, we can score success in the solution of complicated tasks facing the CZ Party and the country of CZ.

CODE

August 1, 1968

TELETYPE URGENT
REC 46 100-428091-7094
SENT BY CODED TELETYPE
TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. H. A. Grubert

ATTENTION: MRS. MILDRED STEGALL
SECRETARY OF STATE
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

~~(SECRET)~~ COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

ON JULY THIRTY LAST, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION ADVISED THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AS FOLLOWS:

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS GOING TOWARD
THE RIGHT AND THE LEADERSHIP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS DOING NOTHING
TO PREVENT THE TENDENCY. THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN WORKING CLASS IS
BEING ATTACKED AND DISORGANIZED WHICH THE SOVIETS ATTRIBUTE TO
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY.
THE SOVIETS ARE CRITICAL OF SECURITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIAN BORDERS
AND BELIEVE MANY VISITORS FROM CAPITALIST COUNTRIES ACT AS
COURIERS BETWEEN RIGHT-WING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES AND SIMILAR
ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD. THE MAIN POINT OF THE SOVIET MESSAGE WAS

TO STRESS THE UNITY OF ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WORLD AND
THEIR DETERMINATION TO STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

HAG: pab
(6)
INITIALED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

WAS TELETYPE

7:40 PM LRC

AUG 1 1968

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCIPHERED

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

61 AUG 12 1968

TELETYPE UNIT

TELETYPE TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT BY ACTING UNITED THEY CAN SCORE SUCCESS IN
THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLICATED TASKS FACING CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE SOVIETS DECLARE THAT THEY ARE READY TO HELP
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN
EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO REPULSE REACTION.

THE SOVIET MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO GUS HALL, GENERAL
SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, ON JULY THIRTY-ONE LAST WHO
STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO PUBLICLY ENDORSE THE SOVIET POSITION
IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY BUT OTHER COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,
FUNCTIONARIES ARE AGAINST THE ENDORSEMENT UNTIL FURTHER INFORMATION
IS AVAILABLE. HALL STATED THAT WITH THE NEWLY DEVELOPED
INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS, HE HOPED TO CONVINCE OTHER
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, FUNCTIONARIES TO ENDORSE THE SOVIET
POSITION.

GP - 1

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of
this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S*)
who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in
grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from New York teletype, dated 7/31/68,
captioned "Solo, IS-C," and New York letter, 7/31/68, same caption.

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan,
dated 8/1/68, captioned "Solo, Internal Security-Communist,"
prepared by HAG:pab, which advised that a summary of this information
was being furnished the White House, Secretary of State, Director of
Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Defense Intelligence
Agency. The Attorney General will be furnished a copy of this
teletype by separate cover.

COB/KC 0000

WH ACK FBI 003. PLS

WH ACK FBI 003 PLS

DE WH ACKT UR 003

STATE ACK FBI 009 PLS (ZIA 008)

RECD U 009 AT 2308Z RL

CIA ACK FBI 004 PLS

AND DE CIFV QSL UR 04 AT 01/2310ZULU CULAR

DIA ACK FBI 003 VIA PHONE PLS

((DH OF DIA ACKED))

ENCIPHERED

SOLO.) IS-C.

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. DeLoach.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Bishop.....
Mr. Casper.....
Mr. Callahan.....
Mr. Conrad.....
Mr. Felt.....
Mr. Gale.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Sullivan.....
Mr. Tavel.....
Mr. Trotter.....
Tele. Room.....
Miss Holmes.....
Miss Gandy.....

NOTES, FURNISHED THE INFORMANT WITH DETAILED STATEMENT. 22 AUG 8 1968
REGARDING SOVIET ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE SERIOUS SITUATION
ALLEGEDLY EXISTING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS DETAILED REPORT
WILL BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU IN A SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION.

END PAGE ONE

TELETYPED TO:

CG4713

PAGE TWO

THE SOVIET DOCUMENT, AS QUOTED BY CHUCHUKIN, INCLUDED REFERENCES TO THE FOLLOWING:

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS GOING "TOWARD THE RIGHT"; AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LEADERSHIP IS DOING NOTHING TO PREVENT THIS TENDENCY. UNDER THE PRETENSE OF CRITICISM, THE WORKING CLASS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS BEING ATTACKED WITH THE AIM OF DISORGANIZING THEM. THIS DISORGANIZATION IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCES, INCLUDING WEST GERMANY AND THE USA. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH "SPIEGEL MAGAZINE", A WEST GERMAN REACTIONARY PUBLICATION, KUCHERA, PRESENT MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MADE A STATEMENT STRESSING THAT THE AIM IS FOR HIS GROUP TO COME TO POWER AND THAT AT PRESENT IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPEAK OF CONCRETE DETAILS WITH RESPECT TO ACHIEVING THIS PURPOSE. THE RIGHT WING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS AND WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND THE FRENCH PREMIER DE MURVILLE. THE PEOPLE'S CATHOLIC PARTY IS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH CORRESPONDING PARTIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS AUSTRIA. ONE OF THE

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

MEMBERS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, MICHKA, VISITED AUSTRIA AND ENLISTED SUPPORT OF THE AUSTRIAN SOCIALISTS PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO PRINTING PAMPHLETS AND LEAFLETS CRITICAL OF THE SOVIETS.

A MOST SERIOUS SITUATION EXISTS BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THE FRONTIERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE WIDE OPEN AND THAT BORDER GUARDS ARE NOT ALERT AND VIGILANT. DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THOUSAND CITIZENS FROM CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, SUCH AS WEST GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, VISITED CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AMONG THE VISITORS WERE MANY DIPLOMATS WITHOUT OFFICIAL STATUS, NEWSPAPER MEN AND MILITARY MEN. IN MANY CASES THESE PEOPLE PLAY THE ROLE OF COURIERS OR MESSENGERS BETWEEN THE RIGHT WING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD. AMONG VISITORS WHO COME IN LARGE NUMBERS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE MILITARY OFFICERS FROM THE USA. IN SLOVAKIA TODAY SLOGANS ARE PRINTED ON WALLS SUCH AS, "A GOOD COMMUNIST IS A DEAD COMMUNIST", AND "THERE ARE ENOUGH TREES TO HANG ALL COMMUNISTS IN SLOVAKIA." THE RIGHT WING FORCES INSIST THAT IT IS NECESSARY

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

TO CONDUCT A NEW ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR A NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HOPEING THAT, IN SUCH AN ELECTION, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE DEFEATED. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT.

THE LAST ITEM IN THE SOVIET MESSAGE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE MAIN THING TO STRESS NOW IS THE UNITY OF ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES. FUTHER DEVELOPMENTS WILL DEPEND, TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, ON UNITY OF COMMUNIST PARTIES' DETERMINATION TO STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ACTING UNITED, WE CAN SCORE SUCCESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLICATED TASKS FACING THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PARTY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA."

THE NYO DIRECTS THE BUREAU'S ATTENTION TO THE AFORESAID LAST PARAGRAPH. IN THE OPINION OF THE NYO, THIS PARAGRAPH IS AMBIGUOUS, AND ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE AMBIGUITY BY QUESTIONING NEW YORK SIX NIE FOUR-S ASTERISK AT LENGTH REGARDING IT, WERE TO NO AVAIL. HE STATED THAT HE WAS REPORTING THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIETS AND COULD NOT EXPRESS AN OPINION WITH RESPECT TO WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE PARAGRAPH WAS INTENDED TO MEAN. THE NYO CONSIDERS THE AMBIGUITY TO LIE IN THE FACT

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

THAT POSSIBLY THE INTERPRETATION IS THAT WHATEVER THE SOVIETS DO WITH RESPECT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL DEPEND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, UPON ITS BEING SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE WORLD. LACKING SUCH SUPPORT, CONCEIVABLY WHT SOVIETS MAY NOT WISH TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL MILITARILY UPON THE CZECHS.

NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR-S ASTERISK ADVISED THAT HE TRANSMITTED THIS INFORMATION TO GUS HALL ON SEVEN THIRTY-ONE SIXTYEIGHT, AND THAT, UPON READING THE INFORMANT'S REPORT, GUS HALL STATED THAT, MUCH AS HE WOULD LIKE TO PUBLICLY ENDORSE THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY, HE PRESENTLY IS IN NO POSITION TO DO SO BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM PARTY FUNCTIONARIES WHO ARE ARGUING AGAINST SUCH ENDORSEMENT UNTIL FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE SOVIET POSITION IS AVAILABLE TO THEM. HALL STATED THAT WITH THE NEWLY FURNISHED INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS, HE HOPED PERHAPS TO CONVINCE THE OTHER CPUSA FUNCTIONARIES THAT THE CPUSA SHOULD ENDORSE THE SOVIET POSITION.

END

WA....HWL R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *Downing*

DATE: August 6, 1968 *7/5*

FROM : C. F. Downing

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 8/6/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:trs:tr
(7)
Downing

REC 46 100-428091-7095

22 AUG 8 1968

59
59 AUG 12 1968

58

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 8/1/68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "MEETINGS OF SUBCOMMITTEES OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, JUNE 12-21, 1968."

Information in the enclosed LHM was furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE during the period 6/29 - 7/14/68.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "~~SECRET~~" in order to protect the identity of this highly placed source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, the unauthorized disclosure of which could jeopardize his security, thus adversely affecting the national security.

The enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect the identity of this source.

On 7/11/68, CG 5824-S* advised that GUS HALL had requested CG 5824-S* to once again represent the Communist

ENCLOSURE

- 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Chicago

REC 49
EX-105100-428091-7076
AUG 8 1968WAB:mep
(5)LHM State, Cpl
Copy to _____
by routing slip for (Liaison)☒ Info ☐ actiondate 7/6/68
by _____Approved: _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

98 AUG 13 1968

CG 134-46 Sub B

Party, USA at the meeting of the Working Group in Budapest, Hungary, beginning on 7/17/68. CG 5824-S* stated that he was physically unable to once again undertake such a mission and, therefore, HALL designated WILLIAM WEINSTONE to make this trip by himself.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 8/5/68

ReCGlet dated July 5, 1968.

Set forth below is an accounting of Solo and Reserve Funds transactions during July, 1968:

Balance on hand, 7/1/68.

Solo Funds

\$114,694.19

Reserve Funds

7,702.61

Total

\$122,396.80

Additions

Solo Funds

Received from CP of the Soviet Union as reimbursement for fares of CP, USA May Day delegation to USSR, added to fund 7/11/68

\$ 3,747.00

Total

\$ 3,747.00

1-914
2-Bureau (RM)

2-New York (RM)

(1 - 100-128861 (CP, USA - Reserve Funds)

(1 - 100-134637 (SOLO)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(5)

EX-100

REC 49

100-428091-7097
AUG 9 1968



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 AUG 13 1968

CG 134-46 Sub F

Reserve Funds

Received from "World Marxist Review"
to reimburse CP, USA for postage for
period July to December, 1968, six
months at \$375 per month, added to
fund 7/11/68 \$2,250.00

Received from Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party as reimbursement of
fares of WILLIAM WEINSTONE and
CG 5824-S* for travel to Budapest,
Hungary, added to fund 7/11/68 910.00

Total \$3,160.00

Disbursements

Solo Funds

On 7/15/68 to LOU DISKIN for pur-
chase of books to send to CP of
Soviet Union \$ 50.00

On 7/15/68 reimbursement to CG 5824-S*
for amount paid to HELEN WINTER in NYC
for subscriptions to "The Daily World"
for foreign CPs 947.00

On 7/19/68 to GUS HALL for personal
expenses 1,000.00

On 7/19/68 to JACK KLING:
\$500 for expenses of KLING's
election campaign; \$500 for
work of FRANCES GABOW 1,000.00

On 7/20/68 reimbursement to CG 5824-S*
for expenses of GUS HALL while in
Chicago, 7/16-20/68 688.63

On 7/20/68 to LOU DISKIN for purchase
of books to send to CP of Soviet Union 100.00

Total \$3,785.63

CG 134-46 Sub F

Reserve Funds

None

Balance on hand, 8/1/68

Solo Funds

\$114,655.56

Reserve Funds

10,862.61

Total

\$125,518.17

Location of Funds - Chicago Office Territory

Solo Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in safety deposit box #C-1362, LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access limited to SAC and ASAC

\$ 85,166.55

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe in his office at Arisco Associates, Inc., 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois

19,489.01

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Inc., checking account at Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access by [redacted] and CG 5824-S*

5,000.00

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Inc., checking account at First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois, with access by [redacted] and CG 5824-S*

5,000.00

Total

\$114,655.56

CG 134-46 Sub F

Reserve Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in safety
deposit box #C-1362, LaSalle National
Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access by
SAC and ASAC \$ 6,150.00

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe in
his office at Arisco Associates, Inc.,
25 East Washington Street, Chicago,
Illinois 4,712.61

Total \$ 10,862.61

Total funds on hand \$125,518.17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637 Sub A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

DATE: 8/5/68

Remylet, 7/5/68.

The records of the NYO reflects the following information regarding SOLO Funds during the period 7/1/68 - 7/31/68:

7/1/68 On hand as of 6/30/68 \$1,770,944.32

Credits

None during July, 1968

Total \$ 1,770,944.32

Debits

7/1/68 To CG 5824-S* for 3,000.00
GUS HALL for general
Party expenses

7/3/68 To CG 5824-S* for 30,000.00
GUS HALL, (\$25,000.00 for
the "Daily World", and
\$5,000.00 for the CP USA
Convention)

7/31/68 To NY 694-S* for GUS HALL 2,000.00
incidental CP expenses

Total \$ 35,000.00

- 1cc 904-DB EX-100 REC 49 100-428091-7098
- 2- Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1- Chicago (134-46 Sub F) (AM RM)
1- New York (100-128861 Sub B) (CP USA Reserve Fund) 41
1- New York (134-91) 41
1- New York (100-134637 Sub A) 41

22 AUG 9 1968

JFL:ptp
(7)



98 AUG 13 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637 Sub A

Balance

Total on hand as of \$1,735,944.32
7/31/68

Location of Solo Funds
New York Territory

Safe Deposit Box, Chemical 10,000.00
Bank, New York Trust Company,
67 Broad Street, New York City

JACK BROOKS, Regular Checking
Account, Chemical Bank, New York
Trust Company, 20 Pine Street,
New York City

Account No. 1	(001-228919)	13,259.28
Account No. 2	(001-232835)	31,507.26
Account No. 3	(001-237942)	48,677.78

Six blank checks (two each drawn
on the above accounts), signed "JACK
BROOKS", are maintained in the safe
of the SAC of Division IV, NY.

NY 694-S* personal checking account, 4,000.00
Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company,
67 Broad Street, New York City

Maintained by NYC - FBI

Safe Deposit Boxes, Manufacturers 1,628,500.00
Hanover Trust Company, 69th Street
and Third Avenue, New York City.

Total \$1,735,944.32

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 8/5/68

ReCGlet dated July 2, 1968, regarding efforts to locate suitable replacements and/or assistants for Solo informants.

CG 5824-S* recently advised that he had a discussion with LOU DISKIN, District Staff and State Board member, Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, concerning [redacted]. At that time he mentioned to DISKIN that JACK KLING, State Secretary, CP of Illinois, had suggested that he contact DISKIN for information concerning a Party member and owner of a record shop on the near North Side of Chicago who might possibly be utilized by CG 5824-S* to attend to some minor details. CG 5824-S* advised DISKIN that KLING stated his association with this individual was not sufficient to make a recommendation on his availability and that DISKIN should be contacted because of his association with this person.

DISKIN replied that CG 5824-S* should go back further than his association with this individual because all he could say was that he had been a member of the CP in Chicago for five or six years and prior to that was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Chicago. DISKIN stated that [redacted] was originally from [redacted]. He stated he could furnish no additional information other than he had learned that this individual had recently been [redacted].

CG 5824-S* advised that in view of the non-committal attitude of DISKIN, it will be necessary to re-generate new methods of approach to obtain success in this venture. Source stated that notwithstanding DISKIN's attitude, it would still be possible to utilize [redacted] for minor details on an infrequent basis. However, it would be to the advantage of [redacted].

②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago



RAV:MDW
(4)

REC 49 100-428091-7099

EX-100

22 AUG 9 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 AUG 13 1968

CG 134-46 Sub B

[redacted] to gain the confidence of the leadership of the CP. In this regard, investment of CP funds in the business of [redacted] would be a direction to follow. It is the desire of GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA, to have CG 5824-S* locate business ventures in the Chicago area in which investment of CP funds could be made on a profitable basis.

In view of the instructions by JACK KLING to [redacted] an individual utilized by the CP, USA in financial matters to contact [redacted] and KLING's admission to [redacted] of this fact, consideration should be given to having the informant contact [redacted] at some future date if this contact is not made soon by [redacted]

CG 5824-S* then advised that he felt [redacted] should be reinterviewed. He said [redacted] is currently on his own but HALL is interested in having [redacted] go into New York to set up some card shops in New York City and to handle some problems with International Publishers. CG 5824-S* advised that [redacted] appears reluctant of HALL's desires at this time.

b7D

It was the impression of CG 5824-S* that if an interview of [redacted] is successful, there would be no difficulty whatever in inserting him into the Solo operation. CG 5824-S* could offer no new avenues of approach to accomplish this successful interview of [redacted] but felt that somehow he could be successfully reached.

Chicago agents are currently in the process of setting up a reinterview of [redacted] that will be submitted to the Bureau under separate communication.

[redacted] PSI recently advised that he has been unable to get in contact with JACK KLING. However, he has learned that KLING is conducting a political campaign as he is seeking election to the State of Illinois Legislature. He advised he is sending a contribution to KLING for this campaign. PSI also advised he will be out of town for a couple of weeks and will contact KLING concerning his campaign immediately upon his return.

Chicago will continue to vigorously pursue all avenues of approach in efforts to locate suitable replacements and/or assistants for the Solo informants and the Bureau will be kept advised.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 8/6/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two Xerox copies and for the New York Office the original and one Xerox copy of a 34-page pamphlet consisting of editorials in the French language entitled, "Voix Du Paupla," the organ of the Party of the Popular Entente of Haiti. This pamphlet was received from CG 5824-S* on August 6, 1968.

The original is being forwarded to New York as CG 5824-S* advised that he should have it returned to him in order that he can furnish it to GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA.

- 1-134
②-Bureau (Enc. 2)(RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(4)

EX 110

REC-51

1 AUG 12 1968



98 AUG 16 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*
FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*
SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: August 8, 1968

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 8/8/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:trstr
(7)

EX 110

REC- 51

100-428091-7101

1 AUG 12 1968

98 AUG 16 1968

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

8/12/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

7/102

1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

EX 110 REC-51

SOLO
IS - C

Reurlet 8/7/68.


It is desired that you forward to the Bureau two copies of the pamphlet mentioned in relet entitled "From Ribbentrop Official to Federal Chancellor In Re: Kiesinger A Documentation."

TJM:pab *pab*
(4)

NOTE:

The above pamphlet was received by CG 5824-S* for transmittal to Gus Hall. Copies are being requested for review at the Bureau and for possible dissemination to CIA.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 16 1968

TJM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 8/7/68

On August 5, 1968, the Chicago Office received an air mail communication in a Chicago mail drop box maintained in the name of N. HANSEL, Box 7363, Chicago, Illinois 60680, for CG 5824-S*. This communication was postmarked Dresden 801, July 23, 1968, and bore the return address Verlag Zeit Im Bild DDR-801 Dresden-Fritz-Heckert-Platz 10.

The communication contained two copies of a 63-page pamphlet entitled, "From Ribbentrop Official to Federal Chancellor In Re: Kiesinger A Documentation," printed in the German Democratic Republic by the National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany.

A copy of this pamphlet was furnished to CG 5824-S* for transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, while CG 5824-S* is in New York City.

If the Bureau desires to obtain copies of this pamphlet, Chicago is in possession of one of the originals from which copies can be reproduced,

②-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(3)

EX 110

REC-51/100-428091-7102

1 AUG 12 1968



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 8/8/68
Attn: Assistant Director WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

R. P. [signature]

As the Bureau is aware, CG 5824-S* recently completed the 27th Solo Mission which commenced on June 8, 1968, and ended with his return to the United States on June 29, 1968. During this mission, he was a covert participant at a very small and selective subcommittee meeting held in Budapest, Hungary, for the purpose of preparing for the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties to be held in Moscow, USSR, on November 25, 1968.

Based upon the results obtained as well as the extraordinary risks involved, it is recommended an award of \$1,000 be made to CG 5824-S*.

The extraordinary risks involved are based upon his travel behind the Iron Curtain, specifically to Budapest, Hungary; Prague, Czechoslovakia; and, Moscow, USSR, which always requires utmost courage and dedication. Source had the additional burden of being in a state of health less than good.

The outstanding results of this mission consisted of the accumulation and dissemination of information from the small subcommittee meeting held in Budapest which probably would have been unavailable if not provided by this source.

In addition, the source met with BORIS N. PONOMAREV, a Secretary of the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union; A. S. BELYAKOV, Chief Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union; OLDRIK KADERKA, alternate member and Deputy Head of the International Department, Central Committee, CP of Czechoslovakia; and, VACLAV FRYBERT, representative of the International Department, Central Committee, CP of Czechoslovakia, dealing with the CPs in capitalist countries.

1cc 904-3
②-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago
MWJ:MDW
(3)

EX-100

REC-39

100-428091-7103

AUG 15 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

20 1968

CG 134-46 Sub B.

If the Bureau approves this recommended incentive award of \$1,000, it will be presented to CG 5824-S* by the SAC.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
DATE: August 9, 1968
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

My memorandum of 7/10/68 set forth, in detail, an accounting of funds received by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), from the Soviet Union and Red China for June, 1968. The following is an accounting of these funds for July, 1968.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 to 6/30/68

Total received from the Soviet Union.....	\$6,266,538.09
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60) ..	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 6/30/68.....	\$6,316,538.09
Total disbursed 9/58 to 6/30/68.....	4,430,899.58
Total as of 6/30/68.....	\$1,885,638.51

RECEIPTS

Received from Soviets for fares of
Communist Party, USA, May Day
Delegation to Soviet Union on 7/11/68..... 3,747.00
Total available..... \$1,889,385.51

DISBURSEMENTS DURING JULY, 1968

All disbursements made on specific
instructions of Gus Hall, General
Secretary, CPUSA.

7/1/68 - To Gus Hall for Party expenses.....	\$ 3,000.00
7/3/68 - To Gus Hall \$25,000 for new paper the "Daily World" and \$5,000 for Party's Special Convention.....	\$ 30,000.00
7/15/68 - Books sent to Soviet Union.....	\$ 150.00

100-428091

RCP:bb
(5)

EX-100

REC-39

1 AUG 15 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

98 AUG 20 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

7/15/68 - Subscriptions to "Daily World" for foreign communist parties.....\$	947.00
7/19/68 - For Gus Hall's personal expenses in Chicago, Illinois.....\$	1,688.63
7/19/68 - For election campaign of Jack Kling (Party functionary in Illinois) \$500 and for employee of Party bookstore in Chicago \$500.....\$	1,000.00
7/31/68 - To Gus Hall for Party expenses.....\$	2,000.00
Total disbursed July, 1968.....\$	38,785.63
Balance of Fund 7/31/68.....\$	1,850,599.88
In Chicago.....\$	114,655.56
In New York.....\$	1,735,944.32
	<u>\$1,850,599.88</u>

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Party funds received from the Soviets will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

[Handwritten initials: "d" on the left and "K" on the right]

[Handwritten signatures: "W.C. Sullivan" and "J.P.M." in the center]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
Attention: M. F. Row

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

8/14/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Reurlet 8/8/68 recommending that CG 5824-S* be given a cash award of \$1,000 for successful completion of Solo Mission 27.

You are authorized to present CG 5824-S* with a cash award of \$700 in recognition of his outstanding accomplishments during Solo Mission 27. At the time you make this presentation, you are to orally express my appreciation for the informant's services.

TJM:lvh
(11) *lvh*

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 8/13/68, same caption, prepared by TJM:lvh.

EX-100

REC-39

100-428091-7105

AUG 15 1968

MAILED 24
AUG 15 1968

COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan *V* _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

98 AUG 20 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

VIA TELETYPE

AUG 12 1968

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

OTT 02 416PM JL

URGENT 8-12-68

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091)

FROM LEGAT, OTTAWA (105-3349) 1P

CPUSA - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IS DASH C.

ON AUGUST TWELVE INSTANT, [REDACTED] INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DELICATE SOURCE INDICATING NELSON CLARKE, NATIONAL ORGANIZER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA, TO TRAVEL NEW YORK CITY TO CONFER WITH JAMES JACKSON, CPUSA OFFICIAL ON THE PROPOSED HEMISPHERIC CONFERENCE TO END THE VIETNAM WAR SCHEDULED FOR MONTREAL OCTOBER TWELVE DASH FOURTEEN NEXT.

SCHEDULED TRAVEL BY CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY VIA BUFFALO LEAVING TORONTO EIGHT FIFTY PM, AUGUST TWELVE INSTANT, AND ARRIVING NEW YORK CITY TEN AM, AUGUST THIRTEEN NEXT.

ABOVE INFO CLASSIFIED SECRET AND NOT TO BE FURTHER

DISSEMINATED.

JDR

FBI WASH DC

XEROX

98 AUG 20 1968

BRD CC MR BRENNAN

100-428091-7106
AUG 15 1968
5-Tgm

CODE

8/13/68

1 - Mr. T.J. McNiff

TELETYPE

URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE
SI-106

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) — 7107

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO NEW YORK NIGHT SECURITY
SUPERVISOR AUGUST TWELVE LAST. [REDACTED] PROPOSED TRIP
OF NELSON CLARKE TO NEW YORK CITY HAS BEEN CANCELLED. IN
RETURN UNKNOWN HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL OF COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,
WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN TORONTO EIGHT THIRTY A.M. THIS
DATE. RCMP ADVISES ABOVE INFORMATION CLASSIFIED "SECRET" AND
NOT TO BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED.

NEW YORK ADVISE BUREAU OF IDENTITY OF THIS OFFICIAL AND
SUAIRTEL, IF APPLICABLE, PERTINENT INFORMATION IN FORM SUITABLE
FOR DISSEMINATION.

VIA TELETYPE

AUG 13 1968

ENCIPHERED

TJM:lst
(4)

NOTE:

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

By teletype 8/12/68, Legat, Ottawa, advised that Nelson
Clarke, National Organizer of the Communist Party of Canada,
was scheduled to travel to New York City 8/13/68 to confer
with James Jackson, CPUSA official, on the proposed Hemis-
pheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam scheduled for
Montreal, Canada, October 12-14, 1968. This information was
telephonically furnished New York night supervisor 8:20 p.m.,
August 12, 1968. Teletype utilized in view of time element.

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 AUG 20 1968

w.l.t. cbp

TJM
lee

VIA TELETYPE
AUG 13 1968 *CAS*
ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

OTT 01 10-31AM JHC

URGENT 8-13-68

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091)

FROM LEGAT, OTTAWA (105-3349)

IP
5010

CPUSA - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IS - C.

REMYTEL EIGHT TWELVE LAST.

[REDACTED] CLARKE'S TRIP TO NEW YORK CITY CANCELED
AND INFO RECEIVED THROUGH SAME DELICATE SOURCE INDICATES
HIGH RANKING OFFICIAL OF CPUSA TO ARRIVE IN TORONTO EIGHT THIRTY AM
THIS DATE. BUREAU TO BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

~~CORRECTION - PLS CHANGE TIME TO READ NINE THIRTYONE~~

END

HWL

FBI WASH DC

100 904 (940)

EX-110
REC-34

100-428091-7107

6 AUG 15 1968

5 - *[Signature]*

BRD CG: MR. BRENNAN

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

8/15/68

EX 110 REC-34

Director, FBI (100-428091) - 7/08

1 - Mr. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R.C. Putnam

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 8/13/68.


Authority granted to reimburse CG 5824-S* up to \$93 to cover expenses of travel to Montreal, Canada, August 12-13, 1968.

1 - Mr. M.F. Row (6221 IB) - *sent separate*

RCP:jms
(6) *jms*

NOTE:

CG 5824-S* is part of Solo Apparatus, liaison between CP, USA and other communist parties. He was instructed by Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA to handle a problem with CP of Canada in relation to funding of the Hemispheric Conference to End War in Vietnam to be held in Canada in October, 1968. Expenses include \$68 for train fare and \$25 for necessary expenses in Montreal. Intelligence informant should gather during trip is well worth the cost.



o

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____

WCA
08

98-AUG 20 1968 TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 8/13/68

On August 12, 1968, CG 5824-S* advised that during his recent trip to New York City during the period August 6-10, 1968, he had discussed with GUS HALL a previous indication by [redacted] of Detroit that [redacted] intended to talk to HALL in New York City on August 7, 1968, concerning his "neighbors" which CG 5824-S* interpreted as possibly referring to [redacted] contacts with the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). As a matter of fact, [redacted] did not show up in New York City and HALL stated that if CG 5824-S* learned of [redacted] problem or if some problem arose in regard to Canada, then CG 5824-S* should handle it on his own without the necessity of consulting HALL.

On August 12, 1968, CG 5824-S* received a telephone call from NORMAN FREED, a functionary of the CPC, in which FREED stated that there was an emergency situation and that the CPC had to see CG 5824-S* immediately. CG 5824-S* stated that he believes that this may have something to do with the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam to take place in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, during October, 1968. Furthermore, the CPC probably wants more money from the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA). CG 5824-S* stated that this is a subject which he cannot discuss with HALL on the telephone and time appears to be of the essence in FREED's "cry for help." Therefore, CG 5824-S* arranged to leave for Montreal by train on the evening of August 12, 1968. He will arrive in Montreal on the morning of August 13, 1968, and will take care of his business with the CPC and return by train on the evening of August 13, 1968, arriving in Chicago on the morning of August 14, 1968. CG 5824-S* took with him a limited amount of funds which he can give to the CPC but stated he will need authorization from GUS HALL for any larger expenditure. As it is, he will have to justify this

1cc 904-D
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info)
1-Chicago

EX 110
REC-34

100-428091-7108
AUG 16 1968

WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

expenditure to HALL upon HALL's possible arrival in Chicago on August 15, 1968, as an emergency in which there was no way to contact HALL beforehand. A subsequent telephonic contact with the wife of NORMAN FREED on August 12, 1968, confirmed that the CPC is requesting funds. It was also learned that NORMAN FREED will be in the hospital and, therefore, CG 5824-S* will make covert contact with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CPC.

In view of CG 5824-S*'s emergency trip to Montreal, the Bureau is requested to authorize reimbursement to CG 5824-S* up to the following amount for expenses of this travel:

Round-trip fare, Canadian National - Grand Trunk Railroad, between Chicago and Montreal.....	\$68.00
Expenses while in Montreal.....	<u>25.00</u>
Total	\$93.00

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Conrad *Down*

DATE: August 14, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 8/14/68, the New York Office furnished the text of two messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

2-ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

EX-103

REC 4 100-428091-7109

1 AUG 16 1968

JLM:trs
(7)
Down

5-RP

98 AUG 20 1968

8/14/68

89980 52303 03446 47843 15821 84425 96108 01295 53992 10553
01243 65063 43062 58148 27819 97970 08981 26672 72433 39469
78220 12472 99153 49639 52203 40136 85654 22092 95941 39596
91524 23790 43364 47636 04414 67049 29277 22856 03664 31649
19086 80728 93216 16752 46857 70533 72396 46647 72913 82084
43327 28799 48532 51203

ABLE-KIT WOULD YOU PLEASE TRANSMIT FOR ME FOLLOWING MESSAGE
ET TO REX LAST. HE WILL BE OUR REPRESENTATIVE TO BEACH BARD INS
EPTEMBER. IT IS POSSIBLE WE MAY SEND ANOTHER COUSIN THERE TO
JOIN REX LAST. PALM REO-ABLE-COX

ABLE	CENTRAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL COMMITTEE
BARD	CONVENTION, CONGRESS
BEACH	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
COUSIN	DELEGATE
COX	COMMUNIST PARTY USA
KIT	COMMUNIST PARTY USSR
LAST	HENRY WINSTON
PALM	GUS HALL
REO	SECRETARY GENERAL
REX	COMRADE

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-7109

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *Joe*

DATE: August 13, 1968 *S/S*

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C *C/S*

On 8/13/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

REC 4 100-428091-7110

EX-103

1 AUG 16 1968

JLM:cpb
(7)

98 AUG 20 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 13, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT:

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other Communist Parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum recommends a \$700 award to CG 5824-S* for having subjected himself to extraordinary risks on a mission behind the Iron Curtain to obtain vital intelligence data not otherwise available to our Government.

BACKGROUND:

During the period June 8, 1968, to June 29, 1968, CG 5824-S* traveled abroad on Solo Mission 27. He participated, covertly, in the work of a very small select subcommittee on preparations for the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties to be held in Moscow, USSR, starting November 25, 1968. Chairman of this subcommittee was Boris Ponomarev, a Secretary of the Central Committee CP of the Soviet Union. Ranking officials of 11 Communist Parties met in Budapest, Hungary, June 12-17, 1968, and the working group of 40 Communist Parties met in the same city June 18-21, 1968. CG 5824-S* participated in both meetings. In addition, he conferred with ranking Soviet officials who furnished him with the "line" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to the situation in Czechoslovakia, peace talks regarding the war in Vietnam and the attitude of the Soviets with regard to the

Enclosure
100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
Attention: M. F. Row
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
- 1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

16 AUG 19 1968 E B I

EX-105

REC-105
AUG 14 11 35 AM '68

98 AUG 26 1968 (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

political situation in the United States. This information has been disseminated to the top officials of our Government and was not available from any other Government sources. In addition, this source furnished documents prepared at the above meetings which information has also been disseminated to the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.

After the above meetings, CG 5824-S* was sent to Moscow to confer with the Soviet in charge of the Solo operation. Together they discussed the working of the Solo apparatus and worked out possible plans to further protect this operation. CG 5824-S* was given the names of two individuals in the United States whom Soviet intelligence officials were considering for development with the request that the Communist Party, USA, conduct an investigation of them. These individuals are now subjects of investigation by this Bureau.

OBSERVATIONS:

The outstanding accomplishments of this source certainly deserve recognition. His risks are many and hazardous and the results are of incalculable value. To our knowledge, information furnished by this source is unobtainable from any other source employed by the intelligence agencies of this Government. It is recognized that CG 5824-S* will be called upon to undertake additional Solo missions later this year in connection with the previously mentioned International Conferences of Communist Parties and it is imperative that this valuable source be made to realize that we are cognizant and receptive to his unique accomplishments in this regard. The SAC, Chicago, has recommended that CG 5824-S* receive a \$1,000 award for his accomplishments on Solo Mission 27. We believe and recommend that a \$700 award in this instance would best serve the interest of economy and at the same time sufficiently impress CG 5824-S* with the importance of his work and assure his continued cooperation.

Attached is a letter to SAC, Chicago, instructing him to personally present CG 5824-S* with an award of \$700 and to orally express the Director's appreciation for the source's accomplishments.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be approved and sent.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
- 2 - OK
WES
RM
J

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *Due*
FROM : *C. F.* Downing

DATE: August 15, 1968 *fs*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

On 8/15/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

JLM:trs
(7)
Downing

REC- 51

100-728091-7112

16 AUG 19 1968

EX-105

98 AUG 26 1968

50

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 8/15/68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 8/15/68, there was transmitted to the Soviets from the CP, USA, by way of a NYC drop several ciphered partially coded messages, the plain text of which are as follows:

(1) CC CPSU

Would you please transmit for me the following message to Comrade Henry Winston. He will be our representative to the Czechoslovakian Congress in September. It is possible we may send another delegate there to join Comrade Winston.

Gus Hall
 General Secretary
 CP, USA NC

1cc 9040
 2-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
 1-Chicago (134-46 SUB B) (RM)
 1-New York (134-91) (INV) (41)
 1-New York (105-45740) (CHUCHUKIN) (344)
 1-New York (100-134637) (41)

JFL:fam
 (7)

EX-107
 REC 27

100-428091-7113
 16 AUG 20 1968

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

98 AUG 26 1968

NY 100-134637

(2) CC CPSU

In regard to travel of Paul Albert and family to USSR as tourists, as we both agreed, please remember he is one of our most important comrades. Please notify your comrades in Washington that Arnold Johnson is being sent by me personally to pick up the visas for Paul Albert and his family. Arnold Johnson will give your comrades in Washington, Paul Albert's arrival time in USSR to make sure that all will go well.

Gus Hall
General Secretary
CP, USA NC

(See NY letter dated 7/29/68.)

(3)

As previously agreed to for reasons of security, the Roosevelt Avenue signal (76th St. & Roosevelt Avenue) is checked every morning except on Radio days, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.

(4)

Next personal meet is Elliott (Avenue J Subway Station - BMT)

Next micro transceiver is #1 location, (51st St. & Madison Avenue)

(5)

Drop Karla next. If unavailable use Drop Tara.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637-Sub-C)

8/20/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)-7144
REC 27 EX-1021 - Mr. W.H. Floyd
EX-1021 - Mr. H.A. Grubert

SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

Reurlet 8/14/68.

Authority is granted to interview [redacted]
under secure conditions for the purpose of developing him
for possible utilization in the SOLO apparatus.

Your contact with [redacted] should be made in accordance
with Section 87D, Manual of Instructions. Care should be
taken to preclude the possibility of embarrassment to
the Bureau.

Advise the Bureau of the results and submit
recommendations for further action in this matter.

HAG:srs
(5)

NOTE:

[redacted] is a white male, born [redacted]
who resides in New York City and is employed as an agent
for the [redacted]
He was a member of [redacted] Communist
Party (CP) in 1936 and was one of the [redacted]
[redacted] He held various
[redacted] when he was ousted as president
when the [redacted] influence. In
1953 he became active in the [redacted] and in 1955
attended a New York State CP Legislative Conference. In 1957
he attended the CPUSA National Convention and [redacted]
[redacted] until about
[redacted] in January, 1958, he attended a CP Industrial
Division meeting and later became [redacted]
[redacted] There is no evidence of CP activity on the part of
[redacted] since that time. [redacted] was interviewed under the Toplev
Program on six occasions, the last being on 1/17/66. While

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

98 AUG 28 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SAC, New York
RE: SOLO
100-428091

NOTE CONTINUED:

he can be engaged in general conversation; he has been adamant in his refusal to discuss CP matters. New York requests authority to interview [redacted] under the SOLO program and anticipates using an oblique approach with little or no reference to [redacted] CP affiliations. This interview constitutes part of a program to locate individuals to be developed as informants and utilized in the SOLO apparatus. [redacted] is the type individual the Party would be seeking as a replacement in the SOLO operation. There is a dual purpose for interviewing [redacted] (1) To ascertain if he would be cooperative and (2) should he not be cooperative, the contact by the FBI would tend to neutralize him in connection with Party utilization of him in the SOLO apparatus.

b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 8/14/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637 Sub C)

SUBJECT: SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

[redacted] has been selected for interview under the SOLO Replacement and Neutralization Program.

Background

[redacted] a white male [redacted] and is employed as an [redacted] He had an [redacted] and for a large part of his life had been active in [redacted] He was one of the founders [redacted] held various [redacted] when he was ousted as [redacted]

Subversive Activities

[redacted] was a Communist Party (CP) member as early as [redacted]

In 1953 [redacted] Section and in 1955 attended a [redacted]

In 1957 he attended the [redacted]

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (41)

REC 27

100-428091-7114

JAH:eac
(3)

18 AUG 20 1968



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

59

NY 100-134637-Sub C

The same year he was elected to the [redacted]
a position he held until about [redacted] In January
[redacted] and later
[redacted] There is no
evidence of CP activity on the part of [redacted] that time.

Recommendation

b7D

[redacted] was interviewed under the Toplev Program on six occasions, the last on 1/17/66, and while he can be engaged in general conversation, he has been adamant in his refusal to talk about CP matters.

Bureau authority to interview [redacted] under the SOLO program is hereby requested. It is anticipated that an oblique approach will be used with little or no reference to [redacted] CP affiliations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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